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Abstract 
The oil palm boom has resulted in an unprecedented rate of expansion in the Malaysian state 
of Sarawak. The planted area increased by 40 percent from 2010 to 2015, from 1.0 to 1.4 
million hectares, with an ambitious plan to further increase this figure to two million hectares 
by 2020. However, the profitability and continued growth of this boom crop are heavily reliant 
on two key factors: an abundance of land and labour. The first depends on the conversion of 
large tracts of Native Customary Rights (NCR) land. In 2016, there was officially estimated to 
be 1.5 million hectares of NCR land in Sarawak, of which 328,000 hectares had been converted 
to oil palm, and a further 500,000 hectares was targeted for conversion. There are two main 
State agencies specifically tasked with large-scale oil palm development on NCR land: the 
Sarawak Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority (SALCRA) and the Land Custody 
and Development Authority (LCDA). The former implements managed smallholder schemes 
implemented by a public agency, and the latter negotiates joint venture schemes with private 
plantation companies. The second key factor for expansion is continued access to Indonesian 
migrant labourers, who make up 80 to 90 percent of the plantation workforce.  
The rapid expansion of oil palm plantations in Sarawak has raised fundamental questions about 
the institutional arrangements in place to access NCR land for large-scale conversion, 
especially those that embrace the private sector. This, in turn, has highlighted issues around 
how scheme participation is experienced by NCR landowners and what are the outcomes of 
participating. It also raises the need to understand the conditions for the foreign migrant 
labourers isolated within these plantations. These questions were addressed by undertaking in-
depth case studies of a SALCRA project and an LCDA-brokered joint venture project with the 
global plantation company Rimbunan Hijau in south-western Sarawak. The studies were based 
on 90 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with NCR scheme participants, 26 interviews with 
Indonesian migrant labourers, and interviews with a wide range of key informants. In addition 
to the two main case-study sites, a further seven oil palm estates and 13 participating villages 
were visited with the relevant scheme officials.  
The research found that the expectations and outcomes of participation did not always match. 
In the case of SALCRA, there was a broad range of outcomes. Some well-connected 
participants had access to good employment opportunities, received substantial dividends, and 
received formal land titles, while others had received no financial returns, no land titles, and 
few attractive employment opportunities, even after a decade of participation. However, even 
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though such managed smallholder schemes implemented by public agencies were slow to 
progress, key benefits were still assured. However, the outcomes of participation in the joint-
venture scheme implemented by Rimbunan Hijau were largely negative. NCR landowners felt 
deceived, and conflicts, blockades, court cases, and loss of land were commonplace. The case 
study further revealed that the close relationships between senior politicians and Rimbunan 
Hijau were detrimental to NCR participants. In the case of Indonesian labourers, they were 
found to suffer low wages, long hours, and difficult conditions. Legal migrants were 
preferentially recruited from the distant islands of the Indonesian archipelago, passports 
removed, and movement highly restricted. Conditions for illegal workers varied, from daily 
movement back-and-forth across the international border, to extremely harsh conditions and 
the risk of severe punishment. 
Large-scale agricultural development projects are often heralded as the best method to improve 
rural livelihoods. The findings of this research are significant because they highlight the risks 
for NCR landowners, and migrant labourers, who participate in large-scale oil palm 
development projects in Sarawak. They also cast doubt on whether the large-scale conversion 
of NCR land in Sarawak is for the benefit of rural communities, or simply a mechanism to gain 
access to the last large tracts of suitable land for private gain. These findings are relevant to 
other indigenous communities with untitled land in regions subject to the same development 
pressures.  
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1. INTRODUCTION      
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Research Problem 
The expansion of oil palm in equatorial Southeast Asia over the past several decades has been 
one of the most extensive and controversial land-use transformations ever to occur in the 
region. Palm oil has been the most highly profitable of the tropical oil crops due to its rapid 
growth, high yields, and low cost of production (partly dependent on government policies 
relating to land and labour). Global demand for palm oil has continued to grow, due not only 
to its primary use as cooking oil in countries such as China and India but also to a range of 
other uses from lipstick and chocolates to biofuel. The resulting palm oil boom has seen the 
global planted area increase from 10 million hectares in 2000 to 17 million hectares in 2012 
(Pirker et al. 2016). Indonesia and Malaysia together account for over 80 per cent of global 
palm oil production (Pirker et al. 2016). Indonesia has overtaken Malaysia as the world’s 
largest producer. Over. the last decade, the total planted area in Indonesia has increased by 150 
per cent to be 10.8 million hectares in 2016 (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2015; Pirker 
et al. 2016). The Malaysian Government has long seized upon the increasing global demand 
for palm oil as a prime development opportunity; from only 54,000 hectares in the 1960s, the 
planted area in Malaysia increased over 100-fold to 5.74 million hectares in 2016 (Malaysian 
Palm Oil Board 2017a).  
In recent years much of this growth has been due to expansion in the eastern states of Sabah 
and Sarawak on the island of Borneo. In 2016, Sarawak alone had a planted area of over 1.5 
million hectares (Malaysian Palm Oil Board 2017a). The economic benefits from this rapid 
growth led the Sarawak Government to set a target of one million hectares by 2010 (Majid 
Cooke 2006b), and to double this target to two million hectares by 2020 (Pim 2016). While 
much of this area has been established by private plantations with leases to state land, 
increasingly the Government has turned to land held under traditional or customary tenure by 
farming communities indigenous to Sarawak to achieve its development targets. This land, 
termed Native Customary Land in the Sarawak Land Code and popularly referred to as native 
customary rights (NCR) land, has been subject to a range of government-initiated land 
development schemes to support its rapid conversion to oil palm. 
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There are an estimated 1.5 million hectares of NCR land in Sarawak (Ngidang 2003). The 
government has indicated that to reach its latest land development target, about 500,000 
hectares of recognised NCR land are required for conversion (Ching 2015). Such rapid and 
extensive development of NCR land has wide-ranging social, economic, and environmental 
implications for rural communities. These impacts are compounded by the fact that the 
profitability and continued growth of this boom crop are heavily reliant on access to an 
abundance of cheap land and labour (Khoo & Chandramohan 2002). Yet relatively few studies 
have been carried out that examine how participation in oil palm development has been 
experienced by NCR landowners or plantation labourers in the different types of land 
development scheme. This study was undertaken to help fill this gap. 
There have been two main institutional arrangement for incorporating NCR land in oil palm 
plantations in Sarawak – one an example of public-sector-led development and the other of 
private-sector-led development. The first has been termed the “government-managed 
smallholder approach” as implemented primarily by the Sarawak Land Consolidation and 
Rehabilitation Authority (SALCRA) since the mid-1970s (Blandoi 2002; Banerjee & Bojsen 
2005; King 2005; Cramb 2007; Sarawak Development Institute 2009). The second is the “joint-
venture approach”, brokered primarily by the Land Custody and Development Authority 
(LCDA), which enters into joint ventures with private plantation companies on behalf of NCR 
landowners (Ngidang 2002; Bulan 2006; Majid Cooke 2006b; Cramb 2011; Majid Cooke et 
al. 2011b; Cramb 2013a). This approach has been implemented since the mid-1990s. The 
studies cited above have primarily focused on the policy issues surrounding these land 
development schemes but have also highlighted issues facing the NCR landowners. These 
range from the length of time it has taken to receive any financial benefits in SALCRA schemes 
to the insecurity of tenure and uncertainty over income streams with the LCDA joint-venture 
approach (Cramb 2013b; Cramb & Sujang 2016). 
This study focuses on assessing how participation in large-scale oil palm development has been 
experienced by NCR landowners in each of these types of project and determining the degree 
to which the outcomes of participation have matched or fallen short of initial expectations. 
Participation, as outlined by Gillespie (2012 p. 254), is a process “that brings stakeholders 
together to define issues and create mutually beneficial outcomes.” In Sarawak, the government 
and both SALCRA and LCDA have spruiked wide-ranging benefits to NCR landowners from 
scheme participation, including increased employment and incomes (Ministry of Land 
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Development 1997; SALCRA 2003). The study aimed to get beyond this political narrative by 
exploring the perceptions and experiences of a range of NCR landholders in specific settings.  
With the expansion of large-scale oil palm developments there has been a rapid growth in the 
employment of migrant Indonesian workers in Sarawak. It is estimated that Indonesian labour 
accounts for around 80 per cent of the plantation workforce in Sarawak. This applies to private 
plantations as well as to the NCR land schemes managed by both SALCRA and LCDA, 
notwithstanding the repeated claims that the schemes will create employment for rural 
Sarawakians. These migrant Indonesian labourers face a “precarious labour regime” (Pye et al. 
2012, p.330) fraught by low wages, long hours, and difficult working conditions (Li 2011; Pye 
et al. 2012; Li 2016; Sanderson 2016). However, the outcomes of their participation in the 
Malaysian oil palm sector have been variable. An additional task of this study, therefore, was 
to investigate the experiences and perspectives of the Indonesian migrant labourers working on 
NCR land developments in Sarawak.  
Research Aim and Objectives  
The overall aim of this research was to investigate the processes and livelihood impacts of 
participation in large-scale oil palm development on Native Customary Land in Sarawak. The 
specific objectives were as follows: 
1. Analyse the processes involved in the two main institutional arrangements for large-
scale oil palm development on NCR land – the managed smallholder approach of 
SALCRA and the joint-venture approach of LCDA. 
2. Assess how participation in these two types of scheme has been experienced by NCR 
landowners and the degree to which the outcomes matched their initial expectations. 
3. Investigate the motivations and experience of Indonesian migrant workers in large-
scale oil palm developments on NCR land.  
Research Approach 
To maintain the focus on the perspectives and experience of local-level actors – landholders 
and plantation workers – the livelihoods framework was used to structure the research. This 
framework conceptualises livelihoods from the perspective of the people living them 
(Chambers & Conway 1992; Scoones 1998; Ellis 2000). It not only considers the various ways 
an individual makes a living but also looks at the household and community resources, the 
trends and shocks in the immediate environment, and the institutional and policy constraints 
 20 
that can help or hinder the pursuit of livelihoods (Scoones 1998; Ellis 2006). Such 
considerations are especially important in Sarawak due to the nature of village consensus and 
the large-scale, top-down approach to the government’s development programs. The 
livelihoods approach helped to highlight the processes and outcomes of participation, the 
response of the various actors involved, and how their livelihoods were ultimately affected.   
Within the livelihoods framework, a case-study approach was chosen to investigate the 
processes and impacts of oil palm development on NCR land. The case-study approach was 
well-suited to investigating the complex relationships that exist between participant 
households, land development agencies, private-sector actors, and the political and economic 
context of an oil palm scheme, allowing in-depth analysis of how scheme participation was 
experienced (Yin 2009). The scale of analysis was set at the level of a particular oil palm 
scheme or project as this served to highlight issues of land access, employment, social relations, 
and political institutions as they played out in a specific context. This was especially important 
in the case of oil palm schemes as they involved the conversion of large tracts of customary 
land (typically including several villages), previously supporting a mosaic of uses and subject 
to an array of rights and obligations, to a centrally-managed and semi-permanent monoculture.  
The study region selected was the Bau-Lundu region in the south-western corner of Sarawak. 
The region was chosen because it is an area of on-going oil palm expansion and contains 
examples of all the major modes of oil palm development on NCR land, from smallholders, to 
managed smallholders, to joint-venture schemes. It also includes private plantations, including 
one of the largest oil palm companies in Malaysia (Rimbunan Hijau), some of which have been 
involved in disputes over encroachment onto NCR land. This region was also close to the 
Indonesian border, allowing a range of migration methods by Indonesian labourers seeking 
employment on Sarawak’s plantations.  
Within this region, two villages were selected as case studies – Kampung Opar, a participant 
in SALCRA’s Bratak Oil Palm Scheme, and Kampung Selampit, a participant in the Raya 
Plantation, a joint venture brokered by LCDA. Multiple methods were used to develop an 
understanding of these two cases, including documentary research, structured and semi-
structured interviews, key informant interviews, and participatory observation. A cross-case 
comparison was then conducted to deepen understanding of the processes and impacts of 
participation under different institutional arrangements, helping to meet the first two research 
objectives. The case-study sites were also used to interview Indonesian plantation workers in 
fulfilment of the third objective. 
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Thesis Overview 
To place the research problem in its larger context, in Chapter 2 I review the processes of 
globalisation, agrarian change, and frontier development in Southeast Asia and the implications 
for rural livelihoods and access to land. I also trace the large-scale commercial expansion of 
oil palm in Malaysia as a whole. In Chapter 3 I briefly outline the Sarawak context, giving 
particular attention to the nature of customary tenure and its treatment in the land laws of 
Sarawak. I then describe the evolution of different modes of oil palm development on 
customary land since the 1970s. The approach and methods used for the case study analysis 
are outlined in Chapter 4. The study region and the case-study villages are described and the 
procedures and techniques used in each case study are itemised. 
The following three chapters present the case studies that address the three research objectives. 
In Chapter 5 the SALCRA managed smallholder scheme in the Bidayuh village of Opar is 
explored. In Chapter 6 the LCDA-brokered joint-venture scheme involving the Bidayuh village 
of Selampit and the plantation company, Rimbunan Hijau, is analysed. As this scheme was part 
of Rimbunan Hijau’s larger Raya Plantation, involving various novel arrangements for 
landholders to participate, the case study went beyond an analysis of the joint-venture model 
as outlined in government documents. The final case study, giving a Sarawakian perspective 
on Indonesian labour migration, is presented in Chapter 7.   
The three cases are examined together and implications drawn in the following discussion 
chapter (Chapter 8) and a short concluding chapter (Chapter 9) sums up the findings of the 
research. 
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2.  AGRARIAN CHANGE AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
CHAPTER 2 
AGRARIAN CHANGE AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS 
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
In this chapter, I review the processes of globalisation and agrarian change that are affecting 
customary landholders throughout the Southeast Asian region and beyond. I then consider how 
rural households respond to these changed circumstances by pursuing various livelihood 
strategies. The potential conflict between customary tenure and the growing profitability of 
frontier development in the region is then examined, before going on to review the particular 
features of the oil palm boom that have generated the controversies surrounding large-scale oil 
palm development on customary land that are the focus of this thesis. 
Globalisation and the Agrarian Transition  
Globalisation affects the lives of the vast majority of the world’s population, from subsistence 
farmers in developing nations to the consumers of commodities in distant, developed countries 
(Sklair 2006). It can be loosely defined as the increase in activities that cross national borders, 
whether they be economic, political, technological, social, or cultural (Goldin 2006). It has also 
been conceptualised as “the spread of ‘supraterritorial’ or ‘transborder’ relations” (Scholte 
1997). The activities linked to this process increasingly impact upon the lives of rural 
communities by rapidly, and often radically, changing their “livelihoods landscape”. 
According to Scholte (1997), the main driver of globalisation is capitalist enterprises in pursuit 
of (a) lower costs of labour, regulation, and taxation; (b) larger markets; and (c) new avenues 
to accumulate tangible and intangible assets.  
Rapid technological progress and the gradual easing of international trade barriers have helped 
to accelerate the pace of globalisation (Sklair 2006), resulting in a “global market” reflecting 
the increasing ease and hence growth of transborder relations (Scholte 1997). These relations 
reduce production costs for commercial enterprises as companies can situate their production 
operations wherever they are cheapest (e.g., regarding land, labour, and regulatory 
frameworks) (Scholte 1997). Global sourcing then enables these commercial enterprises to 
obtain the cheapest materials or resources they require from anywhere in the world. A prime 
example of these global market chains is the palm oil industry. The profitability of this industry 
is dependent on plantations being developed in regions that have an abundance of cheap land 
and labour  (Khoo & Chandramohan 2002) and minimal effective regulation. As a result, oil 
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palm plantations are established in regions such as the forest frontiers of Malaysia and 
Indonesia and measures are put in place to draw in large numbers of migrant workers from 
impoverished areas with few employment options.  
Globalisation is linked to the process of structural change known as the agrarian transition. 
Earlier studies focused on the transformation from subsistence agriculture to commercial 
agriculture, which occurs in close connection with urban industrial development (Goodman & 
Redclift 1981). More recent discussion, however, emphasises the “progressive shift from farm 
to non-farm” activities (Rigg 2005). The latter emphasis highlights the profound change in 
rural livelihood strategies over recent decades, whereby even commercial agriculture is no 
longer the sole activity of many households (Rigg 2005). However, the three main catalysts of 
agrarian transition still derive from agriculture:  (a) the development of large-scale capitalist 
farming; (b) the establishment of large-scale state-initiated or state-run agricultural schemes; 
and (c) the emergence of capital-intensive smallholder farming (Harriss 1992). Each of these 
changes is primarily brought about by increased export demand that has arisen from economic 
growth and “global sourcing”. Agrarian transition is further driven by the “globalisation of 
culture”, in which mass media and the internet expose rural households to often radically 
different social and cultural norms (Sklair 2006). 
The pace of this transition is uneven and results in a mixed landscape of large-scale agricultural 
schemes, agrarian entrepreneurs, subsistence farmers, semi-subsistence farmers, part-time 
farmers, and smallholders (Rigg 2005). As outlined in Table 1, the stages of agrarian transition 
are characterised by whether farming is subsistence- or commercially-oriented, the scale and 
professionalism of farms, and the extent to which non-farm activities or migration are also 
employed. Rigg (2005) states that most rural households in Southeast Asia are semi-subsistence 
(Type 2) or pluriactive (Type 3), although he predicts a rapid transition to professional farming 
(Type 4).  
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Table 1 The framework of agrarian transition in Southeast Asia. 
Agrarian type Characteristics 
1. Subsistence Farming and village focused; some barter and sale of surplus. 
2. Semi-subsistence Combination of subsistence with commercially-oriented 
agriculture; livelihoods remain farming- and village-focused. 
3. Pluriactive    
(post-peasant) 
Combination of subsistence- and commercially-oriented 
agriculture with various non-farm activities, both on-farm and off-
farm. Migration and the delocalisation of work are increasingly 
significant. 
4. Professional Professional farming and the emergence of agrarian entrepreneurs. 
Larger scale, commercial enterprises utilising high levels of 
inputs, a tight integration into national and international markets, 
and technology-intensive. The size and level of production allow 
farmers to make a living from farming alone. 
5. Pluriactive    
(post-productive, neo-
peasant) 
Return or adaptation of pluriactivity as part-time farmers make a 
lifestyle choice and combine farming with other occupations, 
trading higher income for a better quality of life. 
6. Remnant 
smallholder 
Rural households who remain tied to the land and traditional 
production systems. Production is low, subsistence orientation still 
significant, and poverty high. 
Source: Adapted from Rigg (2005). 
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Rural Livelihoods  
The livelihoods framework  
The emergence of different types of rural household as globalisation and the agrarian transition 
proceed can be understood within the rural livelihoods framework. This framework is useful 
in tracing the processes and impacts of change, such as large-scale agricultural development, 
at the level of rural households and communities. It focuses on the competence, strengths, 
potential, and capacities of rural households, rather than their weaknesses and needs (Kirkby 
et al. 2001). This framework outlines the inter-related influences that affect rural households 
and highlights the assets, activities, and access that these households mobilise to pursue a 
sustainable living (Ellis 2000). It also enables one to better understand the complex and 
dynamic processes that may either help or hinder an individual’s livelihood strategies (Scoones 
1998).  A livelihood, as defined by Ellis (2000, p.10), comprises “… the assets (natural, 
physical, human, financial and social capital), the activities, and the access to these (mediated 
by institutions and social relations) that together determine the living gained by the individual 
or household.” It is considered to be “sustainable” when the household can maintain or enhance 
its assets and capabilities, and cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, while not 
undermining the natural resource base (Scoones 1998).  
As Figure 1 illustrates, the livelihoods framework starts by determining an individual’s or 
household’s assets. Assets are the resources or “capital” that an individual either owns or has 
access to (Scoones 1998). They can be broadly divided into five groups: natural (e.g. land, 
water), physical (e.g. infrastructure), human (e.g. labour), financial (e.g. money, loans), and 
social (e.g. networks) (Figure 1: column A) (Ellis 2000). Access to them is governed by an 
individual’s social relations and institutional and organisational constraints (Figure 1; column 
B). Understanding these constraints is particularly important as they can present rigid 
restrictions to some livelihood strategies by limiting access to resources (e.g. policy restrictions 
on land tenure) (Scoones 1998). Access is further influenced by the greater context of social, 
political, and economic trends, and external stressors and shocks such as drought and disease 
(Figure 1: column C).  By understanding an individual’s or household’s livelihood assets and 
their access to them, we can better understand the activities (farm and non-farm) that make up 
a given livelihood strategy (Figure 1: columns D and E), and the “layers of resilience” that 
enable them to cope with the stressors due to large-scale change (Glavovic et al. 2002). 
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Figure 1 The Livelihoods Framework. Adapted from Ellis (2000 p.30). 
In the livelihoods framework, the rural household is considered to be the primary social and 
economic unit (Ellis 2000). This is because the household is at the centre of decisions about 
livelihood strategies in most rural communities (Tomich et al. 1995). The term “livelihood 
strategies” in what follows is used to refer to household strategies unless otherwise stated.   
Changing rural livelihoods in Southeast Asia 
Rural livelihoods in Southeast Asian countries are undergoing an unprecedented rate of 
transition. Many common assumptions about rural households are being challenged by a 
growing body of literature that is revealing how they adapt to change. Rural communities are 
often defined in terms of their attachment to the land and rural livelihoods are assumed to 
remain inextricably linked to farm-based activities (Rigg 2006). In some circles, there is also a 
feeling that rural people should remain on the land and engaged in farming, and that when this 
does not occur things are perceived as going wrong (Rigg 2006). This idealistic and in some 
ways romantic notion can be quite different to the way that rural communities actually feel. 
The combined influence of education, mass media, and consumerism is greatly changing how 
rural communities view their livelihood strategies.  
In rural communities, particularly in East Asia, farming has increasingly become a livelihood 
strategy of the older generation (Rigg 2006). The younger generation enthusiastically strives 
to build a future that does not involve hands-on farming. Education is seen as the best strategy 
for parents to help their children move away from the land and into higher-skilled non-farm 
employment. For example, in East Laguna in the Philippines, providing children with the 
Livelihood 
Strategies 
A        B            C           D    E       F 
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means to obtain the skills and education necessary to move away from farming was found to 
be highly important to parents (Hayami & Kikuchi, 2000, cited in Rigg 2006). Rather than pass 
their land on to their children as an inheritance, some preferred to mortgage it to provide the 
funds needed for their children to “escape” farming. Such actions also have great cultural 
significance as they reveal a shift from viewing land as a cultural asset to an economic one.  
As a result, where once rural livelihoods were characterised by subsistence farming and strong 
ties to the land, they are now rapidly evolving in response to factors like improved 
infrastructure, reduced access to land, and the growth of the wage-based economy. At a 
household level, this transition has been overlooked by some researchers who tended to predict 
a narrow, static, and somewhat bleak outlook for rural communities in response to such changes 
(Blaikie et al. 2002; Rigg 2006). However, rural livelihood strategies are proving to be dynamic 
and constantly changing to adapt to the influences of the larger global economy. Some of the 
key directions of this transition, as outlined by Rigg (2006) are: (1) Livelihood strategies in 
rural communities are diversifying, and pursuing multiple strategies is becoming common. (2) 
There is a shift from farm to non-farm in the balance of household income. (3) Rural livelihoods 
are becoming delocalized and removed from the land as mobility increases. However, it must 
be pointed out that these changes in livelihood strategies do not occur at the same pace between 
rural households or across rural communities.  
Livelihood strategies 
The changes associated with the agrarian transition have resulted in an increasingly diverse 
range of livelihood strategies undertaken by rural households in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. 
The strategies chosen largely depend upon the assets that a household has access to. For 
example, wealthy households have access to more land, labour, and financial capital, enabling 
them to pursue a diversified strategy with commercial agriculture and non-farm business. 
Poorer households may have relatively abundant family labour but limited access to other 
assets, forcing them to depend on wage labour, whether locally or as migrant workers  (Tomich 
et al. 1995). Within the livelihoods framework, livelihood strategies have been classified into 
three broad clusters: agricultural intensification, livelihood diversification, and migration 
(Carswell 1997; McDowell & de Haan 1997; Hussein & Nelson 1998; Scoones 1998). 
(a) Agricultural intensification. This strategy is pursued in response to either a reduction in 
available land resources or an increase in demand for output (Hussein & Nelson 1998). The 
resulting increase in agricultural output (i.e. the value of output per hectare) can be due to 
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capital-led intensification and/or labour-led intensification (Hussein & Nelson 1998). Capital-
led intensification involves the use of external inputs (i.e. finance, purchased farm inputs, 
capital equipment and machinery) whereas labour-led intensification is based primarily on 
greater use of human resources (Scoones 1998).   
(b) Livelihood diversification. Rural livelihood diversification is defined as “the process by 
which a household constructs an increasingly diverse portfolio of activities and assets in order 
to survive and to improve their standard of living” Ellis (2000). There is a wide range of factors 
that prompt livelihood diversification, from necessity (e.g. coping with stressors and shocks) 
to choice (e.g. opportunity for accumulation of assets) (Kabeer & Thi Van Anh 2000).  
With the advent of improved infrastructure, access to media, and dwindling land supplies, the 
majority of rural communities are now as wage-based as urban areas (Rigg 2006). Improved 
infrastructure has led to increased mobility and the “delocalization” of rural communities (Rigg 
2006). This has also driven the rapid diversification of livelihood strategies by giving 
household members increased access to different employment opportunities. In many rural 
households, farming alone no longer provides enough for comfortable subsistence, so 
additional income sources must be sought (Ellis 2000). These may include farm income (e.g. 
selling produce), off-farm income (e.g. wage labour on other farms), and non-farm income (e.g. 
urban wage-labour or rural business) (Ellis 2000). 
Non-farm activities are becoming increasingly important as a result of changing rural 
conditions. While agricultural intensification remains a significant livelihood strategy, it is no 
longer the central one in many rural communities. In a rice village in the Philippines, non-farm 
household income had risen from 13 to 64 per cent over two decades, while farming income 
had declined from almost 90 per cent to just 36 per cent (Rigg 2006). A similar shift was 
reported in the Central Plains of Thailand, where 57 per cent of households had multiple 
occupations, including at least one non-farm income (Molle et al. 2002). Non-farm incomes in 
India also rose from 19 to 48 per cent from 1971 to 1999 (Foster & Rosenzweig 2004).  
However, the greatest shift was revealed in surveys over 1996-1998 in six African countries 
(Ethiopia, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe), showing that 60 to 80 per 
cent of rural household income was derived from non-farm activities (Bryceson 2002).  
(c) Labour migration. Labour migration and mobility are key factors in the diversification of 
rural livelihoods (Rigg 2006). Migration is generally chosen when agricultural intensification 
has been limited and other forms of rural livelihood diversification such as off-farm work or 
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rural business are absent (Bebbington 1999). In many low-income countries, wage migration 
is a key livelihood strategy for the majority of households as individuals within the household 
actively search for wage-based opportunities to support the household as a whole (Ellis & 
Freeman 2005). Migration may be either voluntary or forced, dependent upon the specific 
circumstances of a household (McDowell & de Haan 1997). There is also a range of types of 
labour migration: rural-rural, rural-urban, international, ‘development-induced’, and 
‘economic-forced’ (McDowell & de Haan 1997). Each type can contribute to reducing the 
overall vulnerability of a household to stressors and shocks, while also potentially increasing 
its assets (Norton et al. 2006). For example, in the Philippines, labourers have been enticed to 
migrate to other provinces by the higher agricultural wages offered there (Kelly 1999). This 
form of rural-rural migration can result from a “labour gap” in the destination site, created by 
locals choosing to embark on their own rural-urban migration strategy to seek better non-farm 
opportunities in urban centres.  
In this research, rural-urban and international migration were the main forms of migration 
encountered, the first undertaken by rural households in the study sites in Sarawak and the 
second by Indonesian plantation workers migrating to plantations in Sarawak. These two forms 
of migration also incorporate aspects of the “development-induced” and “economic-forced” 
strategies.  
Rural-urban migration is a key indicator of the agrarian transition and the shift from a 
subsistence to a wage-based economy (Norton et al. 2006). The pace of urbanisation in regions 
like Sarawak has been rapid, increasing from just 16 per cent of the population in 1970 to 54 
per cent in 2010 (Department of Statistics Malaysia 2017). The majority of these rural-urban 
migrants are young and single. The migration of the younger generation in search of non-farm 
activities has led to a strong decrease in reliance on farming as the primary livelihood strategy 
(Bryceson 2002; Rigg 2006) It has also meant that household income is not strictly tied to land 
holdings and productivity of agricultural crops. This is partially due to young migrants sending 
remittances to their families in the village (Rigg 2006). However, the benefits obtained from 
migration are not evenly spread. Research into rich rural households in India found that those 
with large landholdings also had greater access to non-farm employment due to their initial 
wealth and ability to nurture social connections (Jeffrey 2000), whereas poor rural-urban 
migrants did not have the same social connections or access to non-farm employment, and so 
remained in unskilled, low-paying jobs. 
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In the last three decades, international labour migration in Asia has gone from being 
considered insignificant to being of great social, economic, and political importance (Hugo 
1997). As globalisation increases the demand for cheap labour in producing countries, the 
prevalence of international migration has also increased. In the case of Malaysia, poor workers 
from neighbouring Indonesia and the Philippines migrate in search of better livelihood 
opportunities, both legally and illegally. Most are young and unskilled. The Indonesian 
Government sees such migration as a way to address domestic unemployment, promote 
economic growth, and increase foreign exchange (Kaur 2004). The Government has even set 
targets to drive this, for example, a target of 2.8 million outgoing migrant workers for the period 
1999-2003 (0.7 million p.a.). However, in 2007 alone there were estimated to be 2.7 million 
Indonesian migrant workers abroad (International Organization for Migration 2010a), the 
majority of whom were channelled into work as low-skilled labourers in manufacturing, 
agriculture, or domestic services in neighbouring Malaysia (Kaur 2004).  
International migrant labour is so significant in Malaysia that illegal immigrants are loosely 
institutionalised into the system. For example, the Malaysian state of Sabah uses 
documentation and census to incorporate illegal migrant workers from the Philippines (Sadiq 
2005). In other Southeast Asian countries, the situation appears to be similar. For example, in 
Laos surveys done in three border villages into the mobility of illegal migrant workers found 
that between three and 13 per cent of these villagers were illegally employed in Thailand 
(Phetsiriseng 2001). Most were young and employed in low-wage positions like factory work, 
domestic work, construction, entertainment, and farm-based wage labour, and often were at 
high risk of exploitation. In some of the study villages, the migration of young workers was so 
large that it also impacted upon the domestic agricultural labour force (Phetsiriseng 2001).   
Land Tenure and Frontier Development 
The impact of large-scale agricultural development on rural livelihoods is closely related to the 
institutions governing access to land, particularly on the forest frontier. The processes of 
globalisation and agricultural transition increase the need for clearly-defined land boundaries 
and transparent land tenure arrangements as land resources become limited and land takes on 
a market value, not only for rural households but for large corporations. Land tenure systems 
are an integral part of the social, economic, and political structures that govern agricultural 
development (Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2002). Land policies 
and land tenure systems are established to determine who has rights of access to land and 
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natural resources and who can exercise control over its management (Eaton 2005). Land tenure 
can be defined as: 
The relationship, whether legally or customarily defined, among people, as individuals 
or groups, with respect to land. Land tenure is an institution, i.e., rules invented by 
societies to regulate behaviour. Rules of tenure define how property rights to land are 
to be allocated within society. They define how access is granted to rights to use, 
control, and transfer land, as well as associated responsibilities and restraints (Food & 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2002).  
Put simply, tenure is the rights and patterns of control over land (Norton et al. 2006).  
Traditional or customary tenure in Southeast Asia can incorporate rights to cultivate land, hunt, 
fish, and collect forest products, rights of transfer and inheritance, and rights to use land for 
ceremonial or burial purposes (Bulan 2006). Furthermore, in customary systems, the clearing 
and cultivation of primary forest confers permanent rights on the original clearer, regardless of 
whether it continues to be cultivated. Traditional land tenure systems evolved in a vastly 
different physical and political environment to that of modern nation-states. As such, they can 
differ substantially from statutory tenure systems, with their emphasis on mapped boundaries, 
exclusive ownership, and continuous productive use. Customary and statutory tenure systems 
thus serve different social, cultural, and economic concepts and interests (Deddy 2006) and 
readily come into conflict. 
Different land tenure systems can coexist if land resources are abundant and boundaries and 
rights are clearly agreed upon by all stakeholders. However, competing interests soon emerge 
when land resources have the potential to be profitably developed in response to global 
commodity markets. When conflicts arise, as is increasingly the case in Malaysia and 
Indonesia, they are usually between customary landowners and the state (Deddy 2006). This is 
because customary lands often overlap with state-created property rights. To compound 
matters, countries that still have abundant natural resources (i.e. forested land) generally do not 
have the means to monitor these boundaries, even if they are agreed upon. In such countries, 
the state-driven push for national economic development generally follows similar stages. 
Initially, in response to global market demands, export commodities such as timber are 
extracted until supplies are exhausted, at which time land is typically converted to large-scale 
agriculture (Majid Cooke 2006b, 2006a). During the initial stage of development (based on 
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natural resource extraction) these regions are viewed as resource frontiers to be exploited at 
will.  
The concept of frontier development reflects a “colonial-style” view of a region and the 
relationship between the colonising people, customary landowners, and the natural 
environment (Furniss 2005). The “frontier mentality” generally results in benefits for the 
“colonisers” and negative outcomes for both the landowners and the natural environment. For 
example, up until the mid-1990s, the Indonesian provinces and Malaysian states in Borneo 
were labelled as resource frontier regions (Brookfield et al. 1995). From the 1970s to the mid-
1990s this “frontier” mentality resulted the aggressive pursuit of timber exploitation. This 
stemmed from the “boom or bust” mentality of policymakers and a “get rich quick” attitude on 
the part of entrepreneurs (Majid Cooke 2006a). This mentality led to widespread negligent 
logging practices and the frequent occurrence of predatory logging beyond licensed boundaries 
(Majid Cooke 2006a). Even in areas where customary lands were clearly defined, they were 
often ignored due to the limited likelihood of legal repercussions.  
The present-day situation for customary landholders in these countries has not improved. While 
there has been a transition from timber exploitation to large-scale private plantations, the rights 
of traditional landowners are still neglected. Instead, as state spaces have become increasingly 
scarce, the pressure to develop “idle” customary lands has dramatically increased (Majid Cooke 
2006b). State policy now actively encourages large-scale commercial development on 
customary land in the Borneo jurisdictions, exposing rural communities to a wide range of 
impacts brought about by the rapid pace of change and the loss of their land rights. The 
profitability of oil palm has been the primary factor driving this expansion. 
The Oil Palm Boom 
The oil palm (Elaeis guineensis) is a tropical species of West Africa, where local communities 
have a wide range of daily uses for it, such as for medicines, palm wine, and woven material 
(Clay 2004). Palm oil has also long dominated traditional cooking in West Africa, an influence 
that spread to Brazil and other countries that participated in the African slave trade (Clay 2004). 
Oil palms were either intercropped with other annual and perennial species or planted in slash-
and-burn gardens that were left to revert to forest cover (Clay 2004). Oil palm was traditionally 
cultivated for both household use and regional trade. Even today it is still primarily cultivated 
for domestic use in West Africa. This is highlighted by the case of Nigeria, which in 2000 had 
approximately 30 per cent of the world’s planted area (3 million hectares) but still produced 
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solely for domestic consumption (Clay 2004). Despite Nigeria having a substantial planted 
area, by 2002 only 362,000 hectares were in large-scale commercial production (Casson 2003). 
The remaining planted area is made up of palms that are harvested from a wild or semi-wild 
state. 
The oil palm industry has grown rapidly from its origins in small-scale subsistence 
intercropping in West Africa to large-scale commercial monocultures in Southeast Asia. This 
expansion is due to its rapid growth rates (modern hybrids will yield fruit in less than three 
years and have a ~30-year life cycle), high yields, and vast array of high-value industrial end-
uses (Casson 2003). Palm oil has both food and non-food applications, from lipsticks, candy, 
and cooking oil, to machine lubricants and the burgeoning biofuels industry. The global surge 
in palm oil consumption has made it the world’s largest traded edible oil (ProForest & ISIS 
Asset Management 2003). This strong global demand has led to significant changes in the land-
use and agricultural practices of numerous nations, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Colombia, 
Papua New Guinea, and Nigeria. The two main producing countries are Malaysia and 
Indonesia, and the largest importers are China, the European Union, India, and Pakistan 
(Home-Grown Cereals Authority 2007; Malaysian Palm Oil Council 2007). Obtained by 
crushing the fresh fruit bunches of the oil palm, these exports primarily consist of crude palm 
oil, palm kernel oil, palm kernel cake, oleochemicals, and other finished products.  
Initially introduced as an ornamental plant in 1875, oil palm was first planted commercially in 
Malaysia by a French entrepreneur in his Tennamaram Estate in Selangor in 1917 (Malaysian 
Palm Oil Board 2017a). Thus 2017 marked the centenary of the palm oil industry in Malaysia. 
Following this initial planting, the Malaysian oil palm sector grew to become the largest palm 
oil producer in the world, until it was overtaken by Indonesia in the late 1990s. The vast 
majority of the current global expansion has occurred in Malaysia and Indonesia (Pirker et al. 
2016). By 2016 Indonesia had the largest planted area at 10.8 million hectares, followed by 
Malaysia with 5.7 million hectares (United States Department of Agriculture Foreign 
Agricultural Service 2015; Malaysian Palm Oil Board 2017a). Together they accounted for 81 
per cent of the total global planted area and a higher proportion of global output. Apart from 
these two countries, the main producing countries are Colombia, Papua New Guinea, 
Guatemala, and Brazil (Department of Statistics Malaysia 2016). 
The success of oil palm plantations in Indonesia and Malaysia suggests that the other countries 
listed will possibly undergo the same process of rapid expansion, especially as land resources 
become increasingly scarce in Indonesia and Malaysia. The private sector will drive this 
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expansion in response to shortages in the main resources required for profitable oil palm 
plantations – cheap land and labour – as highlighted in a report produced by the Malaysian 
Palm Oil Board (MPOB), “expansion is however limited by the increasing scarcity of two 
essential inputs: land and labour” (Khoo & Chandramohan 2002, p. 12). The push by plantation 
companies to find low-cost production sites will continue to motivate them to push into less-
developed regions to maintain their profitability. The success of oil palm companies will 
encourage other countries to pursue economic development via the plantation sector, as is 
already the case in Papua New Guinea (Vermeulen & Goad 2006), Myanmar (Al-Bazzaz 
2006), Thailand (AP Food Technology 2004), and the Philippines (Food Production Daily 
2002). Meanwhile, Malaysian companies have aggressively pursued all avenues of expansion 
on the forest frontiers of both Malaysia and Indonesia. Of the total planted area of 5.74 million 
hectares in 2016, Peninsular Malaysia, the original heartland of the industry, had an area of 
2.68 million hectares and growth has slowed considerably (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 Increase in planted area of oil palm in Malaysia by region, 1975-2016 (Source: Malaysian Palm Oil 
Board 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2017b). 
The Borneo states, Sabah and Sarawak, on the other hand were continuing to expand. Sabah 
had the largest planted area of any state, increasing by just over 20 per cent from 1.24 million 
hectares in 2006 to 1.55 million hectares in 2016. In Sarawak, economic development was 
driven by the timber boom from the 1970s to the mid-1990s, at which point the pace of oil 
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palm development greatly increased (Majid Cooke 2006a). The planted area went from only 
14,000 hectares in 1975 to over 1.5 million hectares in 2016, of which over 60 per cent occurred 
in the last decade (Malaysian Palm Oil Board 2017b). Thus, Sarawak has become the last 
frontier of oil palm expansion within Malaysia and now accounts for 26 per cent of the total 
planted area in the country. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the broader processes of globalisation and agrarian change that affect 
rural livelihoods in Southeast Asia. In Sarawak, this change is set against the rapid rate of large-
scale oil palm development, which has left customary landowners in a precarious position. The 
frontier mentality of both the state agencies and private sector towards customary land has only 
been exacerbated by the profitability of this agricultural boom. The following chapter outlines 
the Sarawak context for oil palm development on customary land, details customary tenure, 
land laws, and the main modes of oil palm development on customary land over the last four 
decades.  
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3. OIL PALM DEVELOPMENT ON CUSTOMARY LAND IN SARAWAK 
CHAPTER 3 
OIL PALM DEVELOPMENT ON CUSTOMARY LAND IN SARAWAK 
“Large-scale development is not a ploy to take land away from the owners, 
but a genuine long-term plan to bring them into the development 
mainstream.”1 
The processes of globalisation, agrarian transition, frontier development, and the extensive 
growth of oil palm have all come to bear on the ownership and use of customary land in 
Sarawak, giving rise to complex and often controversial relations between customary 
landowners, state agencies, and the private sector. In this chapter, I briefly outline the Sarawak 
context, explain the nature of customary tenure and its treatment in the land laws of Sarawak, 
and describe the different organisational modes of oil palm development on customary land 
over the past 40 years. 
Land and People 
Sarawak encompasses the north-west segment of the island of Borneo and is the largest 
Malaysian state by area (Figure 3). It is bordered to the south and east by Indonesia, and to the 
north-east by Brunei Darussalam and the second largest Malaysian state, Sabah. It has had an 
interesting and unique history. Up to the first part of the nineteenth century, it was controlled 
by the Sultanate of Brunei. From 1841 to 1941 it came under the rule of the Brooke family’s 
three “White Rajahs”, who governed from the capital, Kuching (Bulan 2006). Sarawak fell 
under Japanese occupation from 1941 to 1945. It became a British Colony in 1946 and finally 
a state in the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 (Cramb & Wills 1990). This political history has 
had unique and long-term ramifications for the nature of land tenure, land access, and large-
scale agricultural development. 
Sarawak has a similar biogeography to its neighbours, and its indigenous groups are closely 
related (Eaton 2005). People have inhabited the island of Borneo for at least 40,000 years. They 
most likely arrived over land bridges from the Southeast Asian Mainland during the interglacial 
periods of the Pleistocene (MacKinnon et al. 1997). The earliest evidence of human settlement 
                                               
1 Deputy Chief Minister of Sarawak, The Daily Express, 6 July 2005. 
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has been found in Niah Cave. Since that time there have been various waves of migration, 
including the expansion of Austronesian speakers from Taiwan through the Philippines about 
4,000 years ago. Austronesian languages are now spoken throughout the island. The original 
inhabitants were the various Dayak groups, who adapted to hunting and gathering in the 
rainforest environment and eventually adopted shifting cultivation of rice and other crops. The 
practice of residing in longhouses was a feature of these groups. Some Dayak groups such as 
the Kayan and Iban became warlike and expansive at the expense of other groups, especially 
the hunter-gatherers. The coastal plains were later settled by Malay traders and farmers who 
brought Islam to the Dayak populations in the vicinity of the coast (who thus “became Malay”), 
and by Chinese in search of natural riches like gold (MacKinnon et al. 1997). The colourful 
diversity that makes up the people of Borneo is thus epitomised by the population of Sarawak. 
 
Figure 3 Map of Malaysia, showing Peninsular Malaysia in the west and the Borneo states, Sarawak and Sabah, 
in the east (Source: Rosenberg 2007). 
Despite being the largest state in Malaysia, Sarawak is sparsely populated with a population of 
2.7 million in 2015 (The Official Portal of the Sarawak Government 2016). In 2010, over half 
the population (53.8 per cent) lived in urban areas (Department of Statistics Malaysia 2017). 
The population has a diverse ethnic make-up, comprising 27 distinct groups (Eaton 2005). Of 
these, the Iban make up 31 per cent, the Malay 25 per cent, the Chinese 24 per cent, the Bidayuh 
8 per cent, the Melanau 5 per cent, and the Orang Ulu, a grouping made up of smaller, quite 
distinct Dayak groups including the Kelabit, Kenyah, Kayan, Berawan, Lun Bawan, Penan, 
and Sihans, among others, contributing 7 per cent (Ngidang 2003). In the thesis, the term 
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“Dayak” is used to refer to all non-Muslim indigenous ethnic groups, especially the Iban, 
Bidayuh, and Orang Ulu (Majid Cooke 2006b). The Dayaks and Malays, but not the Sarawak 
Chinese, are officially regarded as “natives” and so are the holders of “native customary rights” 
(NCR) to land. 
Of the Dayak groups, the Iban and the Bidayuh hold the largest areas of NCR land. The Iban 
number around 745,400 people living in about 6,000 longhouse communities (Cramb 2007; 
Borneo Post Online 2014). Characterised as shifting cultivators, over the last few centuries they 
migrated throughout Sarawak to open up new land for shifting cultivation and harvest forest 
products (Cramb 2007). The second largest Dayak group, the Bidayuh, numbered around 
205,900 in 2014 (Borneo Post Online 2014). Bidayuh is a collective name for several 
indigenous groups found in south-western Sarawak who share similar languages and culture. 
Also known as the “Land Dayaks”, over 90 per cent of the population still live on their ancestral 
lands in Lundu, Bau, Kuching, and Serian Districts (Minos 2000). Over the last two decades 
they, like the other Dayak groups, have undergone a rapid transformation in their livelihoods. 
Dwindling land resources, land tenure amendments, state-sponsored development schemes, 
and the shift from a largely subsistence to an urban, wage-based economy have all created new 
opportunities and placed new pressures on rural households and their land.           
Land Laws Governing Customary Tenure in Sarawak 
Traditional land tenure systems in Sarawak, as with many other rural communities throughout 
the world, are founded on an intimate knowledge of the surrounding landscapes. In traditional 
land tenure systems, the household was the basic right-holder and the longhouse community 
governed land administration (Cramb & Wills 1990). This system was based on customary 
laws (adat) and access was established on the basis of long-term patterns of usage (Eaton 2005; 
Bulan 2006). Land boundaries were well understood and were defined by distinct geographical 
features (e.g. a river, a hill, an outcrop of rocks). This was because rural communities were 
completely reliant on the resources within their territories for survival (Eaton 2005). This 
relationship with their environment was buttressed by their social, cultural, religious, and 
political beliefs (Eaton 2005). Land tenure systems provided the key to balancing communal 
and individual interests in the natural resources on which they depended. As explained by Eaton 
(2005 p.7):   
Customary tenure is an integral part of the group’s social structure and culture. It 
results in a close attachment between the community and land, and helps to give a 
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group identity and continuity. It provides security and a means of subsistence. It 
involves long-established practices and beliefs, any of which are designed to prevent 
over-exploitation of the natural resources and degradation of the natural environment 
on which the group is so directly dependent. 
In the Iban case, forested land cleared for shifting cultivation by a pioneering household was 
progressively sub-divided between off-shoot households in subsequent seasons. In the Bidayuh 
case, until recent decades, the pioneering household retained authority over the land, which 
was rotated among descendant households (Bruno Manser Fund 2012). However, population 
growth and the planting of cash crops has led to a gradual curtailment of the Bidayuh custom 
of rotating tenure, first by restricting claims to those within three generations of the land user 
(i.e., those sharing a grandfather), and then by a once-for-all dividing of a kin-group’s land 
between individual households (thereby converging with the Iban system). 
The period of Brooke rule in Sarawak (1841-1941) and the period as a British Colony (1946-
1963) were important periods for the development of land laws to recognise, protect, and also 
restrict customary tenure (Bulan 2006; Cramb 2016). Throughout the Brooke period, 
customary tenure was always acknowledged and a level of self-governance existed, though the 
Brooke state claimed ultimate ownership of the land (Eaton 2005). However, two pieces of 
legislation passed by the British Colonial Government established a system of land 
classification and land tenure that consolidated the statutory arrangements for recognising 
customary land (Bulan 2006). As outlined thoroughly by (Cramb 2007; Cramb & Curry 2012; 
Cramb 2016), these laws were primarily intended to protect the rights of Dayaks to customary 
land by restricting where Chinese smallholders could access land titles, but also to exclude 
Dayak farmers from what remained of Sarawak’s primary forest by restricting claims to land 
that had already been farmed.  
The first item of legislation was the Land (Classification) Ordinance 1948, which built 
on earlier Brooke legislation to divide all land into the following categories (Bulan 2006; 
Cramb 2016):  
- Mixed Zone Land, to which any citizen may acquire title. 
- Native Area Land, to which land title may only be held by “natives” of 
Sarawak. 
- Reserved Land, set aside for public purposes, especially forest reserves. 
- Interior Area Land, a residual category, not yet zoned or titled.  
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- Native Customary Land, that is, land subject to “native customary rights” 
but not held under title.  
- Native Communal Reserve, or land not held under title but for use by a 
native community and subject to their customary laws. 
It is important to note that the underlying basis of the Ordinance is the distinction between 
Sarawak’s indigenous ethnic groups, designated as “Natives”, and Sarawakians of Chinese 
descent, who are not included in this category, regardless of their place of birth (Cramb 2016). 
This distinction is crucial to understanding the rationale of oil palm development strategies 
from the 1990s (Cramb 2016). It is also important to note that the category “Native Customary 
Land” was not a land zone as such but could occur in various zones such as a Mixed Zone, a 
Native Area, or an Interior Area. Native Customary Land is typically referred to in Sarawak as 
“native customary rights land” or simply NCR land, though this is not the term used in the 
legislation. 
The second and more significant item of legislation was the Sarawak Land Code 1958, which 
(as amended) still governs land tenure in Sarawak. The Land Code made it explicit that Native 
Customary Land was “State Land, subject to native customary rights.” That is, it was held “by 
licence from the State” until a formal title was issued (Cramb 2016). Thus, as Cramb (2016) 
outlines, native customary rights were seen as merely an “encumbrance” on State Land. The 
Land Code recognised various means by which native customary rights to land could be created 
before 1958 under section 5(2) (Majid Cooke 2006b): 
1. The felling of virgin jungle and the occupation of the land thereby created; 
2. The planting of land with fruit trees;  
3. The occupation or cultivation of land;  
4. The use of land for a burial ground or shrines; 
5. The use of land of any class for rights of way; or  
6. Any other lawful method. 
However, no new native customary rights could be created after 1 January 1958 (except on 
Interior Area Land and with special approval). Moreover, the traditional method of first 
acquiring land as a longhouse-community by occupying virgin territory within recognised 
boundaries (pemakai menoa) was not listed in Section 5(2). Households would then 
progressively clear forest for shifting cultivation, thereby acquiring rights over many decades 
as in Section 5(2)(a). Some argued that “any other lawful method” could be construed to cover 
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this fundamental method of acquiring prior rights for the community, but Section 5(2)(f) was 
removed by amendment in the 1990s at a time when the Government was strenuously 
challenging the notion of customary rights to a village territory. 
From the 1990s, the Sarawak Government has made numerous amendments to the 1958 Land 
Code which are claimed to have “harmonised the processes and procedures relating to Native 
Customary Land” (Bulan 2006). However, the effect has been to not only prevent the creation 
of new NCR land but to remove customary rights to large tracts of village territories where the 
land had not been cleared for farming before 1958 (Majid Cooke 2002; Bulan 2006).2 These 
changes have served to open up additional “unencumbered” State Land for the private 
plantation sector. In addition, where NCR claims are put forward over land allocated for private 
development, the burden of proof has been shifted onto the claimants so that development will 
not be held up. 
The rights of NCR landholders have been hard-won and are increasingly difficult to maintain. 
This is primarily due to the combination of natural resource wealth and economic poverty in 
Sarawak, which makes large areas of NCR land prime targets for development (Majid Cooke 
2002). Due to the remote nature of much NCR land, legally surveying and recording boundaries 
only occurs when the State has the interest to develop them. The informal nature of customary 
boundary agreements can also result in conflicting ideas of boundary placement (Majid Cooke 
2003). This has been compounded by laws introduced to make mapping illegal for anyone who 
is not a registered surveyor (World Rainforest Movement Bulletin 2001). Factors such as these 
have made NCR land increasingly vulnerable to large-scale state-driven development. 
The lack of a formal title has not prevented customary landholders from engaging in 
commercial agriculture. Over the decades, Iban and Bidayuh smallholders have successfully 
added rubber, pepper, cocoa, and other cash crops to their subsistence rice-farming systems, 
often with government support in the form of planting grants and technical advice. However, 
restrictions on dealing in customary land meant that private investment in land development 
was not possible; especially as such businesses were largely in the hands of Sarawak Chinese 
(deemed to be “non-natives” in the Land Code). In addition, the scope of coordination required 
for large-scale oil palm development (including roads and processing facilities) was beyond 
the capacity of the customary landholders. 
                                               
2 In fact, the cut-off date for new clearing was already embodied in the 1948 Land Classification Ordinance. 
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Modes of Oil Palm Development on Native Customary Land in Sarawak 
As the oil palm boom has proceeded, the crop has been planted by smallholders, in government 
schemes, by private plantation companies, and by state-owned ventures, beginning in 1968 
with Sarawak Oil Palm Sdn Bhd, near Miri in Sarawak’s north-east. Different modes of 
developing oil palm on Native Customary Land have emerged or been promoted over the 
succeeding decades. These are reviewed below.   
Smallholders  
The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) defines a smallholder as a family-based 
enterprise that produces on less than 50 hectares of land (Vermeulen & Goad 2006). The 
Malaysian Government’s classification has a slightly lower threshold, defining a smallholder 
as producing oil palm on less than 40.46 hectares (i.e., 100 acres). Any holding over this size 
is considered to be an “estate” (Teoh 2002). Malaysian smallholders account for 13 per cent of 
the total planted area, considerably less than Indonesian smallholders, who account for 44 per 
cent (Cramb & McCarthy 2016). Nevertheless, rural livelihoods in Sarawak are still closely 
linked to smallholder agriculture, both through direct agricultural production and through 
supplying farm labour, transportation, marketing, or non-agricultural services to farm 
households (Kydd 2002). Smallholder agriculture not only remains a vital livelihood strategy 
for many rural households but is a means by which NCR landholders can take the initiative to 
participate in the oil palm boom on their own terms. The area and number of oil palm 
smallholdings are increasing in Sarawak and new programs are being established to facilitate 
this.3  
A study in Niah District in northern Sarawak found that 44 per cent of farmers had planted oil 
palm, in response to the favourable market (Hansen 2005). Improvements in roads and access 
to processing facilities also greatly influenced their land-use decisions. Due to the very nature 
of oil palm production, smallholders are reliant on the large-scale plantations that surround 
them. Fresh fruit bunches must be processed within 24-48 hours of harvest to ensure their 
quality (Vermeulen & Goad 2006). Hence adequate roads are crucial for smallholders to 
transport their fruit to processing plants quickly. The buyers and processors are often also large-
scale producers (Vermeulen & Goad 2006). Unlike plantations, however, a smallholder’s oil 
palm plot is often just one of the ways they make a living. Their income is typically derived 
                                               
3  Key informant interview with Head of MPOB Sarawak Region, Kuching, 29 November 2007. 
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from a range of farm and non-farm activities (Vermeulen & Goad 2006). This can affect the 
productivity of their oil palms. Studies have found that smallholder productivity is often low 
relative to plantations, and highly variable (Koczberski & Curry 2003; Vermeulen & Goad 
2006).  
Smallholders in Sarawak can be classified as either independent or supported growers, 
depending upon whether they receive assistance from the government and/or private sector 
(Vermeulen & Goad 2006).  
(a) Independent smallholders. In Malaysia as a whole, 11 per cent of national production is 
from around 550,000 independent smallholders (Malaysian Palm Oil Certification Council 
2017). Such independent smallholders do not have direct assistance from the private sector or 
government agencies and are not tied to any government development scheme (The Star 2006; 
Vermeulen & Goad 2006). They have a range of advantages and disadvantages not experienced 
by other types of oil palm producer. They can move labour between different crops (e.g. pepper, 
rubber, rice), depending on market prices, and need not restrict their labour input to oil palm 
(Vermeulen & Goad 2006). They can seek the best prices for their output, rather than being 
restricted by prior agreements. However, they also run the risk that local mills may not purchase 
their fruit bunches or heavily discount the price. Most important, they do not have the same 
access to credit and technology that supported smallholders have (Vermeulen & Goad 2006). 
This reduced access to technology, combined with the movement of labour between different 
crops, often results in independent smallholders producing lower yields than supported 
smallholders (Vermeulen & Goad 2006).   
(b) Supported smallholders. Supported smallholders have the direct support of either private 
companies or the government (Vermeulen & Goad 2006). This support can be in the form of 
access to credit, planting materials, new technologies, and/or agreements with mills to purchase 
their fruit (Vermeulen & Goad 2006). This can result in supported smallholders becoming 
highly dependent on a single crop that is tightly linked to fluctuating global market prices. 
Their agreements with local mills also mean that they have little flexibility in how they use 
their land and allocate labour resources, as they are obliged to continue cultivating oil palm 
regardless of market prices (Vermeulen & Goad 2006).  
However, some forms of support can enhance the productivity of smallholders without 
impinging greatly on their overall independence. An interesting example was encountered 
during fieldwork. The Sarawak branch of the Malaysian Palm Oil Board (MPOB) had 
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developed the Supervised Fertilizer Cluster Scheme (Skim Kelompok Baja Terselia (KBT)).4 
In this scheme, MPOB provided support for a group of smallholders with high-quality 
seedlings, fertiliser, and technical information. The cost of the inputs was then deducted by the 
participating palm oil mills and refunded to the input suppliers. The first KBT was initiated in 
Miri in 2004 and, at the time of fieldwork in 2008, there were five KBT spread across Sarawak 
(Lundu, Serian, Selangau, Miri and Lawas). These areas included about 4,000 licensed 
smallholders, of whom 246 were members of the initial KBT scheme. Since 2008, the 
Malaysian Ministry of Plantation Industries and Commodities has established five smallholder 
incentive schemes: the New Planting Scheme for Oil Palm Smallholders (TBSPK); 
Maintenance Assistance Services (CPC); Replanting Program for Oil Palm Smallholders 
(TSSPK); and the Discount Scheme TRIM (SKIDIC) (Kementerian Perusahaan Perladangan 
dan Komoditi 2016). Smallholders in Sabah and Sarawak, however, were limited in the area 
that could be included in these schemes and special requirements were put in place in Sarawak 
for NCR land to have approval from the village head, including a statement that there were no 
overlapping claims to the land (Kementerian Perusahaan Perladangan dan Komoditi 2016).5  
Despite the relatively limited and recent government support for smallholders, the area of NCR 
land under smallholder oil palm has increased dramatically over the last decade (Cramb & 
Sujang 2013). At the end of 2016, the Deputy Chief Minister announced that there were an 
estimated 34,590 oil palm smallholders in Sarawak with a planted area of 190,000 hectares, 98 
per cent on NCR land (Achoi 2016). He stressed that it was “no problem” not having a land 
title, stating that “all you [oil palm smallholders] need to do is to get the verification letter 
endorsed by the community leaders and also the licence issued by MPOB” (Achoi 2016).  
Government-managed smallholders 
It is estimated that there are 1.5 million hectares of NCR land in Sarawak (Ngidang 2003). 
However, despite these NCR landowners being “land rich”, they are some of the poorest 
communities in Sarawak (Ngidang 2002). In recognition of this poverty, a range of land 
development schemes was developed from the 1970s with the aims to improve rural livelihoods 
                                               
4 Key informant interview with the Head of the MPOB Sarawak Region, Kuching, 29 November 2007. 
5 These restrictions were put in place by the Malaysian Ministry of Plantation Industries and Commodities to 
address potential issues of NCR land ownership under the Sarawak Land Code and to keep smallholdings below 
40.46 ha. 
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and encourage “settled” commercial agriculture (Bulan 2006). These included agrarian 
resettlement schemes and in situ schemes.  
The first land resettlement schemes were implemented in the 1960s by the Department of 
Agriculture, modelled on the Federal Land and Development Authority (FELDA) projects in 
Peninsular Malaysia (Ngidang 2002). These projects involved rubber smallholdings in large 
blocks and represented the early attempts to merge a plantation-based economy with 
smallholder farming practices (Ngidang 2002). In the early 1970s, the Sarawak Land 
Development Board (SLDB) took over these rubber schemes and also began opening up State 
Land in northern Sarawak for oil palm, hoping to attract settlers from NCR land in the south 
(Ngidang 2002). Eventually, the rubber schemes were written off and handed back to the 
settlers and the oil palm schemes, which had not attracted settlers, were privatised and run by 
Sarawak Plantation Berhad (SPB) as a commercial plantation. SLDB became largely inactive.6 
The main form of managing smallholders has been through in situ land development schemes 
implemented by the Sarawak Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority (SALCRA) 
and, to some extent, by the Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority 
(FELCRA) (Ngidang 2002). Unlike the previous land development agencies, SALCRA had 
the power to develop large-scale plantation agriculture on NCR land (Ngidang 2002). The 
agency’s first oil palm plantation was the Lemanak Scheme in Lubok Antu District, 
commenced in 1978 with an area of 3,600 hectares (Schmidt et al. 1998). By 2016, SALCRA’s 
oil palm plantations had grown to 51,072 hectares (SALCRA 2017) and included land in both 
Iban- (54 per cent) and Bidayuh-dominated (46 per cent) regions (Ngidang 2002). SALCRA 
markets itself as “a catalyst of rural development” (SALCRA 2003) and its method of in situ 
land development is considered to have been relatively successful in the south-west region of 
Sarawak. While the initial focus of these schemes was “socio-economic”, that is, improving 
the livelihoods of poor rural communities, the focus has shifted from to large-scale commercial 
expansion (Sutton 2001; Ngidang 2002). 
                                               
6 The Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority (FELCRA) also managed resettlement schemes 
for Iban communities in the area administered by the Rejang Security Command (RASCOM) during the 
Communist insurgency, and the Sarawak Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority (SALCRA) 
implemented the Batang Ai Resettlement Scheme to make way for the Batang Ai Hydroelectric Scheme (Banerjee 
& Bojsen 2005). 
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Joint ventures with private plantation companies 
The Land Custody and Development Authority (LCDA or Pelita) was established in 1982 to 
facilitate commercial development of NCR land, both urban and rural. In 1996, the New 
Concept (Konsep Baru) of Land Development was launched, with LCDA the key 
implementing agency. This took a different tack to the managed smallholder model used by 
SALCRA. The brainchild of Chief Minister, Abdul Taib Mahmud, it essentially gave the 
predominantly Chinese-owned private plantation sector access to large tracts of NCR land 
(Cramb 2016). This was done by “inviting the private sector” to enter joint ventures with 
LCDA, acting as trustee for the landholders, in order to develop NCR land as large, 
commercially operated plantations (Ministry of Land Development 1997).  As asserted in the 
Government’s Handbook on New Concept of Development on Native Customary Rights (NCR) 
Land, “Plantation Development is the most natural and practical way of developing NCR land 
on a large-scale basis that could provide optimum returns on investment on [a] sustainable basis 
(Ministry of Land Development 1997, p.19). 
The procedure was to “pool together” NCR land into a land bank with a minimum area of 5,000 
hectares. A Joint-Venture Company (JVC) was then formed between a private investor and 
LCDA, with the investor holding 60 per cent of the shares and LCDA 40 per cent – including 
30 per cent in trust for the NCR landowners and 10 per cent in its own right (Ministry of Land 
Development 1997). For the JVC to legally access NCR land, it would apply to be deemed a 
“Native” under the Land Code (Ministry of Land Development 1997; Cramb 2016). Land title 
in the form of a Provisional Lease was then issued to the JVC for 60 years (two planting cycles 
of oil palm). This structure enabled the private plantation sector to directly develop NCR land 
in Sarawak. Konsep Baru was given strong support by political leaders who argued for its 
development potential for landholders. The Chief Minister declared in 2005: “We want to use 
especially Native Customary Rights (NCR) lands because we want to help the native 
landowners.”7 The Iban Deputy Chief Minister regarded it as “a genuine long-term plan to 
bring them [Dayaks] into the development mainstream.”8  
However, as described by Cramb (2013, 2016), Majid Cooke (2006), and Ngidang (2002), this 
model has been fraught with issues since its inception. Early landholder concerns included 
                                               
7 Daily Express, 30 June 2005. 
8 Daily Express, 30 June 2005. 
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feeling that they lacked a real choice about whether to participate; having little control over the 
initial negotiation process; uncertainty over whether their NCR land will be returned at the end 
of the lease period; concern whether a consolidated land title would still recognise individual 
NCR landowners (Ngidang 2002; Majid Cooke 2006c, 2006a; Vermeulen & Goad 2006). 
Nevertheless, political rhetoric and ambitious development targets placed strong pressure on 
government agencies to push through the oil palm schemes, regardless of the concerns of NCR 
landowners. In 2016, only 79,000 hectares of the 400,000 hectares targeted for potential 
development under Konsep Baru had been converted to oil palm (Ministry of Land 
Development 1997; Wong 2016). The Joint Venture model had reportedly fallen short of 
achieving the desired results and several joint-venture agreements had been cancelled (Cramb 
2013a; Wong 2016). This is of great concern for those NCR landowners already participating 
in joint-venture projects and indicates that more research into the impacts of these joint 
ventures at a household level must be done (Hansen 2005; Cramb 2013b).  
Critics have questioned whether large-scale monocultures are the best livelihood strategy for 
rural communities. The Rendah Putan Agroforestry Project, a community agroforestry scheme 
that incorporated a range of agroforestry activities (e.g., hill rice farming, livestock, and forest 
resource management), found that the overall incomes of the Iban community involved were 
far greater than those in the nearby Kanowit oil palm scheme (Chuo 2001). The average take-
home wage for a Kanowit oil palm plantation worker was about MYR 200 per month, whereas 
the average of participants in the agroforestry scheme was about MYR 1,600 per month (Chuo 
2001). The poor returns to landholders in joint venture schemes has been the major source of 
frustration and conflict, fuelling concerns that the joint ventures provide greater returns for the 
private companies than for the NCR landowners (Ngidang 2002; Cramb 2013b). 
Political Pressure for the Large-Scale Development of Native Customary Land 
Over the last two decades, government policy for land development in Sarawak has 
increasingly targeted NCR lands.  This push has coincided with a decrease in timber supplies 
and a subsequent shift to large-scale agricultural conversion for oil palm, spurred by a rapidly 
growing demand for palm oil from countries like China and India (Cramb 2011). As available 
State Land has been allocated, attention has shifted to NCR lands. It has been estimated that 
there are 1.5 million hectares of NCR land in Sarawak (Ngidang 2003; Goh 2016), though the 
actual area would be larger if the territorial boundaries claimed by indigenous communities 
were recognised by the state (Cramb 2016). It is reported that, to reach the government’s 
ambitious plan to develop two million hectares of oil palm in Sarawak by 2020, about 500,000 
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hectares of NCR land will be targeted for conversion, that is, a third of the total area of NCR 
land recognised as such by the state (Ching 2015). 
To support this push for land development, the government has used a range of methods to 
encourage NCR landowners to participate in plantation agriculture, as described above. This 
push has also been accompanied by increasingly strong rhetoric to shift social attitudes towards 
large-scale agricultural development on NCR lands, to the point that non-participation often 
results in being labelled “anti-development”, a brand with extremely negative connotations, 
not far removed from being “anti-government” (Ngidang 2002). This development rhetoric can 
be seen in the following statements by some of Sarawak’s most important officials:   
Landowners who take harsh action to prevent the government’s move to develop 
their land through private firms will only mar their own progress (Chief Minister 
of Sarawak, New Reality, May-June 2000, p.16). 
Large-scale development is not a ploy to take land away from the owners, but a 
genuine long-term plan to bring them into the development mainstream (Deputy 
Chief Minister of Sarawak, The Daily Express, 6 July 2005). 
The government has the responsibility to bring development to your area. Do not 
make the customary right to the land cause you to be excluded from the 
development (Human Rights Commissioner Dr Mohd Ritom Abdullah, The 
Borneo Post 15 March, 2007).9 
Whereas earlier schemes such as SALCRA’s Lemanak Scheme aimed to improve rural 
livelihoods and resulted in participants being issued official title to their land upon successful 
repayment of scheme outlays (Banerjee & Bojsen 2005; Bulan 2006), the more recent joint 
venture schemes have been shown to be far less beneficial to NCR landowners than to the 
private companies and government agencies involved (Cramb 2013b). It has been suggested 
that one of the primary purposes of these newer schemes has been to access NCR land for the 
financial benefit of private enterprises and their political patrons (Ngidang 2003; Banerjee & 
Bojsen 2005). Key figures have responded indignantly to these claims. The then Minister for 
Land Development, James Masing, warned in relation to protests over large-scale oil palm 
development on NCR land: “I suggest that land activists in Sarawak stop the political noise and 
                                               
9 This last statement was in relation to Penan resistance to logging, not oil palm, but logging has often paved the 
way for future palm oil development and the sentiment regarding resistance to large-scale development is the 
same. 
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allegations of land grabbing by the government” (Ling 2016). In early 2015, the then Chief 
Minister, Adenan Satem, declared that the Sarawak Government would stop alienating state 
land for new oil palm development, instead stressing: “We are not going to allow any more 
new plantations, except on communal and NCR [native customary rights] land” (Saai 2015). 
This decision staked the success of the state’s oil palm development targets on the large-scale 
conversion of Native Customary Land into oil palm plantations.  
The target of reaching two million hectares of oil palm by 2020 and the 2015 declaration that 
no further state land would be allocated for new oil palm development placed government 
agencies under increased pressure to aggressively target NCR land (Ching 2015; Saai 2015). 
Due to the fraught nature of the New Concept of land development, the government has 
introduced other “new concepts” in an ad hoc way. The “New Joint Venture” concept is based 
on a rental agreement directly between the private company and the NCR landowners 
(discussed in Chapter 6). The most recent “new concept” is the “New Management Module”, 
which involves accessing Federal funding through FELCRA to support 5,000-hectare projects 
with a 90:10 allocation of shares between the landholders and the agency (Borneo Post Online 
2015b). However, it is unlikely there will be much Federal funding for this sort of project, 
which flies in the face of the government’s public-private partnership ideology. 
By 2016, total of 380,072 ha of NCR land had been planted with oil palm (Achoi 2016; Banji 
2016; Wong 2016; SALCRA 2017). About 111,000 hectares was in managed smallholder 
schemes, implemented by SALCRA and FELCRA (Figure 4). Only 79,000 hectares were in 
joint-venture schemes facilitated by LCDA. In contrast, almost half (190,000 hectares) had 
been planted by independent or supported smallholders – as much as the other agencies 
combined. Smallholder oil palm has increased more rapidly than any other category in the past 
decade, calling into question the government’s push for large-scale projects that have often 
failed to deliver benefits to the landholders.  
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     Figure 4 Planted area of oil palm on Native Customary Land by scheme type, 2016 
Plantation Labour in Sarawak 
When considering large-scale oil palm development on Native Customary Land in Sarawak, 
much of the attention is on the outcomes of participation for the landowners involved. One of 
the main arguments for participation stressed by each government agency was the promise of 
increased employment opportunities for the rural households involved. While the early 
schemes did in fact employ landowners as plantation workers, over time it became increasingly 
difficult to mobilise sufficient workers on a consistent basis drawing on the local population. 
From the 1990s, each agency instead opted to follow the private plantation sector and employ 
the cheaper, more easily managed Indonesian migrant labourers, especially for the onerous 
work of harvesting. While landowners did not accept this change readily, Indonesian labourers 
now make up 80 per cent of the plantation workforce in Sarawak (Sanderson 2016). With the 
expansion of oil palm in Indonesia and Malaysia, the plantation sector in Sarawak has been 
experiencing an increasing shortage of both local and Indonesian labour for over a decade 
(Kong 2016). Plantation Industries and Commodities Minister, Mah Siew Kong has 
highlighted that one of the biggest issues for the plantation sector in Malaysia is labour 
shortages, especially as production continues to increase (Kong 2016). In light of the rapid 
increase in the oil palm sector in Sarawak, and the state’s aggressive target to reach two million 
hectares of oil palm by 2020 (Wong 2016), it is essential to understand the motivations and 
experiences of Indonesian migrant labourers working on NCR land. 
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Conclusion 
The rapid expansion of oil palm plantations in Sarawak and the state’s targets for continued 
expansion has raised fundamental questions about the institutional arrangements to access 
NCR land for large-scale conversion to oil palm, especially those that embrace the private 
sector. This in turn has highlighted issues around how scheme participation is experienced by 
NCR landowners and what are the outcomes of participation. There is also the need to 
understand the conditions for the foreign migrant labourers employed on these plantations and 
their relationship with the landowners, government agencies, and private companies involved. 
These issues are taken up in subsequent chapters, with a case study of a SALCRA-managed 
smallholder scheme (Chapter 5), a case study of a LCDA-brokered joint-venture scheme 
(Chapter 6), and a study of Indonesian plantation workers (Chapter 7). The methods used in 
these studies are described in the next chapter.  
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7. RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODS  
CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODS 
 
The livelihoods framework reviewed in Chapter 2 was used to structure the research, which 
involved in-depth case studies of particular schemes using mixed methods. The livelihoods 
framework was developed to better understand the ways people survive in light of changing 
circumstances (Lindenberg 2002). It stems from a body of literature that aims to conceptualise 
livelihoods from the perspective of the people living them (Chambers & Conway 1992; 
Scoones 1998; Ellis 2000). It not only considers the diverse range of ways an individual makes 
a living but also looks at the household and community resources, the risk factors, and the 
institutional and policy constraints that can help or hinder the pursuit of livelihoods (Scoones 
1998; Ellis 2006). Such a holistic approach is important as researchers need to consider, not 
only differences in individual livelihoods, but also the ways in which the context interacts with 
and influences individual behaviour (Ostrom 2009). Such considerations are especially 
important in Sarawak due to the nature of village consensus and the large-scale, top-down 
approach pursued by the government to developing NCR land. 
A multiple-perspectives approach was used to assess the processes and outcomes of 
participation in oil palm schemes for individual landowners, their communities, and the 
migrant labourers involved. It was important to specify the scale of the analysis because the 
livelihood strategies chosen may have different net livelihood effects dependent upon the level 
at which they occur (Scoones 1998). The scale was set at the level of a particular oil palm 
scheme or project as this served to highlight issues of land access, employment, social relations, 
and political institutions as they play out in a specific context. This was especially important 
in the case of oil palm schemes as they involved the conversion of large tracts of customary 
land that had previously supported a shifting mosaic of crops and other uses, subject to a 
complex array of rights and obligations, to a centrally-managed and semi-permanent 
monoculture. The livelihoods approach helped to highlight the processes and outcomes of 
participation, the response of the various actors involved, and how their livelihoods were 
ultimately affected.   
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The Case Studies 
Within the livelihoods framework, a case-study approach was chosen to investigate the 
processes and impacts of oil palm development on NCR land. This approach enables a holistic 
focus to gain an in-depth understanding of a case by recognising both its complexity and its 
context (Punch 1998). A case study enables a combination of general observations and detailed 
investigation into the causes and outcomes of change at household and community levels 
(Casley & Lurley, 1982). The approach was well-suited to investigating the complex 
relationships that exist between participant households, development agencies, private-sector 
actors, and the political and economic context of an oil palm scheme, allowing in-depth 
analysis of how scheme participation was experienced in the natural setting of the village (Yin 
2009).  
The study region selected was the Bau-Lundu region, comprising Bau and Lundu Districts in 
Kuching Division in the south-western corner of Sarawak (Figure 5). While this region does 
not have the largest area of oil palm, it was chosen because it is an area of on-going expansion 
and contains examples of all the major modes of oil palm development on NCR land, from 
smallholders, to managed smallholders (both SALCRA and FELCRA schemes), to joint-
venture schemes (brokered by LCDA). It also includes private plantations, including one 
operated by FELDA Bhd and another operated by one of the largest oil palm companies in 
Malaysia – Rimbunan Hijau – both of which have had disputes over NCR land. This region 
was also of interest due to its proximity to the Indonesian border, allowing a diverse range of 
migration methods by Indonesian labourers seeking employment on Sarawak’s plantations. 
The Bau-Lundu region is made up of coastal lowlands, consisting of peat swamps and flat 
alluvial floodplains, phasing into undulating and rolling hills of less than 60 metres above sea-
level. The region is dissected by northeast-southwest mountain ranges rising to 300-600 metres 
in the centre and east, and in the west the terrain rises to Gunung Pueh at 944 metres and over 
1,000 metres along the border with Indonesia (Ecosol Consultancy Sdn Bhd 2008) (Figure 6). 
The main river system is the Kayan, which winds through the middle portion of the region 
where most settlements and plantations occur. The mean annual rainfall is 3,884 millimetres in 
Bau and 4,300 millimetres in Lundu, with the driest time of the year in May and June (Ecosol 
Consultancy Sdn Bhd 2008). The main towns are Bau and Lundu (shown as red dots in Figure 
6), about 50 kilometres apart on Jalan Tun Hussein Onn (the Bau-Lundu Road), which links 
both districts to the state capital, Kuching, to the east.  
 54 
 
Figure 5 Location of study sites (base map by Bissonnette and Cramb 2008). 
 
 
Figure 6 Bau-Lundu region showing location of study sites – Opar (1), Selampit (2) Sebandi Hulu and 
Sebandi Hilir (3) (base map from Ecosol Consultancy Sdn Bhd 2008). 
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The Bau-Lundu region is home to the Bidayuh people, also known in the past as “Land 
Dayaks”. The Bidayuh make up eight per cent of the population of Sarawak and are the second 
largest Dayak group after the Iban, numbering over 205,900 in 2014 (Borneo Post Online 
2014). They are believed to be one of the earliest farming groups to inhabit Sarawak, 
originating from across the border in what is now West Kalimantan, Indonesia (Chang Pat Foh 
2002). Over 90 per cent still live on their ancestral lands in Lundu, Bau, Kuching, and Serian 
Districts in around 128 villages (Pilo 2017). They make up the majority of the population in 
the Bau-Lundu region (Minos 2000; Ecosol Consultancy Sdn Bhd 2008).  
Unlike the Iban, who typically used river systems to name and differentiate groups, the Bidayuh 
mostly used hills or mountains, e.g., the Jagoi group traces their origins to a village on Mount 
Jagoi. There are six main Bidayuh groups: Bisadong, Bibukar, Biatah, Bijagoi, Bisinggai, and 
the Selako/Rara group, but these can be further differentiated into 21 different “tribes” (Chang 
Pat Foh 2002). This separation is thought to originate from days when they were subject to 
head-hunting raids by the more aggressive Iban, keeping them in relative isolation. Before the 
establishment of Brooke rule in the 1840s, they were described as being bullied and oppressed 
by coastal populations (Wilford 1955; Mamit 2003). The geographer Wilford (1955, p. 11) 
recorded them as “a retiring, secretive people but, once their confidence is won, they are eager 
to help the traveller with their intimate knowledge of the countryside.” This isolation 
presumably gave rise to the many distinct dialects of the various groups. Today there are four 
main dialects of Bidayuh in general use – Jagoi/Singgai, Selakau/Lara, Bukar/Sadong, and 
Biatah (Chang Pat Foh 2002).  
More recently there have been calls among prominent Bidayuh figures to unite as a single 
community to strive for common goals like improved education and access to better 
development models (Mamit 2003; Minos 2003). Vocal Bidayuh leaders like Peter Minos were 
active advocates for oil palm development schemes on NCR land as a means of driving the 
community forward economically (Minos 2000, 2003). Minos even called for scattered villages 
to regroup into new planned rural townships, allowing “the vacated area [to] be turned into 
massive commercial agricultural areas” through Government agencies like LCDA and SEDC 
(Minos 2003, p. 111). This view aligned closely with the radical vision of the former Chief 
Minister, Abdul Taib Mahmud, and with the New Concept of land development. 
In 2008, a large part of the Bau-Lundu region was proposed for the Opar Rural Gowth Centre 
(the area enclosed by the dashed line in Figure 7) (Ecosol Consultancy Sdn Bhd 2008). This 
study produced a range of detailed maps, including the land tenure zones (Mixed Zone, Native 
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Area, etc) and land tenure status (Native Customary Land, etc) of the study region. These maps 
reflect the complex mosaic of land tenure in Sarawak. As highlighted by Majid Cooke (2003), 
maps have the power to include or exclude people from their territories and are are essential in 
defending NCR land claims. Despite these classifications being of great significance to NCR 
landowners, no interviewees had seen any such maps for their villages. During fieldwork for 
the thesis, therefore, maps were used in interviews and discussions with local landholders 
wherever possible. 
Figure 7(a) shows large areas classified as Native Area Land (pink), Interior Area Land (white), 
and Native Customary Land (orange), as well as Reserved Land (dark green). Surprisingly, 
there are also large areas of Mixed Zone Land, able to be alientated to “non-natives” (light 
green), not only around the commercial centres of Bau and Lundu and along the coastal road, 
but deep into the interior in the west of the region, abutting two of the study sites (2 and 3). 
This may well reflect recent re-zoning to suit the commercial plantation interests in that area. 
Figure 7(b) shows that much of the area is regarded as State Land (grey) that may be 
“encumbered” or “unencumbered” with native customary rights. Such land is frequently 
allocated to private companies through provisional leases, on the presumption that they are 
largely “unencumbered”, resulting in subsequent on-going land disputes (as in the case of the 
FELDA plantation). The large area of Reserved Land also indicates a substantial portion that 
has been “committed to development” (dark green with cross-hatching), usually meaning 
alienation to private plantation companies. There is also a significant area of Alienated Land 
(pink), which may include titles granted in Mixed Zones or Native Areas, including NCR land 
that has been surveyed, registered, and converted to a permanent title. 
The actual occupancy of land by different land uses is shown in Figure 8. While there is 
extensive mixed cropping by smallholders along the Bau-Lundu road as far as the Kayan river 
(salmon colour), the overwhelming feature is the large area currently under oil palm plantations 
(orange), including SALCRA schemes, joint ventures, and private plantations, or areas 
designated for oil palm but not yet planted (yellow). Frequently such areas will have been 
designated, mapped, and even leased before the local population is aware that their perception 
of land ownership has been undermined. 
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Figure 7 Maps of the Bau-Lundu region indicating (a) land zones and (b) land tenure status. The study 
sites are numbered as for Figure 6 (Ecosol Consultancy Sdn Bhd 2008). 
3 
2 
1 
3 
2 
1 
(a) 
(b) 
 58 
 
Figure 8 Map of land use in the Bau-Lundu region. The study sites are numbered as for Figure 6 (Ecosol 
Consultancy Sdn Bhd 2008). 
The case study schemes within the study region were chosen to represent the different modes 
of participation in large-scale oil palm development on NCR land in Sarawak. This permitted 
both in-depth study of specific processes but also a cross-case comparison of different modes. 
As described in Chapter 3, there are two main state agencies tasked with large-scale oil palm 
development on NCR land – SALCRA and LCDA. The former directly implements managed 
smallholder schemes and the latter negotiates joint venture schemes with private plantation 
companies. Kampung Opar, a participating village in SALCRA’s Bratak Oil Palm Scheme, 
was chosen as the first case (Site 1 in Figure 6), and Kampung Selampit, a participating village 
in LCDA’s Raya Plantation, was chosen as the second (Site 2 on Figure 6). A third case study 
was also undertaken of the Tamang Sembawang Estate managed by FELCRA (Site 3 on Figure 
6). Unfortunately, due to lack of time, this case study was not completed. However, some of 
the findings were relevant to the second case study (Chapter 6), as were the interviews with 
Indonesian labourers (Chapter 7).  
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A different kind of case study was undertaken in conjunction with the study of SALCRA and 
LCDA schemes. The opportunity was taken to investigate the motivations and experiences of 
a cohort of Indonesian workers on these schemes, constituting a case study of migrant workers 
on NCR land close to the Malaysia-Indonesia border. While no comparison was undertaken 
with other cases of migrant plantation workers, the case was used to gain insights into the 
labour processes associated with large-scale oil palm development on NCR land in Sarawak. 
Research Methods 
Fieldwork was undertaken over a total of ten months, including November-December 2007, 
April-June 2008, and July-December 2008. A wide- range of qualitative and quantitative data 
sources were sought to aid in the triangulation of methods and data to improve the integrity 
and rigour of the case study research (Patton 1987). These methods were used in combination 
to build up an understanding of how participation in large-scale oil palm development was 
experienced, and how that, in turn, contributed to the transformation of rural livelihoods in that 
setting. Within each case-study site, interviews were undertaken and observations made to 
identify the opportunities, constraints, and shocks affecting livelihood choices at both 
household and community levels (Lindenberg 2002). In particular, the focus was on the 
relationships between the state agency concerned, the private-sector partner (if applicable), 
scheme or plantation management, NCR landowners, and plantation labourers. Having built up 
a detailed picture of processes and outcomes in each case-study site, the cases were then 
compared to give further insight into the range of processes involved.  
Case-study profiles 
(a) Kampung Opar and the SALCRA Bratak Oil Palm Estate. Opar is a village situated 
about 50 kilometres from the state capital, Kuching, and 12 kilometres from the district capital, 
Bau. At the time of fieldwork, it had a population of 1,659 in 252 registered households.10 It is 
a Bidayuh village, and its inhabitants stem from Bung Bratak (Tembawang Sauh), one of the 
oldest Bidayuh settlements in the Bau District (Chang Pat Foh 2002). Before settling at Bung 
Bratak, their ancestral home was in Sungkung in what is now West Kalimantan, Indonesia 
(Chang Pat Foh 2002; Sejarah Kampung Opar 2011). First established on the banks of the Opar 
River in 1846, the village originally consisted of three longhouses (Batang Kugan, 12 doors; 
Batang Koted, 12 doors, and Batang Kosa, nine doors) and a head house (baruk), the ritual 
                                               
10 Information obtained from Opar Headman, 14 May 2008. 
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centre of the village (Chang Pat Foh 2002). A total of 30 household interviews were conducted 
in Opar over a six-week period in April-May in 2008. 
(b) Kampung Selampit and the LCDA-Rimbunan Hijau joint venture projects. Selampit 
is a Jagoi Bidayuh village that is located on the western banks of the Kayan River, 
approximately 29 kilometres from the town of Lundu (Environment Planning & Research 
Consultants 1999; Pejabat Daerah Lundu 2008). The founders of the village were led by Minah 
ak Kumbai from Kampung Stungkor and built the first houses on the banks of the Jaong River 
in 1937 (Chang Pat Foh 2002). Shortly after, a second group from Kampung Raso joined them 
and Minah became the first village head (ketua kampung) in 1938 (Chang Pat Foh 2002). This 
was two decades before the proclamation of the Sarawak Land Code, which set 1958 as the 
cut-off for the creation of new Native Customary Land (State Attorney-General's Chambers 
1999). In 2008, the village had a population of 942 comprising 217 families in 182 households 
(Pejabat Daerah Lundu 2006). A total of 30 household interviews were conducted in Selampit 
over a four-week period in October 2008. 
(c) Indonesian labourers. The experience of migrant Indonesian workers was explored 
through interviews in each plantation. In all, 26 semi-structured interviews were undertaken 
with labourers on the SALCRA Bratak Estate, the LCDA-Rimbunan Hijau Estate, and the 
FELCRA Tamang Sembawang Estate. To be culturally appropriate, these interviews were 
conducted in the labourers’ barracks only if other women were present. Otherwise, they were 
conducted outside their barracks in view of other labourers. In addition to these interviews, I 
accompanied Rimbunan Hijau labourers for the day on their monthly visit to the local town of 
Bau and went into the plantations to help female Indonesian labourers work on several 
occasions. A range of key informant interviews were also conducted to better assess the 
conditions for Indonesian migrant labourers living in Sarawak. These included personnel and 
officials in the Labour Department, the Immigration Department, the Semuja Detention Centre, 
the Indonesian Consulate, local police stations, and local hospitals.  
Case-study procedure 
For each case-study site the same procedure was followed. 
- Meet with government agency officials and plantation company managers at their head 
offices in Kuching, then arrange to meet the regional manager or the managers of the 
selected estates.  
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- Visit the estates of the state agency in the region (all SALCRA estates in the Bau-Lundu 
region; three LCDA estates spread across southern, central, and northern Sarawak; all 
FELCRA estates in south and central Sarawak). At each estate, drive around the villages 
with agency employees to see house-types, main crops, infrastructure, and access. 
- Once the case-study village was selected, meet the village head, explain the project, 
show permits, and organise accommodation. This was generally at the discretion of the 
village head. At two of the four villages where interviews were undertaken (Sebandi 
Hulu and Sebandi Hilir) I stayed at the headman’s house. In Selampit the headman 
selected a family for me to stay with and in Opar I was offered accommodation while 
walking through the village. 
- In each village 30 semi-structured interviews were carried out with randomly selected 
households (90 in total). When not conducting interviews, I was involved in day-to-day 
activities (e.g., planting rice, harvesting crops, and helping to cook for celebrations). 
- Whenever possible, I accompanied scheme officials to meetings held in the village, in 
the estate, or in town (e.g., meetings of the Village Development and Security 
Committee (Jawatankuasa Kemajuan dan Keselamatan Kampung, JKKK), ceremonies 
to distribute dividends, communal working groups (gotong royong). 
- While resident at each site, I visited relevant offices in local towns (Bau and Lundu) and 
in the capital (Kuching). This included the Bau District Office to obtain census data, 
Native Court Clerks, and the Land and Survey Department in Kuching to obtain maps. 
Data collection methods 
As indicated above, data were collected using a range of methods. 
(a) Document review. Relevant government documents (policies, feasibility studies, reports) 
were reviewed, along with research papers and press articles. Press articles were especially 
important as the links between politicians and large-scale NCR land development were a major 
topic in the media. These articles often provided data about land development that would 
otherwise have been difficult to obtain. 
(b) Informal and formal interviews. I was fluent in both Malay and Indonesian, hence 
interviews were conducted in Malay, Indonesian, or English depending on the participant’s 
preference. When older interviewees only knew the Bidayuh or Iban language, a family 
 62 
member would translate. Informal interviews covered various topics (e.g., land use, labour 
migration, and cultural change). Names of interviewees were coded to preserve anonymity.  
(c) Direct observations. I kept notes on observations made while in homes, villages, and 
plantations. I also attended community meetings, events, and gatherings in each site to get an 
overview of the issues of concern in each area. This proved to be very important to better 
understand the various methods of oil palm development individuals were participating in. 
Details of the formal interviews follows.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
(a) Community leader interviews. At each site, the initial interviews were conducted with the 
village head to gauge the general feelings towards oil palm development and the themes of the 
research. These interviews were also used to obtain data about the demography of the village, 
its history, political affiliations, land holdings, land use, infrastructure, disputes, and plans. Five 
interviews were conducted. The schedule is given in Appendix A. 
(b) Household interviews. Thirty households were interviewed in each site. Individual 
participants were selected randomly, using a random number generator to select 30 names from 
the scheme’s main participant list before arriving at the village. Once at the house of the 
participant, an interview was undertaken. However, if the participant was no longer residing in 
the village, the next participating member of the household was interviewed. This was done 
because many residents worked away from the village (e.g., in Kuala Lumpur, Kuching, or 
other urban centres). The interview was used to obtain data about land holdings, land use, the 
education and/or employment of each household member, and perspectives on scheme 
participation. The schedule is given in Appendix B. 
(c) Plantation manager interviews. Five plantation managers were questioned about land 
acquisition, plantation size, oil palm yields, the plantation labour force, community relations, 
and general issues about rural livelihoods (e.g. infrastructure, facilities, and community 
programs). See Appendix C for the interview schedule. 
(d) Indonesian labourer interviews. Ten Indonesian labourers were interviewed at each site, 
except for the FELCRA site which only had six Indonesian labourers at the time; the rest had 
returned home to Indonesia for the important religious holiday, Idul Fitri. While Indonesian 
migrant workers are considered a lifeline to the local oil palm industry (Khoo & Chandramohan 
2002), little is known about them. Hence these 26 interviews were included to shed some light 
on their motivations and experience (Appendix D). 
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(e) Key informant interviews. These interviews were undertaken opportunistically throughout 
the duration of fieldwork. They included interviews with government officials from the 
Ministry of Land Development (3), SALCRA (6), LCDA (2), FELCRA (5), the Malaysian 
Palm Oil Board; the Labour Department; the Semuja Detention Centre; the Indonesian 
Consulate; the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM); the Sarawak Dayak 
Iban Association; local police stations; local hospitals, prominent Dayak activists, and others 
with a knowledge of oil palm and NCR land development issues.  
The following steps were taken to ensure the validity and reliability of interview data. Before 
household interviews began, anyone present was given a clear description of the project and its 
aims. Questions were also encouraged. The interview would take between one and two hours 
depending on the household and the number of people present. Interviewees were always given 
a choice of whether they would like to participate; only one out of 90 households declined to 
be interviewed. All interviewees were also told that their identity would remain anonymous 
and that the data would only be used by the researcher. I primarily conducted interviews in 
Malay or Indonesian, and Malay and Indonesian translations were checked by a native speaker. 
I avoided discussing my opinions to prevent biasing responses. Interviews were conducted in 
culturally appropriate settings. I always acted and dressed in a culturally appropriate manner. 
The household interview process was also used as a tool to gain access to a wide range of 
households, who in turn passed on word of the research. This was important as the first village 
visits were with government agency officials; my residence in the village conducting 
interviews helped establish my independence from the agency. The interviews were also used 
as a method to begin further dialogue with participants. On a number of occasions it was found 
that the interviews in themselves did not yield important information, or missed some of the 
intricate mosaic of activities that contributed to a household livelihood as the interviewees 
deemed them to be “just seasonal”, “unimportant”, or “a side pursuit”. However, key findings 
and insights emerged during future conversations with the same interviewee.  
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4. THE MANAGED SMALLHOLDER MODEL: STATE-LED DEVELOPMENT OF NATIVE CUSTOMARY LAND 
CHAPTER 5 
THE MANAGED SMALLHOLDER MODEL: STATE-LED DEVELOPMENT OF  
NATIVE CUSTOMARY LAND 
 “United, we work diligently, planting oil palm the SALCRA way. 
The people are blessed to obtain wealth, receiving dividends by the million.”11  
Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 3, while customary landholders in Sarawak are increasingly planting 
oil palm as independent smallholders (Cramb & Sujang 2016), there are two main methods for 
the incorporation of Native Customary Land in large-scale oil palm plantations – “managed 
smallholder” schemes implemented by public agencies and “joint venture” schemes 
implemented by private plantation companies (Cramb & McCarthy 2016). It is the former 
approach that is the focus of this chapter. The principal agency responsible for implementing 
the managed smallholder approach is the Sarawak Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation 
Authority (SALCRA). This agency was established in 1976, at the height of the era of state-
led development globally (Ellis & Biggs 2001; McCarthy & Cramb 2009). Its charter was to 
develop plantation agriculture (oil palm, cocoa, tea, rubber) on Native Customary Land 
(commonly referred to as NCR land) with the agreement of the landholders and for their socio-
economic improvement (Ngidang 2002). 
Forty years later, despite setbacks and criticisms, SALCRA is widely considered to be the most 
successful agency for developing NCR land in Sarawak (New Sarawak Tribune 2015). In 2015, 
the Minister for Land Development remarked (Borneo Post Online 2015): 
It is not an exaggeration to say that SALCRA has proven itself as one of the most 
successful development agencies in Sarawak in creating employment and business 
opportunities, providing basic infrastructure to rural communities, generating financial 
returns, and in enhancing landowners’ rights to their land through issuance of land 
titles. 
                                               
11 Begempung kitai rajin bekerja, Naman sawit atur SALCRA, Rakyat berkat bulih pengeraja, Terima dividen be 
juta-juta. First verse of song “Advance SALCRA”, written by Alfred Jabu Numpang, Chairman of SALCRA and, 
until 2016, Deputy Chief Minister of Sarawak. 
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SALCRA pitches itself as a “catalyst of rural development” (SALCRA 2003, 2016b). Given 
its high profile and the official praise it has received, it is important to understand how 
participation in SALCRA oil palm schemes is experienced at the household and community 
level and to assess the long-term impacts on rural livelihoods. 
In this chapter, I examine how SALCRA has been experienced by participants in the Bratak 
Oil Palm Estate in the Bau-Lundu Region of south-western Sarawak. I explore why NCR 
landowners chose to participate, what participation has entailed, how production has been 
organised, and to what degree initial expectations have been met. Given the radical change 
from small-scale farming under customary arrangements to large-scale corporate organization 
of land, labour, and income, I am particularly interested in the nature of the relationship 
between SALCRA and the participating households and villages, that is, the various means by 
which smallholders have been “managed” to conform to the SALCRA mode of production.  
Methods 
The data for this chapter were obtained during fieldwork conducted from April to June, 2008. 
With SALCRA officials, I visited all five SALCRA estates in the Bau-Lundu Region (Bratak, 
Jagoi, Stenggang, Sebako, and Undan) and seven participating villages (Duyoh, Grogo, Opar, 
Serasot, Serikin, Stass, and Undan). The village of Opar, a participant in the Bratak Estate, was 
selected for in-depth study. I lived with a family in the village for six weeks (April-June 2008), 
and subsequently made follow-up day-visits on seven occasions. These generally involved 
catching up with key informants over a meal, or a walk around the village to stop off at several 
houses for a cup of tea.  
During the April-June period, 30 semi-structured interviews were undertaken with scheme 
participants, who were randomly selected from a scheme participants’ list before arriving in 
the village to avoid bias once in the village. Interviews were conducted in Malay, English, or a 
mix of both, and generally occurred in the participant’s home. Fourteen women and 16 men 
from separate households were interviewed, who ranged in age from 34 to 74. Further 
interviews were undertaken with key informants, including SALCRA scheme officials, 
plantation managers, district officials, plantation employees, and local residents. Several 
meetings of the Estate Development Committee (Jawatankuasa Pembangunan Ladang (JPL)) 
in three different SALCRA estates (Jagoi, Bratak, and Stenggang) were attended, as well as a 
SALCRA festival held at Stenggang. In addition to interviews and observations, secondary 
data were obtained from government documents, research journals, and newspaper articles. 
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The SALCRA Model  
SALCRA was established in 1976, partly modelled on the Federal Land Consolidation and 
Rehabilitation Authority (FELCRA) established in Peninsular Malaysia 10 years earlier. 
SALCRA was the first development agency in Sarawak that was specifically authorised to 
develop plantation agriculture on NCR land (Ngidang 2002). The agency has been funded by 
concessional loans and Federal Government grants (SALCRA 2012). Its first oil palm 
plantation was the Lemanak Oil Palm Scheme in Lubok Antu District, commenced in 1978, 
with an area of 3,600 hectares (Schmidt et al. 1998).  By 2015, SALCRA was responsible for 
19 oil palm plantations with an area of 51,072 hectares and four palm oil mills, all in south-
western Sarawak (Figure 9) (SALCRA 2017). There were 19,640 NCR landowners 
participating in these schemes from 457 Iban and Bidayuh villages.  
SALCRA’s stated objective is to “raise the long-term productivity and optimum utilization of 
Native Customary Rights (NCR) land by developing and managing the development of such 
land which are hitherto under-utilized, unutilized or underdeveloped into socially and 
economically viable plantation” (SALCRA 2016b). The agency outlines the main benefits of 
participation in its oil palm projects as (SALCRA 2016b): 
- issuance of land titles;  
- payment of dividends;  
- opportunities for employment;  
- encouragement of entrepreneurship;  
- access to infrastructure;  
- local involvement in estate-level management through the JPL.  
However, SALCRA’s slow progress in delivering on its promised outcomes has been a key 
issue for participants. In 2002, the total planted area was 46,654 hectares, but this had increased 
by only 4,418 hectares to 51,072 hectares by 2015 (SALCRA 2003, 2017).  
The SALCRA model is one of in-situ development in that it works with customary landowners 
where they are, without requiring resettlement (as with the Federal Land Development 
Authority (FELDA) schemes in Peninsular Malaysia and the schemes of the Sarawak Land 
Development Board (SLDB). SALCRA prefers to develop contiguous areas of at least 5,000 
hectares. The official process is initiated when SALCRA receives a request from landowners, 
at which time village briefings begin (Tawie 2011a). Once the area has been declared a 
Development Area under the SALCRA Ordinance, land surveys begin to establish ownership 
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of individual plots, to determine each participant’s share of dividends and with a view to 
eventually issuing titles in perpetuity under Section 18 of the Land Code, once the costs of 
development have been repaid. The standard SALCRA agreement is for 25 years, during which 
the land cannot be withdrawn from the plantation.  
In the first two decades, SALCRA strictly followed the “managed smallholder” model, in 
which landowners were mostly responsible for their own lots within the plantation, resulting 
in variable productivity. Farmers worked on their own land and received wages, which were a 
charge against future dividends. However, in 1996, after management of the agency was 
contracted out to Sarawak Plantation Services (SPS), the emphasis shifted to a commercial 
business model, with plantations managed on an estate basis to maximise returns.12 This, 
combined with the growing shortage and low productivity of local labour, led to new labour 
regimes on the plantations, including the employment of migrant Indonesian workers. This 
move was initially met with great resistance from NCR landowners, most of whom did not 
want foreigners working on their land. 
SALCRA has, until relatively recently, been confined to four divisions in south-western 
Sarawak (SALCRA 2012) (Figure 9), often in areas of hilly, marginal land. It was only in late 
2007, with the repeated failure of the LCDA joint-venture projects (see Chapter 6), that the 
Chief Minister, Abdul Taib Mahmud, stated that SALCRA could expand into other regions of 
the state, in particular, the Kapit and Bintulu Divisions (Figure 9).13 Some senior SALCRA 
officials saw this as a mandate to take over where the LCDA joint-venture projects had failed.14 
In response, SALCRA Jaya Sdn Bhd, a wholly-owned subsidiary, was established to undertake 
new agricultural projects (SALCRA 2017b). In 2014, dialogue between SALCRA and NCR 
landowners led to an agreement to develop 11,000 hectares of NCR land in Song District, Kapit 
Division (Sibon 2015). This was one of the first SALCRA projects outside south-western 
Sarawak, to which had previously been confined. The following year, the Minister of Land 
Development, James Masing, further announced that SALCRA had been allocated 15,000 
hectares of State land in the Sungai Tunoh River Basin, also in Kapit Division (Sibon 2015). 
The Minister went on to say (Sibon 2015): 
                                               
12 Key informant interview, SALCRA Head Office, 30 November 2007. 
13 Key informant interview, SALCRA Head Office, 30 November 2007. 
14 Key informant interview, SALCRA official in plantation office, 11 December 2007. 
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This will be the first time in SALCRA’s history that we develop State land. I want 
SALCRA officers through Salcrajaya to prove their mettle whether they can do it or 
not through the same way other commercial plantations are doing. 
However, these developments are relatively recent and still in the early stages. Furthermore, 
the new Song-Kapit Road to access the NCR land in Song District area was not expected to be 
completed until 2016 (Borneo Post Online 2013). Hence the agency has remained largely 
confined to the south-west corner of the state. 
 
Figure 9 The four SALCRA regions: 1. Bau-Lundu; 2. Serian; 3. Sri Aman; 4. Saratok. The main 
study area was in the Bau-Lundu region. Possible regions of future expansion for SALCRA are 
indicated (Kapit and Bintulu). Map adapted from Bissonnette and Cramb (2008).  
A Case Study of Managed Smallholders in the Bau-Lundu Region 
The Bau-Lundu region 
SALCRA manages five oil palm estates in the Bau-Lundu Region – Jagoi, Bratak, Undan, 
Stenggang, and Sebako. This study focuses on the Bratak Oil Palm Estate and, in particular, 
the major participant in that Estate, the village of Opar. In 2008, SALCRA commissioned a 
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socio-economic impact assessment of its five oil palm estates in Bau-Lundu. A total of 1,105 
NCR landowners were interviewed out of the 2,913 participants in these estates, including 
respondents from Opar (Sarawak Development Institute 2009). Almost all the respondents 
(99.4 per cent) were of the Bidayuh ethnic group. Households averaged 5.2 members. Overall, 
education levels were deemed to be low, with just 29.3 per cent completing upper secondary 
or higher levels. A further 12 per cent had not received any formal education. Almost half the 
population in the surveyed households was aged under 20 years, and many of those aged 20 to 
39 years had migrated to urban areas, usually for better employment opportunities. Hence less 
than a third of respondents (28.1 per cent) were full-time farmers. Most (53.2 per cent) were 
employed in the private sector and a smaller percentage (14.3 per cent) in the public sector. 
The farmers interviewed planted rice (both wet rice and hill rice), vegetables, and fruit trees, 
as well as cash crops including rubber, pepper, cocoa, and oil palm (independently of 
SALCRA) (Sarawak Development Institute 2009). There were 217 families (20 per cent) that 
still cultivated rice. The average area of wet rice was 1.4 acres (0.6 ha), producing 710 kg, and 
the average area of hill rice was 1.9 acres (0.8 ha), producing 620 kg. The average rubber 
holding was 3.0 acres (1.2 ha).  
Most of the respondents (72 per cent) earned cash income – 46 per cent earned MYR 300-600 
per month, and 23 per cent earned MYR 610-900 per month (Sarawak Development Institute 
2009). Only 74 respondents (7 per cent) were employed by SALCRA in the Bau- Lundu estates. 
In 2008, the poverty line for an individual was MYR 720 per month, putting 33 per cent of 
participants below the poverty line, though this does not take into account income in kind 
(Kementerian Sumber Manusia Malaysia 2009).  
Kampung Opar  
Opar is a village situated about 50 kilometres from the state capital, Kuching, and 12 kilometres 
from the district capital, Bau. At the time of fieldwork, it had a population of 1,659 in 252 
registered households.15 It is a Bidayuh village, its inhabitants stemming from Bung Bratak 
(Tembawang Sauh), one of the oldest Bidayuh settlements in Bau District (Chang Pat Foh 
2002). The ancestral home of the pioneers of Bung Bratak was in Sungkung in what is now 
West Kalimantan, Indonesia (Chang Pat Foh 2002; Kampung Opar Bau Sarawak 2011). First 
established on the banks of the Opar River in 1846, the village originally consisted of three 
                                               
15 Key informant interview, Opar Headman, 14 May 2008. 
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longhouses (Batang Kugan, 12 doors; Batang Koted, 12 doors, and Batang Kosa, nine doors) 
and a head-house (baruk), the ritual centre of the village (Chang Pat Foh 2002).16 However, 
these longhouses were dismantled in 1930 to make way for individual houses, a pattern 
followed by most Bidayuh villages in Sarawak. Another seven-door longhouse was built in 
1940 but was also dismantled in 1963 (Chang Pat Foh 2002). Opar remained a pagan village 
until Sawek anak Kugoh and his family were converted to Roman Catholic Christianity by a 
missionary from Portugal in 1957.17 Soon other families followed, and the first church was 
built in 1960 (Chang Pat Foh 2002). However, in 2000 around 40 per cent of villagers still 
identified themselves as pagan and continued to use the baruk to practice the “old traditions” 
(adat lama) (Chang Pat Foh 2002). 
Participation in the Bratak Estate 
The SALCRA Bratak Estate was commenced in the early 1990s.18 It comprised six phases and 
involved 745 landowners from ten villages (including Opar), with a total planted area of 2,411 
hectares – an average of 3.2 hectares per participant (Table 2). Opar contributed 1,577 hectares 
of NCR land to the estate, or 65 per cent of the total area.19 This land was in Phase 1 (187 
participants; 412 ha), Phase 3 (116 participants; 154 ha), Phases 5a and 5b (the number of Opar 
participants was not known; 866 ha).  It took ten years from the first opening up of the Bratak 
Estate until all the phases were planted. 
The Village Headman (Ketua Kampung) during the consultation and implementation phases 
(he was Headman from 1977 to 1992) credited himself with first bringing SALCRA officials 
to the village after he had visited Peninsular Malaysia and seen the extent of oil palm 
development.20 After an initial meeting, he sent a formal request to SALCRA and also had a 
meeting with the Ministry of Agriculture in 1991. He helped to undertake perimeter surveys to 
assess the overall land area for the estate and then informed those who owned land in that area 
                                               
16 Each household in a longhouse (rumah panjang) occupied an apartment (bilek), with a door (pintu) opening 
onto an open gallery (awah) that ran the length of the longhouse. Hence the number of doors (pintu) indicated the 
number of households. As Cramb (2007, p. 48) describes, the number of doors (pintu) is generally used to state 
the size of a longhouse community. This term was still often used in the village, even though there was no 
longhouse in the village anymore, and people now lived in separate houses. 
17 Household interview OP30, 50-year-old father of four, teacher, Opar, 20 May 2008. 
18 Key informant interview, Bratak Plantation Manager, 27 May 2008.  
19 Key informant interview, Bratak Plantation Manager, 29 April 2008. 
20 Key informant interview, former Opar headman (1977-1992), 18 May 2008. 
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by going door-to-door. Two-thirds of interviewees also remembered that the old headman had 
“brought SALCRA to the village”.  
Table 2 Total planted area of each phase in the SALCRA Bratak Estate in 2008. 
Phase Planted area (ha) Year(s) planted 
1 412 1993 
2 417 1994 
3 299 1995-1997 
4 134 1996 
5a 387 1998 
5b 479 1998-2000 
6 283 1998-1999 
Total  2,411 1993-2000 
Source: SALCRA Bratak Estate Office, 2008. 
The President of the Dayak Bidayuh National Association (DBNA) at the time, Peter Minos 
(1988-1995), was also active in promoting the SALCRA scheme. One-third of interviewees 
recounted how he and SALCRA officials came to the village to promote the development. As 
one participant stated: “Peter Minos said it’s good for the young people of the village, and also 
so that the older people with no education can work.”21 Minos has continued to be a vocal 
Bidayuh leader who actively advocates for oil palm development schemes on NCR land as a 
means of driving the community forward (Minos 2000, 2003). He has even called for scattered 
villages to regroup into new planned rural townships, while “the vacated area be turned into 
massive commercial agricultural areas” through Government agencies (Minos 2003, p. 111).22 
In 2008, there were only three of the 252 registered households in Opar that had not contributed 
land to the Bratak Estate.23 Such a high proportion of participants suggests that there must have 
been a strong consensus about participating during the consultation stage. However, during 
                                               
21 Household interview OP25, 53-year-old father of six, quarry worker, Opar 19 May 2008. 
22 This vision closely mirrors that of the Chief Minister at the time, Abdul Taib Mahmud. 
23 Key informant interview, Headman of Opar, 14 May 2008. 
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interviews with participating households, a different picture emerged, highlighting various 
levels of persuasion and resistance, with some landowners feeling powerless to choose 
otherwise. Some informants reported that, during the early meetings, around half the 
landowners did not agree with the scheme, apart from those who were “sitting on the fence”.24  
The main reasons given during interviews about participation revolved around land titles, 
employment, and income – land security through obtaining titles to their NCR land, new 
employment opportunities in the estate, and access to a new income stream in the form of 
dividends (Table 3). However, eight of the 30 participants interviewed felt that they did not 
have a choice in participating: “There was no way out for people who did not want to follow.”25 
This may have been because participants felt they had to follow the village consensus (ikut 
kampung), or their land was bordering that of people who wanted to join the scheme so they 
had no choice (terpaksa ikut). A 41-year-old mother of three and a librarian remarked: 
“Because everyone was close [to her household’s land], so it forced me to join SALCRA.”26 It 
was also widely believed that participation would lead to secure employment, as highlighted 
by one participant: “Whoever gave land to SALCRA can work in the plantation.”27 
However, there were also those households that no longer practised any form of farming and 
commuted daily to work in Bau. They viewed participating as a good way to benefit from land 
that they no longer used: “Rather than have it empty and idle, it is better to get some revenue.”28 
Statements like these helps to show that the reasons for participation were not homogeneous, 
and that there was an increasingly diverse range of livelihood strategies in villages such as 
Opar with access to urban centres and an educated younger population.  
 
 
 
                                               
24 Key informant interview: OpW Opar resident, 14 May 2008. 
25 Tidak ada jalan untuk orang yang tidak mahu ikut. Key informant interview, OpW Opar resident, 14 May 2008. 
26 Sebab semua orang dekat, jadi terpaksa ikut SALCRA. Household interview OP8, 41-year-old mother of three, 
librarian, Opar, 13 May 2008. 
27 Siapa kasih tanah SALCRA dapat kerja di ladang. Household interview OP7, 61-year-old father of five, 
shopkeeper, Opar, 13 May 2008. 
28 Daripada kosong and terbiar, lebih baik ada hasil. Household interview OP14: 50-year-old father of three, 
teacher, Opar, 15 May 2008. 
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Table 3 Reasons for participating in the SALCRA Bratak scheme (n=30). 
Reason for participation No. of responses 
(n=30) 
Dividends 9 
Work 5 
Land title 4 
To put land in children’s names for future 5 
Inheritance 5 
Forced to follow (terpaksa ikut) 5 
Follow the village (ikut kampung) 3 
Progress (kemajuan) 2 
 
The Bratak Estate 15 years on 
How did the establishment of the Bratak Estate affect the daily lives of the participants? Given 
the high proportion of Opar households contributing land to the Estate, it might be expected 
that it would play a bigger role in their lives, but this did not appear to the case. Of the 30 
participants interviewed in Opar, only six had already received their land titles by 2008. 
Nineteen had received dividends, but ten had still not received any payments. The employment 
opportunities provided by the Estate were not an option for most, one participant stating that it 
was only “a place of work for the old and uneducated.” One frustrated landholder exclaimed: 
“What has SALCRA done for the village? Nothing yet, no dividends yet, no money yet, but 
the palms are already tall.”29 Data provided by SALCRA show that the early phases of the 
Estate were producing reasonable yields (16 t/ha of fresh fruit bunches) and generating net 
proceeds30 of over MYR 2,000 per hectare in 2007 (Table 4). However, these returns were 
presumably unevenly distributed, depending on the area of land each household contributed 
and in which phase it was planted. SALCRA officials also pointed out that one key impact on 
                                               
29 Household interview OP10, 55-year-old woman, no children, farmer, Opar, 14 May 2008. 
30 Note that the payments to landholders are termed “net proceeds” rather than “dividends” as they are taken out 
before company tax. However, the term “dividends” is used in everyday references to the payments, including the 
official SALCRA song!  
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participating communities was due to the infrastructure provided, especially roads, but that (in 
their view) this was not sufficiently factored into the assessment of benefits.31 In Opar, 
SALCRA had helped to develop and maintain the village road and assisted in funding the 
community hall and football field.32 However, these investments were additional to the oil palm 
scheme and involved grants from the Sarawak Government that could have been made in the 
absence of the scheme. Even so, participants felt even the roads had not been maintained. When 
asked about the benefits of the scheme, one farmer responded: “Where are they [the benefits], 
there aren’t any. Even the road is ruined.” 33  
Table 4 Planted area, yield, and net proceeds of Bratak Oil Palm Estate by phase, 2007.  
Section of 
estate 
Year 
planted 
Area 
planted (ha) 
Yield 
(t/ha) 
Net 
proceeds 
(MYR) 
Net 
proceeds 
per ha 
(MYR) 
Phase 1 1993 412 16.2 845,000 2,051 
Phase 2 1994 417 16.4 880,000 2,110 
Phase 3 1995-1997 299 14.7 400,000 1,338 
Phase 4 1996 134 14.0 175,000 1,306 
Phase 5 1998-2000 866 13.2 780,000 901 
Phase 6 1998-1999 283 8.4 50,000 177 
Total 1993-2000 2,411 13.9 3,130,000 1,298 
Source: SALCRA (2008). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
(a) Land titles. The desire for secure title to land was very strong among the members of the 
Opar community, as among other Dayak groups in Sarawak. Though customary land tenure 
worked well in the past, when the community was smaller and the task was simply to allocate 
land for rice production each year (Bruno Manser Fund 2012), a number of factors were 
                                               
31 Key informant interview, SALCRA Head Office, 30 November 2007. 
32 Key informant interview, SALCRA Bratak Estate Manager, 27 May 2008. 
33 Mana ada, tidak ada, Jalan pun rusak. Household interview OP18: 49-year-old mother of six, farmer. Opar, 17 
May 2008. 
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combining to undermine the effectiveness of the customary tenure system. These included 
population growth, adoption of cash crops, outmigration of younger people, and growing 
interest from outsiders in Bidayuh land, whether urbanites interested in purchasing a small 
farm-lot or agribusiness firms wanting land for large-scale plantations. As expressed by the 
former headman: “Life can be a little hard for the Bidayuh people. There is land here, but the 
land has not yet been measured. So, we have NCR land, but we don’t have property rights. 
Chinese land, Malay land, is measured, and then they get property rights.”34 Hence one of the 
major attractions of participating in the SALCRA Estate was the promise of receiving 
individual titles to their land once the development loans had been repaid.  
However, this promise had not yet been fulfilled. Of the 30 participants interviewed in Opar, 
only six had already received their land titles by 2008. One-third of those interviewed did not 
know how long their land would be with SALCRA, and many feared that they had lost it 
altogether. One participant reported that his land had been with SALCRA for 10 years but he 
had still not received any dividends or land title; he had no idea about the status of his land. 
Such long waits for land titles are not isolated events. It took 20 years for a participant in 
another estate in SALCRA’s Bau-Lundu Region to receive his land title (Aubrey 2013). While 
it is unlikely that the legal security of title is under any threat, it is clear that many participants 
remained confused about the status of their land. 
One reason for the concern over land titles has been the change in the mode of labour 
management on the Estate. Initially, participants worked as household groups on their own 
land, thus reaffirming their connection with the land they had contributed. However, the Estate 
management stressed on a number of occasions that this was untenable for an efficient 
plantation business. Hence the practice was gradually changed to working as directed on other 
oil palm plots, but still in groups with family and friends. Eventually, management succeeded 
in assigning participants to work anywhere on the Estate, just as in a commercial plantation. 
People have accepted working on other people’s land, but still insist on working with people 
they know. 
Moreover, with the steady decline in the local labour force, for many participants access to the 
land and participation in the SALCRA scheme had come down to the communal work days 
(gotong royong) SALCRA organized up to four times a year. 35 These were communal “clean-
                                               
34 Key informant interview: former Opar Headman, 18 May 2008. 
35 Field notes from SALCRA plantation visit, 17 May 2008. 
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up days” on various plots within the Estate, where villagers helped to clear overgrown plots or 
carry out other maintenance work. This practice harked back to traditional community ways 
and was intended to build community spirit and identification with SALCRA while fostering 
a sense of ownership over and responsibility for the estate land as a whole. However, 
participation in the work days was not voluntary and absenting oneself carried a fine.  
(b) Employment. As mentioned above, the original SALCRA concept was that participating 
households would work on their own lots as “managed smallholders”, rather than merely 
pooling their land as an undivided plantation worked by mobile labour gangs, as in the joint-
venture schemes brokered by LCDA. Participants were paid a modest daily wage for the work 
undertaken, which was a cost to be added to the participant’s development debt and hence 
deducted from scheme revenue before net proceeds could be paid. Progressively, as noted 
above, the Estate sought to manage labour on more commercial lines, with labour gangs 
working under field supervisors in any part of the plantation, as required – as one official put 
it, “they must work where they are told.”36 However, plantation work did not appeal to many 
villagers, who had other farm and non-farm employment options. As one informant said: “For 
me it’s not so good: hard work, low wages, why would I want to work there!”37 The wife of 
another participant, who had three children in Miri, Bau, and Peninsular Malaysia respectively, 
said in relation to young people working as plantation labour: “More glamour in Kuching. Very 
hot, sweating [in plantations]. In supermarket very cool, they get to see boys.”38 
Moreover, the managers had a negative view of the quality of the local workforce and steadily 
pushed for the recruitment of Indonesian workers. On a number of occasions in the JPLS 
meetings attended, SALCRA officials stressed to the assembled village representatives that 
local workers put in less effort than Indonesian workers. At one such meeting in 2007, the 
manager of the Jagoi Estate asserted that locals work “three days on, two off, two on, three 
off”, whereas the Indonesian labourers worked straight through.39 An official from SALCRA’s 
Head Office continued this sentiment as he went through a chart of the yields of each plot in 
the estate.40 He highlighted the plots where locals worked, saying they often wanted time off, 
                                               
36 Key informant interview with senior SALCRA official outlining SALCRA’s running methods during a meeting 
at the head office, 30 November 2008. 
37 Kurang baik bagi saya; kerja susah, gaki kecil. Mana saya mau kerja di dalam! Household interview OP18. 
38 Household interview OP14: Wife’s comments about how her children viewed plantation labour. She had one 
child working in the army, one working in a large company, and one still at school. Opar 15 May 2008.  
39 Key informant interview: SALCRA Jagoi Plantation Manager, 11 December 2007. 
40 Information obtained during JPLS meeting at SALCRA Jagoi Estate, 11 December 2007. 
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especially if their rice or pepper needed attention. He also referred to a pattern of “always three 
days on, three days off”. The official said that local workers were good but did not understand 
the business of oil palm, for example, how much is a ton of fruit. In some areas they just wanted 
to harvest along the roads, where the work was easier, leaving the palms that were further in. 
He concluded that if you wait for local workers you will “die bankrupt”.  
When interviewed privately the same day, the Jagoi Estate Manager went on to say: 
Orang kampung [villagers] are moody. I sometimes argue with them. They start work 
at 6 am, the fruit pick-up point can be full by 8 am, but the local contractor doesn’t 
arrive until 10 am. Then they work a bit, then stop for a 2-hour lunch. They make 20 
ringgit and then stop work, even if it’s only 1-3 pm. They think that they have made 
enough money for the day, [but] don’t think about later. Sometimes lorry drivers are 
very keen, come to the office and wait for work when there’s not a lot of fruit. But 
when there’s a lot of fruit they complain, “Oh boss, I’m very tired, there’s so much 
fruit and tomorrow again, but yesterday nothing.” Sometimes they just go home and 
leave the fruit.41 
At the meeting of the Jagoi JPLS the following year (2008), the Estate manager organized a 
field trip for the JPLS members which I joined. On the drive out to the site, the manager 
explained why he was taking them to the steep plots of mature, unpruned oil palm at Sebobok: 
“We bring them here to show them how hard it will get. That we have to find another way. We 
need foreign workers.”42 Once there, the mainly elderly JPLS members were encouraged to try 
to prune old palm fronds, using a pole that was around 12 to 13 metres long. It was hot and 
difficult work which they struggled to perform. Later, in a small hut in the same field, the 
manager stated: “We don’t take away their chance to work; we just help them to realize what 
it is like.”   
When fieldwork was undertaken in 2008, there were 260 workers in the Bratak Estate. Of these, 
128 were Opar residents (out of a population of 1,659), including 16 office workers, nine 
foremen, 15 loaders, and 88 general workers. Many of these general workers were women 
engaged in fertilising and weeding in small groups with relatives and friends. The remaining 
132 were Indonesian workers, primarily employed as harvesters. Pay-day at the Bratak Estate 
saw a flurry of activity – a queue of small vans selling soft drinks, cakes, vegetables, fish, and 
                                               
41 Key informant interview: SALCRA official, 16 May 2008. 
42 Key informant interview: SALCRA Jagoi Plantation Manager, 16 May 2008. 
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clothes lined up waiting for the Indonesian workers to receive their wages. These vans followed 
pay-days around the different estates. Also present was a shop owner from Opar, waiting to 
collect the money he was owed by Indonesian workers for produce advanced from his village 
store. Indonesian workers were not allowed to leave the estate without written permission from 
the management, so the shop owner would deliver produce to them when they called, extending 
lines of credit until pay-day.  
The preference for employing Indonesian workers had become quite common in SALCRA’s 
schemes (as in private oil palm plantations). A case study of SALCRA’s Lemanak and Batu 
Kaya Oil Palm Estates in the Sri Aman Region found that only 20 per cent of households had 
family members working on the estates (Blandoi 2002). Participation was influenced by 
household size and the area of land contributed. Larger households supplied more labour but 
those contributing more land were less likely to be working there (Blandoi 2002). As one Opar 
participant observed: “They [SALCRA] had a good idea, but when it comes to implementation 
it is not good. In the beginning, you could work on your own land, but now it’s just 
foreigners.”43 Yet the SALCRA narrative (and that of the Sarawak Government as a whole) 
still emphasizes that “these projects provide employment opportunities for the rural 
communities” (SALCRA 2012). 
The SALCRA Culture: Protest, Persuasion, and Participation  
At one level, the SALCRA Bratak Oil Palm Scheme was merely a contractual arrangement 
between Opar landholders and SALCRA, and the issues raised by participants were matters of 
contractual details – When will titles be issued? Why are dividends so low? However, there 
was another level of interaction in which SALCRA actively sought to manage, not just the oil 
palm plantation, but the individuals and communities involved, through the development and 
promotion of a “SALCRA culture.”   
The JPL was the main channel of communication between the estate management and the 
village. All villages participating in the Bratak Estate had one JPL member, except Opar which 
had two due to its greater size. The JPLS meetings had a functional aspect, allowing estate 
management to go over general plantation information and plans. However, they also had 
overtones of social control. To begin the second JPL meeting of the year at the Bratak Estate, 
the Community Development Assistant read out SALCRA’s aims: “Work together, reach 
                                               
43 Household interview OP14, 50-year-old father of three, teacher, Opar, 15 May 2008. 
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target, harmony between SALCRA and plantation.”44 Thus the meetings were used to identify 
and address any issues or conflicts that had arisen. Indeed, SALCRA management viewed the 
JPLS as the “eyes and ears of the estate in the village.”45 
There was evidence that critics of SALCRA among the landholders were either progressively 
brought into the “inner circle” or subjected to vilification to undermine their influence. As one 
villager put it: “The people in the past who strongly protested have become the important 
people.”46 On the other hand, the headman of Opar at the time of fieldwork was labelled “anti-
development” by SALCRA officials on a number of occasions. He had been slow to contribute 
land to the scheme and in JPLS meetings he was the only member observed to consistently ask 
about land survey progress and estate management. It was remarked by a visiting SALCRA 
official to the Bratak Estate JPLS meeting that “he has a brain that is a little anti-SALCRA.”47 
In 2007 a letter of complaint about SALCRA, written by a participant from the Undan Estate, 
was read out at each SALCRA estate during that month’s JPLS meetings by a visiting 
SALCRA official.48 It clearly outlined what were the main issues for many of the participants 
interviewed: 
1. SALCRA has let the Bidayuh community down and should employ the sons 
and daughters of the shareholders. 
2. Shareholders should be encouraged to be workers, but SALCRA takes foreign 
workers because they take a lower wage. 
3. Local Bidayuh contractors should be employed building houses, as fertilizer 
suppliers, roads, grass cutting, etc. 
4. Social obligation by supplying scholarships to learn. Also, for toilets, etc. 
5. Profit/loss statement should be more transparent. 
6. Villagers must have a representative from each village/estate on the board. 
7. Plantation land must be surveyed and land title issued. 
8. Plantations must be well maintained – not too much fruit unharvested, lots of 
grass and bad roads. 
                                               
44 Information obtained during SALCRA Bratak JPLS meeting, 15 May 2008. 
45 Information obtained during SALCRA Bratak JPLS meeting, 15 May 2008. 
46 In past orang yang kuat protes menjadi orang tinggi. Key informant interview, Opar resident OpW. 
47 Information obtained during SALCRA Bratak JPLS meeting, 7 May 2008. 
48 Letter read by visiting SALCRA official at JPLS meeting at Jagoi Estate, 11 December 2007. 
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After reading out the letter at the Jagoi Estate’s JPLS meeting, the official stated that the writer 
would be “called to SALCRA to explain.” He went on to say that if “anyone meets him, they 
need to give him advice, because maybe he doesn’t understand.” He darkly suggested a 
subversive influence: “Maybe it’s [the protest letter] not from his own heart, maybe it’s from 
someone else. He will only hurt himself.”49 
The next day at the Undan meeting, the official went on to explain why some of the estates 
underperformed, using the analogy of raising children: 
There are 130-150 palms per hectare that SALCRA must teach. Children get low marks 
even though the teacher tries. Or if all go to the hospital, there will also be those that 
die. It’s the same in the plantation; there will definitely be some that die. Every office 
has problems; there are none that are perfect. 
A JPLS member responded that SALCRA was good because they issued land titles, regardless 
of the plantation results. He added that he had eight children but not all were successful; only 
three had degrees or diplomas. However, another member, who was also a teacher, asserted 
that many people in the Bau-Lundu Region had issues like those outlined in the complaint 
letter. According to him, many were unhappy with SALCRA because the agency “produced 
no results”.50 
Another important aspect of SALCRA’s attention to building a “SALCRA culture” was the 
regional SALCRA festival, held just before the official Sarawak-wide Dayak harvest festival 
(Gawai Dayak). I observed one such festival on 24 May 2008 in the SALCRA Stenggang Oil 
Palm Estate hall. It was a full day devoted to appreciation and celebration of SALCRA. 
Organised via the JPLS meetings, each estate was instructed to bring 400 people, all of whom 
had to be dressed in batik or gawai clothing.51 Over 3,000 people attended. The festival 
included markets, music, food, and an exhibition about SALCRA, all culminating in the final 
speech by Alfred Jabu Numpang, the long-serving and politically powerful SALCRA 
Chairman.52 
                                               
49 SALCRA Undan JPLS meeting, 12 December 2007. 
50 SALCRA Undan JPLS meeting, 12 December 2007. 
51 SALCRA Bratak JPLS meeting, 15 May 2008.  
52 His full title was “Yang Berhormat Datuk Patinggi Tan Sri (Dr.) Alfred Jabu Anak Numpang, Deputy Chief 
Minister, Minister for Modernisation of Agriculture, and Minister for Rural Development.” 
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To an outsider, the day felt like it was on hold until Jabu arrived – a “Festival of Jabu.”53 As 
the stairs were hurriedly vacuumed, the long-waiting participants were told to stand up, clap, 
and show respect when he finally arrived. Eventually the sound of his helicopter was heard and 
everyone hurried into place. Once he was on stage, there was a slide show of Alfred Jabu among 
the oil palms, walking, talking, and taking photos. This was followed by everyone singing the 
song he had composed, “Advance SALCRA”, and then sitting again to hear a long speech that 
was a heady mix of English, Bidayuh, and Malay, filled with references to the faults of the 
opposition parties and the strengths of SALCRA. “The opposition just suppress and oppress 
NCR landowners. So please don’t be hoodwinked,” he shouted.  
He went on to cite statistics, encouraging any reporters present to write things down, 
highlighting that dividends totaling MYR 45 million had been distributed to 3,233 participants 
from 36 villages over the past 12 years.54 While the “trouble-makers did not want to see 
progress, before SALCRA, people were poor, but not anymore.” At times he loudly shouted in 
a mix of Bidayuh and Malay: “Lots and lots of money. Lots and lots of money. Receive millions 
upon millions of dividends. Lots and lots of money. Extra clever from school.”55 However, the 
total of MYR 45 million would average only MYR 14,000 per participant for 12 years of 
participation. This figure would vary, depending on the amount and quality of land contributed 
and for how long it had been in the scheme. Add to this the limited employment opportunities 
with SALCRA, and participants were not happy with the outcomes of participation. 
  
                                               
53 I made this observation after waiting four hours for him to arrive. In the interim, participants were continually 
reminded how to behave when he arrived. This was a similar feeling to each of the dividend ceremonies that I 
attended. The scheme participants seemed like an afterthought, compared to the Minister’s issuing of statements 
for the press.  
54 As was pointed out in the very active Sarawak blogosphere, this averages out at just over MYR 1,000 per 
participant per year, or about one month’s wages as a farm labourer. 
55 “Bogo-bogo duit. Banyak-banyak wang. Terima dividend berjuta-juta. Bogo-bogo duit, pandai-pandai sekolah.” 
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Conclusion 
A verse of the “Advance SALCRA” anthem (as sung at the SALCRA Festival in 2008) 
declares:     
Thirty years SALCRA has succeeded 
All participants are happy and prosperous 
Receive dividends and get richer 
All thanks to SALCRA.56 
In 2017, the author of this song, the former Deputy Chief Minister, Alfred Jabu Numpang, 
stepped down as SALCRA Chairman, and current Deputy Chief Minister and Minister of 
Modernisation of Agriculture, Native Land, and Regional Development, Douglas Uggah 
Embas (a nephew of Jabu), took over (Borneo Post Online 2017). It was the end of the Jabu 
Era. The SALCRA General Manager, Vasco Sabat Singkang, pledged his support to the new 
leader in glowing terms, stating: “You are the beacon of hope for SALCRA. You have the 
vision to improve our rural community in terms of social and economic development” (Borneo 
Post Online 2017). This comes at a time when SALCRA is expanding into new regions in the 
Kapit Division, including their first foray into developing oil palm on State land. Thus, the 
depiction of SALCRA’s future in the media and in government propaganda is bright. 
In 2017, SALCRA’s webpage reiterated the “Benefits of Participating in SALCRA’s Projects” 
as follows: (a) issuance of land titles; (b) payment of dividends; (c) opportunities for 
employment; (d) entrepreneurship; (e) accessibility to infrastructure; (f) local involvement in 
management (SALCRA 2016a). The page went on to state: “It takes many decades of changing 
the mindset of the rural communities to accept change: moving from subsistence farming to 
commercial plantations” (SALCRA 2016b). However, the same concerns expressed during 
fieldwork in Opar and surrounding estates remain. Many landowners are aggrieved at waiting 
20 years for a land title, not receiving dividends after well over a decade of participation and 
obtaining few desirable employment opportunities (Sarawak Development Institute 2009; 
Aubrey 2013). As for entrepreneurship and local involvement in management, these have been 
minimal or non-existent. In terms of infrastructure, it can be argued that it is the responsibility 
of the State government to provide basic infrastructure, which should not be contingent on 
participation in large-scale oil palm schemes.  
                                               
56 Verse of song “Advance SALCRA”, written by Alfred Jabu Numpang, Chairman of SALCRA and, until 2016, 
Deputy Chief Minister of Sarawak. 
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The experience of participating in SALCRA schemes has varied – within and between schemes 
and over time for any one participant or scheme. The participants in the Bratak Estate from 
Opar had also experienced a wide range of outcomes, but many felt they had not received the 
benefits they expected. A few well-connected participants had obtained good employment, had 
received a flow of dividends, and had been issued with land titles. However, most had received 
limited financial returns, no land titles, and few realistic employment opportunities, even after 
more than a decade of participation. Moreover, the nature of participation had changed, with 
landholders increasingly detached from their land. In reality, SALCRA no longer managed 
smallholders in situ, but developed and managed land as a large-scale commercial plantation 
on behalf of the owners. A range of persuasive and coercive measures had been deployed to 
bring about this radical change in management, notably subjugating participants to the 
“SALCRA culture.”  
For some, the ability to turn their land into an income-generating asset (or “capitalizing their 
land”) was the ideal way to support their mainly non-farm livelihoods and to have a valuable 
asset to pass on to their children. Such villagers had no desire to work in the oil palm plantation, 
and also had higher aspirations for their children. For others, seeing their land progressively 
managed as a large plantation and worked by Indonesian labour was a major social and 
economic change to which they were struggling to adjust. In either case, SALCRA had not 
been able to provide the full range of benefits that the organization promised (and still 
promises) and had not been the “catalyst of rural development” that many NCR landowners in 
Opar had hoped for. The questions are whether this was the inevitable outcome of the changes 
in Sarawak’s rural economy over the 40 years of SALCRA’s operation, and whether 
landowners would have been better off under any alternative arrangement, such as the joint-
venture schemes considered in the next chapter. 
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5. THE JOINT-VENTURE MODEL: ENABLING PRIVATE COMPANIES TO DEVELOP NATIVE CUSTOMARY LAND 
CHAPTER 6 
THE JOINT-VENTURE MODEL: 
ENABLING PRIVATE COMPANIES TO DEVELOP NATIVE CUSTOMARY LAND 
“We are not sincere in the way we develop NCR [Native Customary Rights] land.”57 
Introduction 
The rapid rate of oil palm development on State land in Sarawak led to pressure to make Native 
Customary Land (NCL) available for private development. On the one hand, the Sarawak 
Government attempted to narrow the legal definition of NCL so that more land could be 
designated as State land and leased to private companies, either in their own right or as joint 
ventures with the Land Custody and Development Authority (LCDA, also referred to by its 
Malay acronym, PELITA). On the other, the Government introduced its New Concept of 
Development on Native Customary Rights Land (Konsep Baru) in 1995, whereby large areas 
of NCL would be held in trust by LCDA, which would then enter into joint ventures with 
private plantation companies – the company holding 60 per cent of the shares, the landholders 
30 per cent, and LCDA 10 per cent. By late 2016, LCDA had brokered development of 79,000 
hectares in 48 Konsep Baru projects, involving more than 40 joint-venture companies (Wong 
2016). However, there is a growing body of research that highlights serious flaws in the joint-
venture model and its implementation (Majid Cooke 2002; Ngidang 2002; Majid Cooke 2006b; 
McCarthy & Cramb 2009; Cramb & Ferraro 2012; Cramb 2013a; Cramb 2016). These issues 
include the way joint-venture projects acquire customary land, their methods of development, 
how they are managed by the private sector partner, and the lack of promised dividends.  
In 1993, a Bidayuh village in Lundu District in southwestern Sarawak, close to the Indonesian 
border, entered into a 25-year agreement with the Sarawak Land Consolidation and 
Rehabilitation Authority (SALCRA) to participate in the 9,271-hectare Raya Oil Palm Project 
– a managed smallholder scheme that guaranteed the landholders’ customary title to the land. 
However, in 1997, under the Konsep Baru policy, the project was handed to LCDA to be 
implemented as a joint-venture scheme under a new 60-year agreement in which land title was 
held by a joint-venture company. The landholders were now locked into a joint venture with 
                                               
57 Interview with private consultant and former Land Custody and Development Authority (LCDA) employee, in 
relation to a LCDA joint-venture oil palm scheme in Sibu Division, 27 November, 2007. 
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one of the largest oil palm conglomerates in Malaysia, Rimbunan Hijau (RH). Over 40 per cent 
of the original 9,271 hectares was now designated as State land and incorporated in a second 
LCDA joint-venture with an RH subsidiary. RH, at the behest of its political patron, Abdul 
Taib Mahmud (Sarawak’s former Chief Minister and now Governor), would go on to 
systematically acquire another 9,300 hectares in the vicinity of the Raya Project, some of which 
was developed under a rental model that fell outside the Konsep Baru guidelines. Ultimately, 
from RH’s point of view and as seen by many of the landholders, there was one large privately-
managed oil palm development of nearly 20,000 hectares simply known as “Raya”. 
In this chapter, I examine how such a radical and large-scale transformation came about by 
exploring how the original SALCRA project became two LCDA-brokered joint-ventures with 
RH, the extent to which landholders were participants in this process, and how RH went on to 
increase its land holdings in the surrounding region. I consider why landowners chose to 
participate, the outcomes they experienced as a result of entering into the joint venture and 
other agreements, and the degree to which their initial expectations were met. I also consider 
how this unfolding saga has impacted on the relationships between the principal actors – 
LCDA, RH, and the customary landowners. In the process, I hope to shed some light on the 
joint-venture approach to developing customary land in Sarawak. More broadly, this case 
studies also aims to highlight theoretical issues of power, negotiation and access in the rural 
landscape. 
Methods 
In exploring the Konsep Baru approach, in 2008 I visited four LCDA joint-venture projects in 
the southern, central, and northern regions of Sarawak with LCDA officials and plantation 
managers – PJP PELITA Lundu, Boustead PELITA Kanowit, PJP PELITA Ulu Teru, and SPB 
PELITA Suai (Figure 10, p. 91). I decided to focus on the PJP PELITA Lundu scheme as a 
detailed case study. As the research in Lundu unfolded, I visited three related schemes that fell 
outside the Konsep Baru model –PJP PELITA Biawak (a joint venture between LCDA and a 
RH subsidiary on disputed State land) and two project sites for a new rental model implemented 
by RH on customary land, Ezy Saga (Sebandi Ulu) and Wealth Ezy (Sebandi Hilir). The four 
schemes in Lundu were all managed by RH as a single large plantation, referred to here as the 
Raya Plantation. 
The village of Selampit, located in what is now called the PJP PELITA Lundu Estate, was 
selected for the in-depth case study. This village was in relatively close proximity to the other 
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three case-study villages in the thesis research (Sebandi Ulu, Sebandi Hilir, and Opar). I lived 
with a family in the village for six weeks (September-November 2008). Due to the complex 
history of what began as the SALCRA Raya Oil Palm Project, involving changing names and 
contractual arrangements, the overall project site will be referred to as the Raya Plantation. The 
name “Raya” was still in common usage during fieldwork, despite it being over a decade since 
SALCRA had handed over the project. Individual estate names will still be used when referring 
to specific projects within the Raya precinct. The Raya Plantation is also a fitting name as Raya 
translates as “great” or “main”. “The Great Plantation” is in line with the grandeur and 
overtones of prosperity that are often attached to RH company names.58 
Thirty semi-structured interviews were undertaken with a random sample of scheme 
participants. Interviews were conducted in Malay, English, or a mix of both, and generally 
occurred in the participant’s home. Thirteen women and 17 men from separate households were 
interviewed, who ranged in age from 34 to 90. All interviewees were assigned a code name to 
minimize the risk of repercussions from talking about land issues. Further interviews were 
undertaken with key informants, including LCDA scheme officials and field staff, RH senior 
staff, plantation managers, contractors, and plantation employees, district officials, and local 
residents. In addition to interviews and observations, secondary data were obtained from 
government documents, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) reports, research journals, 
and newspaper articles.  
The Joint-Venture Model in Sarawak 
Native Customary Rights to Land 
Traditional land tenure systems in Sarawak developed from the complete reliance rural 
communities had on their surrounding environment. Given the imperatives of subsistence, 
solidarity, and survival (Azima et al. 2015), communities developed an intimate knowledge of 
their landscape, resources, territorial boundaries, and individual land rights. In Bidayuh land 
tenure systems, as first described by Geddes (1954) for the Sadong Bidayuh, individual land 
rights were recognized within a network of kin and community relations.  
Although much of the land belonging to Dayak villages in the Sadong has many people 
sharing in its ownership, the system of land tenure is in no sense a communal one, for 
                                               
58 The name Rimbunan Hijau (RH) literally means “green lushness” or “evergreen”, translated from the Mandarin 
characters to denote perpetual success. 
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each of these persons has his or her particular rights defined in such a way that there 
should be no conflict with the rights of the others (Geddes 1954:59). 
Thus, although these customary tenure systems were often obscure to outsiders, they 
functioned well for Bidayuh and other Dayak communities in rural Sarawak as they utilized 
the land and forest for their livelihoods. Moreover, the attachment to the land of their ancestors 
remains strong. As expressed by one respondent when asked what his land meant to him: 
“Grandchildren – if there is land, we can say that our grandchildren are secure.” 59 
Unlike many colonial regimes, Sarawak under the Brooke Raj (1841-1946) and then as a 
British Crown Colony (1946-1963) gave recognition in various statutes to what it termed 
“native customary rights” to land, albeit in limited form. The earlier Brooke legislation was 
consolidated in two key pieces of legislation in the British period that have influenced the 
current legislation governing the recognition and protection of native customary rights to land 
– the 1948 Land (Classification) Ordinance and the 1958 Land Code (Bulan 2006).  
The Land (Classification) Ordinance provided for the division of land into distinct racially-
defined categories – Mixed Zone Land (which could be owned by Sarawakians of any race, 
including Chinese); Native Area Land (titled land which could only be owned by designated 
“natives”, including Malays and the various Dayak groups); Reserved Land (held by the state, 
mainly as Forest Reserves); and Interior Area Land (not yet classified or allocated). Native 
Customary Land was untitled land over which native customary rights were held, whether 
individually or in common as a Native Communal Reserve (Bulan 2006). Native Customary 
Land is often referred to in Sarawak as NCR land and can be found in any of the above zones. 
These classifications placed restrictions on those designated as “non-natives”, in particular, the 
Sarawak Chinese, from acquiring or leasing Native Customary Land. The exclusion of Chinese 
from NCR land would become a key motivation for developing Konsep Baru, as the joint-
venture model was seen as a method for private plantation companies, predominately Chinese-
owned, to gain access to large tracts of NCR land for the first time.  
The Sarawak Land Code of 1958, as subsequently amended, remains the overriding land law 
in Sarawak. Despite common usage of the term “native customary rights”, there is no formal 
definition of such rights in the Land Code. The Code defined Native Customary Land as “land 
in which native customary rights, whether communal or otherwise, have lawfully been created 
                                               
59 Cucu, kalau tanah ada, kita bisa kata cucu aman. Household interview with Sela 3, 40-year-old father of two 
who worked as a RH load supervisor (Selampit, 8 October 2008). 
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prior to the 1st day of January 1958 and still subsist as such” (Bian 2007). The Code listed 
various means by which native customary rights could be lawfully acquired, including the 
clearing of forest for farming, in recognition of the importance of shifting cultivation in Dayak 
agriculture. However, subsequent amendments under the government of Abdul Taib Mahmud 
have made it more difficult for Dayak landholders to assert native customary rights over the 
territories to which they traditionally laid claim, including forest reserves not cleared for 
farming (Majid Cooke 2006b; Bian 2007). 
Despite the lack of formal title to their land, Bidayuh and Iban smallholders continue to 
successfully pursue semi-commercial agriculture as a key livelihood strategy, allocating land 
and labour resources between subsistence rice farming and oil palm, rubber, pepper, and other 
cash crops, depending upon the global markets at the time. However, village-based 
smallholders occupying customary land have found this system increasingly difficult to 
maintain in the face of the oil palm boom. This is primarily due to the combination of natural 
resource wealth and economic poverty in Sarawak, which makes large areas of NCR land prime 
targets for large-scale oil palm development using private capital (Majid Cooke 2002). Native 
Customary Land in Sarawak thus became the final development frontier (Cramb 2013a).  
The Increasing Policy Emphasis on Private Corporations in Land Development 
While private investment in the agricultural sector was encouraged in the Sixth Malaysia Plan 
(1990-1995), it was fully embraced in the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000) (Malaysian 
Economic Planning Unit 1990, 1996). As outlined in the Seventh Malaysia Plan, “the private 
sector is expected to play a great role in agricultural development thereby reducing the role of 
the public sector in agriculture. In this regard, agricultural agencies will be revamped with the 
view to increasing their efficiency and effectiveness (Malaysian Economic Planning Unit 1996, 
p. 259). 
In Sarawak, the implementation of any new in-situ managed smallholder schemes by FELCRA 
and SALCRA, both of which dealt with NCR land, was expected to be on a commercial basis 
with the private sector. In addition, the private sector was to be encouraged by state land 
development agencies, especially in the role of managing existing schemes. The Federal 
Government further wanted state governments to improve databases for “idle land” and to 
enforce all provisions relating to the development of idle land (Malaysian Economic Planning 
Unit 1996). 
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This shift away from public sector in-situ land development methods was underscored by a 
significant reduction in Federal agricultural funding to Sarawak in the Seventh Malaysia Plan 
(Table 5). The allocation for new land development was reduced to just 7.8 per cent of the total 
agricultural budget (Malaysian Economic Planning Unit 1996). This would now provide only 
basic infrastructure, as agencies were expected to partner with the private sector for the land 
development itself. In-situ land development schemes such as those undertaken by SALCRA 
were still given strong support during the Sixth Malaysia Plan but the rate of new land 
conversion was seen to have slowed due to factors including the unwillingness of NCR 
landowners to participate in development schemes (Malaysian Economic Planning Unit 1996). 
Table 5 Development allocation for agricultural land development in the Sixth and Seventh Malaysia Plans (1990-
2000). 
Agricultural Programs Sixth Malaysia Plan 
1990-1995 
(MYR million) 
Seventh Malaysia Plan 
1996- 2000 
(MYR million) 
Percentage 
change 
New Land Development 1,279.2 590 - 46.1 
In-situ Land Development 3,167.4 1,736 - 54.8 
Total 4,446.6 2,326 - 52.3 
Source: Malaysian Economic Planning Unit (1996) 
The Joint-Venture Approach to Developing NCR Land 
In line with this shift to the private sector, the New Concept of Development on Native 
Customary Rights Land (Konsep Baru), the brainchild of then Chief Minister, Abdul Taib 
Mahmud, was introduced in 1996. Taib believed that rural NCR landowners must embrace 
large-scale oil palm development by placing their land within a corporate structure, and was 
adamant that the Konsep Baru was the best way to do it (Ministry of Land Development 1997). 
This was to be done by inviting private plantation companies to develop large blocks of NCR 
land, thus creating “win-win investment opportunities” (Ministry of Land Development 1997, 
2014). As argued in the Government’s Handbook on New Concept of Development on Native 
Customary Rights (NCR) Land, “plantation development is the most natural and practical way 
of developing NCR land on a large-scale basis that could provide optimum returns on 
investment on sustainable basis” (Ministry of Land Development 1997, p. 9).  
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The model involved pooling together individual parcels of NCR land into “land banks” with a 
minimum contiguous area of 5,000 hectares, with the native customary rights to the land held 
in trust by the LCDA. Then a joint-venture company (JVC) would be created between an 
approved private investor and LCDA. The investor would own 60 per cent of the shareholdings, 
the NCR landowners 30 per cent), and LCDA 10 per cent (Ministry of Land Development 
1997). An agricultural lease would then be issued to the JVC for 60 years (two planting cycles 
for oil palm). The Handbook booklet that was distributed to NCR landowners in targeted 
development areas (including landowners in Selampit) listed the benefits to the participants as 
follows (Ministry of Land Development 1997, p. 24): 
(a) Their idle land will be developed into modern plantation estates with provision of 
adequate infrastructure facilities such as roads, buildings, factories, schools, etc. [that] 
will increase the value of their land. 
(b) 30% share of profits of the JVC 
(c) Investment in Unit Trust  
(d) Cash up-front payment (10 per cent of the total value of the said land) 
(e) Job opportunities 
(f) Stable income in the form of bonus and dividends 
(g) Other benefits 
Joint-venture projects were rolled out from one end of Sarawak to the other. In 2008, at the 
time of fieldwork, LCDA had 31 approved NCR projects spread across Sarawak (Figure 10;           
Table 6). The projects were mostly slotted in between larger private plantations developed on 
State land, helping to the private companies to expand their land banks. Seven of these projects 
(23 per cent) were joint ventures with RH or one of its subsidiaries. From 2003 to 2010, LCDA 
had signed 31 Joint Venture Agreements to develop 34 NCR estates (some projects covered 
more than one estate) with a total area of 316,187 hectares (PELITA Digital Spatial Information 
Management Sector 2007). However, the total planted area was just 56,258 hectares.  
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Figure 10 Location of 31 joint-venture projects on NCR land in Sarawak, 2007. Projects 1, 16, 27, and 31 were visited for this research. Source: PELITA 
Digital Spatial Information Management Sector. Note: Plantation names are clearly listed in Table 6 on next page. Map is in colour and visible on-line. 
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          Table 6 Details of 31 joint-venture projects in Sarawak, 2007. 
No.  Joint-venture company1  Area2 
(ha) 
Private-sector partner3 
 
Police 
report 
Block-
ades 
Conflict Court 
cases 
Land 
Bank 
Southern Region 
1 PJP PELITA Lundu  6,918 Pemandangan Jauh Plantation (PJP) Y Y Y Y Y 
2 KTS PELITA Simunjan  4,674 KTS Group Y Y    
3 KTS PELITA Simunjan  6,122 KTS Group Y Y    
4 Tetangga Akrab PELITA Pantu  6,870 Kumpulan Sama Sdn. Bhd. Y Y Y Y  
5 Tetangga Akrab PELITA Kranggas  2,952 Kumpulan Sama Sdn. Bhd. Y  Y Y  
6 Tetangga Akrab PELITA Kranggas  69  Kumpulan Sama Sdn. Bhd. Y  Y Y  
7 Harn Len PELITA Begunan  7,357 Premium Dragon Sdn. Bhd.    Y  
8 Harn Len PELITA Begunan  4,276 As for 7     Y  
9 Harn Len PELITA Begunan  6,650 As for 7    Y  
10 FC PELITA Undop  14,500 No information found      
11 TH PELITA Beladin  1,577 TH Plantations Berhad     Y  
12 A&M PELITA Spaoh-Debak   15,130 A&M Realty Berhad No information found 
13 Kabo Awek Betong 8,500 No information found No information found 
Central Region 
14 SPB Wak Pakan Plantation             5,340 Sarawak Plantation Berhad (SPB) Project dormant Y 
15 Block A PELITA Kanowit 10,000 No information found No information found 
16 Boustead PELITA Kanowit 24,000 Boustead Y Y  Y  
17 Ta Ann PELITA Kanowit (Lesih)                  7,000 Ta Ann Group    Y  
18 Palmraya PELITA Spapa Oya 5,440 Palmraya No information found 
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19 Palmraya PELITA Sikat 6,575 As for 18 Y Y Y   
20 PJP PELITA Selangau  5,824 PJP No information found 
21 Palmraya PELITA Meruan 5,400 Palmraya  Y Y    
22  SPB PELITA Mukah (5 & 6) 5,445 Sarawak Plantation Berhad (SPB) Project dormant Y 
23 Ulu Balingian (Block A & B) 14,416 Kwantas      
Northern Region 
24 Ta Ann PELITA Silas  11,000 Ta Ann Group   Y  Y 
25 Ta Ann PELITA Silas 13,000 Ta Ann Group   Y  Y 
26 DD PELITA Sebungan  10,000 Double Dynasty Plantations No information found 
27 SPB PELITA Suai (formerly Titian Tepat Sdn. Bhd.). 2,128 Sarawak Plantation Berhad (SPB) Y Y  Y  
28 SOP PELITA Bekenu & Niah 6,841 Sarawak Oil Palm (SOP) Y Y Y Y Y 
29 SOP PELITA Kedayan-Keluli  2,247 Sarawak Oil Palm (SOP)     Y 
30 PJP PELITA Ulu Teru 7,902 PJP disposed of shares to LAKMNS but still manages plantation Y Y Y   
31 PJP PELITA Long Ekang-Banyok  3,367 PJP No information found 
Total  Data on 21 plantations 226,075  12 10 7 12 7 
1 The names are followed by “Plantation Sdn Bhd”, meaning “proprietary limited”. 
2 The areas refer to the gross area approved for development; the planted areas were less. 
3 Note that seven of the projects (shaded) have a RH company as the joint-venture partner.  
  Sources: See Appendix E. 
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The initial concerns raised by NCR landowners with regard to the Konsep Baru projects (both 
in the case-study site and in other project sites across Sarawak) included feeling that they lacked 
a real choice about whether to participate; having little control over the initial negotiation 
process; concern over whether the land title for the joint-venture estate would still recognise 
the rights and boundaries of the individual landowners; and uncertainty over whether the land 
would be returned at the end of the lease period (Majid Cooke 2002, 2006b; Vermeulen & 
Goad 2006; Colchester et al. 2007). With regard to the last concern, a Boustead plantation 
manager in the first joint-venture project at Kanowit (No. 16 in Figure 10, and Table 6) offered 
the opinion that “in 60 years people won’t have an attachment to the land.”60 However, concern 
over long-term title to individually-owned plots of land has remained very real, as discussed 
further below. 
In general, the early concerns expressed by landholders have proved to be well-founded. The 
vast majority of Konsep Baru joint ventures have had disputes (see Table 6, p.92). These were 
primarily around issues relating to the plantation company’s methods of land acquisition and 
the management of operations on the plantation, including employment of local labour. As time 
went by, however, the major issue was the failure of the joint-venture companies (JVCs) to 
declare or disburse dividends. By 2009, only one of the 34 joint-venture projects had distributed 
“dividends”, following blockades, protests, and legal action by the participants, though the 
payments were small and did not actually come from company profits (Cramb 2013b). This 
scenario has been repeated across Sarawak. Meanwhile, LCDA, the trustee appointed to 
manage the interests of the landowners, has done little on their behalf. As one former LCDA 
employee put it, “all 23 projects are not in LCDA’s control; rather they are in the private 
sector’s hands.”61 
In 2013, the Sarawak Dayak Iban Association (SADIA) was assisting in 200 court cases related 
to claimed violations of native customary rights, many of them arising from joint-venture 
schemes (Sarawak Dayak Iban Association 2013). RH-linked companies were the private-
sector partner in seven of the 31 projects listed in Table 6 (p. 92).  Four of these had disputes 
with their participants. However, this number may be higher as some communities’ grievances 
                                               
60 Interview with manager of Boustead Kelimut (Kanowit) Estate, 27 November 2007. 
61 Interview with a private consultant and former LCDA employee in relation to joint-venture oil palm 
development schemes, Sibu Division, Sarawak, 27th November 2007. The reference to 23 projects rather than 31 
is because the remainder were not yet being implemented but remained as land banks. 
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may not yet have received any media attention or been escalated to legal proceedings. These 
disputes were not limited to joint-venture projects n NCR land. There was an increasing number 
of court cases arising from disputes over LCDA joint ventures on State land, following the 
Sarawak Government’s aggressive approach to dismissing NCR claims not meeting its rigid 
definition.  
Landowners and Investors in the Raya Plantation 
Kampung Selampit 
The landowners of Kampung Selampit were at the centre of the sequence of decisions and 
events that gave rise to the extensive oil palm plantation referred to here as the Raya Plantation. 
Selampit is a Bidayuh Jagoi village that is located on the western bank of the Kayan River, 
about 29 kilometres from the town of Lundu, the district capital (Environment Planning & 
Research Consultants 1999; Pejabat Daerah Lundu 2008). In 2008, the village had 182 
households, 217 families, and a population of 942 (Pejabat Daerah Lundu 2006). This is a 
significant increase from the original group led by Minah ak Kumbai62 from Kampung 
Stungkor (located to the east in Lundu District), which built the first houses of Selampit on the 
banks of the Jaong River in 1937 (Chang Pat Foh 2002). Shortly after, a second group from 
Kampung Raso joined them and, once the village was established in 1938, Minah became the 
first village head (ketua kampong) (Chang Pat Foh 2002). This was two decades before the 
promulgation of the Sarawak Land Code, which set 1958 as the cut-off for the creation of new 
native customary rights to land (State Attorney-General's Chambers 1999).  
Selampit lies between the Jaong and Kayan Rivers. One story of the origin of the name is that 
it stems from the Bidayuh-Jagoi word lampit, which means to squeeze or press, as the village 
is squeezed in between these two rivers (Chang Pat Foh 2002). Ironically, the villagers are now 
also squeezed between oil palm plantations, while being squeezed out of any meaningful access 
to land and employment opportunities. On the western side of the Kayan River, the village is 
hemmed in by the various RH plantations described below, while to the east of the river is the 
1,386-hectare Sampadi III Estate that was established by FELDA in 1988-1989 as one of the 
first oil palm plantations in the state (Rosenkrants et al. 2002).  
                                               
62 Chang Pat Foh (2002) refers to him as Minah @ Midah ak Kumbai. The symbol “@” indicates “alias” as 
people’s names were often written with different spelling when registration cards were being issued. 
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As summarized as the start of the chapter, oil palm development on Selampit land began in 
1993 with the 9,271-hectare SALCRA Raya Oil Palm Project. This scheme was converted to 
a joint-venture scheme under LCDA in 1997 after some land preparation and planting had taken 
place. Soon after, the original scheme was divided into two different projects, both involving 
RH as the private-sector partner: the Raya Oil Palm Plantation Lundu, including 4,029 ha on 
State land and an approved NCL development area of 2,890 ha; and the new PELITA Cergas 
Estate on State land (3,933 ha). Further projects were developed on NCR land in the vicinity 
by Rimbunan Hijau, using arrangements outside the Konsep Baru framework. These changes 
would have long-term negative impacts on the customary landholders involved as they became 
immersed in an extensive RH-managed plantation overlaying a complex web of land claims 
and counter-claims.  
Rimbunan Hijau  
The company selected as the JV partner for the Raya Plantation was Rimbunan Hijau (RH), a 
major timber and plantation company in Sarawak and globally. RH has for decades had close 
links to the political elite in Sarawak. The executive chairman of RH, Tiong Hiew King, is a 
Fuzhou-Chinese born in Sibu in 1935. He first worked in the timber business of his uncle, 
Wong Tuong Kwong, whose company, WTK, is one of the largest timber conglomerates in 
Sarawak, also with close political ties to the government (Straumann 2014). Tiong left WTK 
in 1975 and founded RH, which has grown into a huge multinational conglomerate, with forest 
concessions in 16 countries and interests in oil palm, oil, mining, gas, manufacturing, fishing, 
and information technology (International 2004). Tiong is dubbed the “Rupert Murdoch” of 
the Chinese media due to his media and publishing interests. As the RH plantation manager for 
Lundu put it during an interview: 
Rimbunan Hijau is very, very well diversified. It is into banking, it is into timber, 
housing construction, oil and gas in China and Russia. Very big. In Africa, also timber. 
So many things. Can I let you into a little bit of a secret, a remark made by somebody: 
“They are into everything, except making coffin!”63  
The methods that RH uses to expand its business in Sarawak and globally has consistently 
attracted criticism for extremely detrimental social and environmental impacts (Greenpeace 
                                               
63 Interview with the Rimbunan Hijau manager of the Lundu and Biawak Joint Ventures, 25 September 2008. 
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International 2004, 2006; Straumann 2014). However, due to the company’s close political ties, 
mutually beneficially business ventures, and media control it has remained largely immune to 
any repercussions.  
A key to Tiong’s business success in Sarawak were the personal ties he developed with two 
successive chief ministers (Straumann 2014). After a tense relationship in the early 1970s with 
Abdul Rahman Ya’kub, Tiong began to cultivate a patron-client relationship with the powerful 
chief minister, helping to finance election campaigns in return for timber concessions.64 When 
Abdul Taib Mahmud (Rahman’s nephew) became chief minister in 1981, Tiong moved quickly 
to appoint Taib’s immediate family members and cronies to senior positions on the boards of 
12 companies in the RH Group. Taib showed his gratitude with over 1.5 million hectares of 
new and renewed logging concessions (Straumann 2014), setting RH quickly on the path to 
becoming one of the Sarawak’s largest timber producers, generating the capital to invest in oil 
palm and other sectors. In 2008, RH was the private sector partner in seven of the 31 approved 
joint-venture projects on NCR land (PELITA Digital Spatial Information Management Sector 
2007). The close relationship was highlighted at RH Group’s 40th Anniversary Gala Dinner in 
2015, when Taib was front and centre for the occasion (Figure 11) (Chua 2015).  
The Original SALCRA Project 
SALCRA in the Bau-Lundu Region 
As discussed in Chapter 5, SALCRA’s main objective was to improve the livelihoods of rural 
communities through in-situ development of NCR land (SALCRA 2003). In 1990, the Raya 
Oil Palm Plantation was one of six potential oil palm projects included in a socio-economic 
study to assess the viability of the proposed Bau-Lundu Oil Palm Complex on NCR land (Ayob 
et al. 1990). The four projects in Bau District were Jagoi I, Jagoi II, Bratak I, and Bratak II, 
while the two in Lundu District were the Raya and Undan schemes, which shared a common 
boundary. A key feature of SALCRA schemes is that they are only implemented on NCR land. 
Thus, all of the land in the proposed projects was classified as Interior Area Land or Native 
Area Land subject to NCR. Selampit and Kendaie were two of the twenty-nine Bidayuh 
                                               
64 Rahman Ya’kub had Tiong Hiew King imprisoned for several weeks in the early 1970s, accusing him of being 
a communist sympathizer. After this Tiong went to great lengths to gain his favour. One anecdote recounts how 
he accompanied Rahman to Taiwan to hold his golf umbrella (Straumann 2014).   
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villages included in the initial socio-economic survey to gauge the receptiveness of potential 
scheme participants (Ayob et al. 1990).  
 
Figure 11 Chief Minister Abdul Taib Mahmud (centre) at Rimbunan Hijau Group’s 40th Anniversary Gala Dinner 
in 2015 (Chua 2015). Rimbunan Hijau Group founder and executive chairman Tiong Hiew King (first on left) 
stands beside the late Adenan Satem, appointed Chief Minister in 2014 when Taib resigned after 33 years in office 
to become Governor of Sarawak. Next to Taib is his wife Ragard Kurdi Taib, Adenan’s wife Jamilah Anu, and 
the Governor of Khabarovsk Krai, Russia, Vyacheslav Ivanovich Shport. 
SALCRA’s managed smallholder approach to oil palm development on NCR land has been 
better received than the joint-venture approach because participants are guaranteed to receive 
formal individual title to their NCR land. This was the main reason that landowners wanted to 
participate in the Raya scheme, followed by the potential profits and the access to employment 
opportunities (Ayob et al. 1990). As one of my respondents said: “We heard they would give 
land titles, grants and bonus dividends. That’s the reason we followed SALCRA.” 65 
                                               
65 Kita dengar mereka bagi hak milik, grant dan bonus dividen. Itu sebabkan kita ikut SALCRA. Household 
interview with SELA 3, 40-year-old man, father of two, Rimbunan Hijau load supervisor, stating why they chose 
to participate in the SALCRA Raya Oil Palm Development. They had heard of good progress from family and 
friends in the nearby villages of Bokah and Raso who were participating in the neighbouring SALCRA Undan 
Estate (Selampit, 8 October 2008). 
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Furthermore, the SALCRA model better reflected customary institutions and the traditional 
mixed pattern of land use by enabling participants to continue farming land not included in the 
scheme area with crops like pepper, cocoa, and rubber (Ayob et al. 1990; Cramb 1993). Hence, 
by 2016, SALCRA’s operations in the Bau-Lundu region had grown to include 6,590 
landowners from 53 villages, participating in five estates comprising 11,859 hectares of oil 
palm (SALCRA 2016a). The five estates (all of which were I visited with SALCRA officials) 
were the Jagoi, Bratak, Undan (bordering Raya), Stenggang, and Sebako Oil Palm Estates. The 
Stenggang and Sebako Estates are also in Lundu District, the Sebako Estate being the last to 
be developed in 2000 (Environmental Planning & Research Consultants 1999). Thus, the Raya 
Oil Palm Plantation was surrounded by NCR land development projects, indicating SALCRA’s 
long-term commitment to the region. 
The SALCRA Raya Oil Palm Plantation  
SALCRA initiated the development of the Raya Plantation in 1990 with funding under the 
Fifth (1986-1990) and Sixth (1991-1995) Malaysia Plans (Malaysia Economic Planning Unit 
1990, Malaysian Economic Planning Unit 1996). Bormap Surveys Sdn Bhd was contracted to 
carry out the perimeter and block surveys of the proposed project (Figure 12) (Bormap Surveys 
Sdn Bhd 1990; MEX Environmental Sdn. Bhd. 1998). These involved consultations with NCR 
landowners from both Selampit and Kendaie villages to help determine boundaries of 
territories and individually-owned plots. The proposed Raya and Undan Estates initially 
totalled 2,000 hectares (Ayob et al. 1990), though the perimeter survey for Raya encompassed 
9,271 ha, which was the designated area handed over to LCDA in 1997. 
The initial groundwork for the plantation began in 1993, with planting of Phase 1 in Kendaie 
beginning in 1994 and of Phase 2 in Selampit in 1996 (Figure 12; Table 7) (SALCRA 1997). 
However, as discussed above, in 1996 the Seventh Malaysia Plan was released, in which the 
federal budget for in-situ land development was reduced by 55 per cent in a bid to encourage 
state development agencies to embrace the private sector (Malaysian Economic Planning Unit 
1996). These financial constraints meant that SALCRA was no longer able to continue its 
previous modus operandi (MEX Environmental Sdn.Bhd. 1998). On 30 March 1996, at 
SALCRA’s 55th Board Meeting, a proposal for SALCRA to adopt the Konsep Baru model of 
land development on NCR land was approved (MEX Environmental Sdn. Bhd. 1998). Initially, 
SALCRA secured Perlis Plantation Berhad (PPB) as the private investor. 
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Figure 12 The SALCRA Raya Oil Palm Plantation perimeter and block survey map at handover to LCDA in 1997, 
showing a total area of 9,271 ha of NCR land and planted areas of 400 ha (Phase I) and 816 ha (Phase II). The 
approximate locations of Kendaie Village (K) and Selampit Village (S) are shown. 
Selampit was later relocated to the northeast to be on the Kayan River at the eastern edge of the plantation 
(SALCRA 1997). 
However, when the Sarawak Government appointed PPB to be the private investor for the Long 
Lama and Ulu Teru joint-venture projects in northern Sarawak, the company withdrew from 
the Raya project.66 SALCRA then selected Sri Idaria Sdn Bhd (an RH subsidiary) to be the 
private sector partner to continue development of the Raya Plantation (MEX Environmental 
Sdn. Bhd. 1998; Faeh 2011; Wall Street Journal 2016). SALCRA submitted the proposal to be 
endorsed by the Ministry of Land Development. However, in early January 1997, the State 
Task Force Committee overseeing NCR land development decided that the implementation of 
the Raya Oil Palm Plantation should be taken over by LCDA (MEX Environmental Sdn Bhd 
1998). The implications of this transfer were that the Raya scheme participants would no longer 
                                               
66 PBB subsequently merged with the Singapore-based oil palm giant, Wilmar. 
K 
S 
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be guaranteed individual land titles and that their land would be tied up for 60 years. The 
transfer also entailed splitting off 3,933 hectares of the original 9,271-hectare estate that LCDA 
had now determined was State land. This was handed to a new joint-venture company, PELITA 
Cergas Sdn Bhd, involving LCDA and yet another RH subsidiary, but not the original 
landholders (Rimbunan Sawit Berhad 2009). The landowners had little or no access to 
information about these changes that would negatively impact on their participation. As stated 
by one informant: “People do not know why they [SALCRA] stopped. There were some who 
said that they were bankrupt. It’s not possible that they could go bankrupt. SALCRA is the 
Government’s model. I know that there is politics in this. This is politics. Politics always enters 
into it.”67 
Table 7 Progress of the SALCRA Raya Oil Palm Estate at handover to LCDA in 1997. 
 Selampit Kendaie 
Village head Nyotie ak Nyayaw Amit ak Daud 
No. of households in village 280 42 
No. of families in village 510 61 
Population of village 1,76868 305 
Date planting began  May 1996 November 1994 
Total planted area (ha) 591.9 294.1 
Total no. of palms planted 78,400 36,404 
Average planting density (palms/ha) 132 123 
No. of participants with planted land  91 45 
 
 
 
                                               
67 Rakyat tidak tahu mengapa mereka [SALCRA] berhenti. Ada orang-orang mengatakan SALCRA pandai 
bankrap. Tidak mungkin dia boleh jadi bankrap. SALCRA pun di kerajaan bagi model. Saya tahu itu ada politik 
dalam. Ini politik. Politik selalu masuk dalam. Statement made during key informant interview with the Selampit 
Area Development Committee Chairman, Selampit, 6 October 2008. 
68 The higher population for Selampit than the figure of 942 given above is because the sub-village of Bitokan 
separated from Selampit in 2008 and relocated to the eastern bank of the Kayan River, though they still share the 
same headman (Pejabat Daerah Lundu 2006).  
Source: SALCRA (1997). 
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The Joint-Venture Project 
The transition to joint-venture arrangements  
The transition from a managed smallholder scheme to a joint-venture scheme was a complex 
process that was not widely understood by the participants (Table 8). SALCRA’s financial 
inability to develop the Raya Oil Palm Estate was cited as the main reason for the management 
change amongst the scheme participants interviewed. However, it appears that the underlying 
reason was the political push to get the Konsep Baru policy off the ground (MEX 
Environmental Sdn Bhd 1998). In 1994, while the Sarawak Government was presenting 
Konsep Baru to representatives from landowners, financiers, and investors, SALCRA was 
already planting Phase 1 of the Raya Estate (Table 8) (Ministry of Land Development 1997; 
SALCRA 1997). Then in 1996 the Government scored a political trifecta.  
First, as previously discussed, the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000) was released with a 
strong emphasis on embracing the private sector and a 55 per cent reduction in funding for 
SALCRA-type schemes. In May 1996, SALCRA began planting Phase 2 of the Raya Estate. 
However, on 26 May, the Selampit headman, Nyotie ak Nyayaw, the headman of Kendai, Amit 
ak Daud, and the local councillor, Lamat ak Horan, sent a letter requesting that their NCR land 
already surveyed for the Raya Oil Palm Scheme (9,271 hectares) now be developed following 
the Konsep Baru approach (MEX Environmental Sdn Bhd 1998). In the letter they stated: 
Following the meeting that recently took place at SALCRA’s Headquarters, we as the 
representatives of the landowners agree that our Native Customary Land that has 
already been measured for the Raya Oil Palm Scheme now be developed following the 
New Concept of land development…. The area that we agree to have developed is the 
same as already outlined in SALCRA’s Perimeter Survey map. We request that areas 
are left (reserved) for the villages, and that areas planted with Engkabang and Durian 
trees (as shown on the map) are not developed.69 
                                               
69 Berikutan dengan mesyuarat yang telah diadakan di Ibu Penjabat SALCRA baru-baru ini, disini kami sebagai 
wakil tuan-tuan punya tanah bersetuju supaya tanah-tanah adat bumiputra kami yang telah disukat untuk Skim 
Kelapa Sawit Raya di bangunkan mengikut Konsep Baru Pembangunan... Kawasan-kawasan yang dipersetujui 
untuk dibangun adalah seperti yang ditandakan diatas peta Perimeter Survey SALCRA. Kami mohon supaya 
kawasan-kawasan yang ditinggalkan (reserve) untuk kampung-kampung dan yang ditanami dengan pokok-pokok 
Engkabang dan Durian (seperti yang ditandakan diatas peta) tidak dibangunkan. 
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Table 8 Timeline for transition of the SALCRA Raya Oil Palm Plantation to LCDA. 
Year Event 
1990 
- Benchmark study of proposed SALCRA Bau-Lundu oil palm complex; perceptions, attitudes 
and levels of living 
- SALCRA appoints Bormap Surveys to conduct perimeter and block surveys of proposed 9,271 
ha Raya scheme 
1993 - SALCRA Raya Oil Palm Plantation established and first groundwork begun 
1994 
- Government organizes NCR Seminar (31 September to 3 October) for representatives from 
landowners, financiers, investors, and Government to discuss land development on NCR land, 
laying foundations for launch of Konsep Baru   
- SALCRA begins planting Phase 1 of Raya Estate (November) 
1995 
- First Konsep Baru joint-venture projects identified: Kanowit, Ulu Teru, Long Ekang/Long 
Lama in central and northern Sarawak, with a total area of ~ 60,000 ha and 20,000 NCR 
landowners 
- PELITA Cergas Sdn Bhd incorporated (6 September), a joint-venture company between 
LCDA and Cergas Sdn Bhd – a subsidiary of Pemandangan Jauh Plantation (PJP) Sdn Bhd, 
part of the RH Group. This company would go on to develop the newly identified State land 
section of the Raya Plantation (3,933 ha).  
1996 
- Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000) released with strong emphasis on embracing the private 
sector, accompanied by a 55% reduction in budget for in-situ land development schemes  
- SALCRA’s 55th Board Meeting (30 March) approves proposal to adopt Konsep Baru model 
of development on NCR land. SALCRA had secured Perlis Plantations Berhad (PPB) as 
private investor. PPB pulls out and Sri Idaria Sdn Bhd (RH subsidiary) selected. 
- SALCRA begins planting Phase 2 of Raya Estate in May 
- Letter dated 26 May sent by headmen of Selampit and Kendaie and local councilor requesting 
Raya Scheme of 9,271 ha now be developed following Konsep Baru 
- Chief Minister officially launches two pilot Konsep Baru projects (19 August) 
- Deputy PM on half-day visit to Sarawak officially launches Raya JV project (5 September) 
- Seventh Sarawak State Election held (7-8 September), BN returned 
- Ministry of Land Development (MLD) writes to SALCRA about Raya Oil Palm Scheme (7 
November) 
- Letter from SALCRA to MLD (18 November) proposing to be managing agent of Konsep 
Baru project at Raya, including letter from village heads requesting change to Konsep Baru 
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1997 
- SALCRA’s proposal submitted by MLD to State Taskforce Committee (3 January), which 
decides Raya Project to be taken over by LCDA “on advice of Sarawak State Government” 
- PJP PELITA Lundu Sdn Bhd incorporated (25 March) to develop NCR section of Raya 
Plantation, with Pemandangan Jauh Plantation (PJP) Sdn Bhd, a RH subsidiary, as private 
investor 
- First joint-venture projects at Long Lama, Ulu Teru and Kanowit experience numerous 
landowners withdrawing support 
- SALCRA removes all staff from Raya Plantation and hands over to LCDA (31 October) 
1998 
- EIA report for PELITA Holdings Raya Oil Palm Plantation submitted to Natural Resources 
and Environment Board (August) 
They further requested that representatives from SALCRA be included in all village dialogues 
to inform and better explain the new Konsep Baru system. However, the reality of the transition 
was that SALCRA would completely withdraw, the plantation would not follow SALCRA’s 
original perimeter survey, many of the original participants would not know what had 
happened, and the participants would instead end up feeling that there was little choice in the 
change.  
When asked about the transition during household interviews, respondents expressed a general 
belief that the late Village Head (Ketua Kampung, KK) of Selampit did not act in the best 
interest of the community. Instead, he was rumoured to have taken “incentive” money for 
himself. A 66-year-old father of four and a builder asserted: “He cheated the people of 
Selampit. He wanted to deceive, wanted the money for himself. All of them are already dead. 
So how can we ever know what he signed, how?”70 
The second event of the 1996 trifecta occurred on 19 August when the Chief Minister, Abdul 
Taib Mahmud, officially launched LCDA’s two pilot Konsep Baru projects, Kanowit and 
Baram, with much pomp and ceremony, adding impetus to the push for a Konsep Baru scheme 
for Selampit (see Table 8) (Ministry of Land Development 1997). The third event was the 
Sarawak State Election, held over 7-8 September. This was an important election for the ruling 
party, the Barisan National (BN). Taib had referred to the region where the Raya Oil Palm 
                                               
70 Tipu rakyat Selampit. Dia mau tipu, mau duit sendiri. Semua sudah mati. Macam mana kita mau tahu dia sign, 
macam mana? Household interview with SELA 14, describing what he knew about the late headman’s role in the 
transition from SALCRA to LCDA (Selampit, 12 October 2008). 
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Plantation was situated as “a problem area for BN. Our machinery is not able to penetrate the 
area” (Ujang 1996). Thus, in further publicity for Konsep Baru and to swell the potential BN 
vote, Anwar Ibrahim, then the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, made a special half-day 
visit to Sarawak to officially launch the new Raya joint-venture project (Ujang 1996, MEX 
Environmental Sdn. Bhd. 1998).   
Thus, in January 1997, the Government advised the State Task Force Committee after the fact 
that the implementation of the 9,271 SALCRA Raya Oil Palm Plantation would be taken over 
by LCDA (MEX Environmental Sdn Bhd 1998). In March, a joint-venture company was 
established to develop the 6,918 ha of the Raya Oil Palm Plantation deemed by the 
Government, under its more stringent definition of customary tenure, to be NCR land. (A 
separate joint-venture company would be given the rights to develop the area identified as State 
land.) The transition from SALCRA to LCDA management was completed by 31 October 
1997, when SALCRA removed all staff and officially handed the Raya Plantation over to 
LCDA (see Table 8) (SALCRA 1997).  
The transition to LCDA management came with much hype – in the press, during village 
meetings, and in the form of continual persuasion by the Selampit and Kendaie headmen and 
the local councillor – the three signatories to the letter requesting the change to Konsep Baru.71 
Many participants felt they had no choice except to “follow the village” (ikut kampung) and 
participate. Some respondents saw this in terms of communal politics, with SALCRA viewed 
as a more amenable, Dayak-controlled entity, under its long-time chairman, the Deputy Chief 
Minister, Alfred Jabu Numpang, while LCDA was clearly the creature of the powerful Muslim-
Melanau Chief Minister, Abdul Taib Mahmud: “This is, of course, a fraud. SALCRA had an 
Iban as Chairman, Jabu, that’s a bit better… It was Taib Mahmud that opened this [joint-
venture] plantation [Raya].”72 
The reasons for participation in the new joint-venture project appear to be a combination of 
coercion by key stakeholders and grand promises made of speedier development and, in turn, 
                                               
71 This continued persuasion was a constant theme during household interviews about the establishment of the 
joint venture scheme. Many felt that the headmen were possibly given cash incentives by RH (Selampit, October-
November 2008). 
72 Ini memang tipu. SALCRA orang Iban jadi ketua, Jabu, itu bagus sedikit… Itu ladang ini [Raya] Taib Mahmud 
yang buka. Household interview SELA 5 with 55-year-old father of two, a prawn fisherman, talking about the 
SALCRA-LCDA transition (Selampit, 10 October 2008). 
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faster access to increased dividends. However, the long-term impacts on NCR landowners 
would be detrimental. Not only had the promised benefits of the original SALCRA agreement 
completely changed (notably the assurance of individual titles) but they were also now 
contractually bound to an aggressively expansionist private-sector partner. The sub-division of 
the original SALCRA Raya Oil Palm Project and the subsequent management through a string 
of RH subsidiaries highlighted the risks for NCR landowners of embracing the joint-venture 
model. As expressed by one respondent: “They promise sugar, but only give you salt.”73 
The land issue in the Raya Plantation 
The first significant change was the sub-division of the original Raya Plantation into two tenure 
categories – one incorporating NCR land and the other incorporating what was now deemed 
by the Ministry of Planning and Resource Management, hence LCDA, to be State land – much 
to the dismay of the original NCR participants (Figure 13) (see Table 8). The 6,918-ha deemed 
to be genuine NCR land (75 per cent of the original plantation), was divided into (1a) the Raya 
NCR Oil Palm Plantation (4,028.5 ha) and (1b) an area approved for NCR land development 
(2,889.5 ha), presumably referring to land that had not yet been formally incorporated in the 
estate. Though the identified State land had been excised from the Plantation, an additional 
1,580 ha of NCR land had been identified and included. The joint-venture company, PJP 
PELITA Lundu Plantation Sdn Bhd, was incorporated in 1998 to continue development of the 
6,918 ha of NCR land, with the RH subsidiary, Pemandangan Jauh Plantation (PJP), as the 
private investor.74 The shareholdings of the partners followed the Konsep Baru template, with 
PJP holding 60 per cent, the landholders 30 per cent (held in trust by LCDA), and LCDA 10 
per cent (in its own right) (PELITA 2008; Rimbunan Sawit Berhad 2009).  
 
 
  
                                               
73 Mereka janji gula, tapi hanya kasih yang pahit. Household interview with SELA 3, 40-year-old father of two 
and RH load supervisor, when discussing the benefits received from participation (Selampit, 7 October 2008). 
74 Pemandangan Jauh means “the long view”. 
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Figure 13 Simplified structure of changes from the original SALCRA scheme (1990-1997), through to LCDA-
brokered division into two new estates: one on NCR land and one now on State land, but both run by the private 
sector partner Rimbunan Hijau.  
Note: total size of both is now 11,287 ha, as additional land was acquired, but it is unclear in which estate (Ayob 
et al. 1990; Rimbunan Sawit Berhad 2016).   
Subsequently, in August 2002, another joint-venture company not involving NCR landholders, 
PJP PELITA Biawak Plantation Sdn Bhd, was allocated the State land section of the original 
Raya Plantation, identified as (1c) in Figure 14 (3,933 ha).75 In this case, PJP held 70 per cent 
of the shares, LCDA 15 per cent, and the Lembaga Amanah Kebajikan Masjid Negeri Sarawak 
(LAKMNS) 15 per cent (Rimbunan Sawit Berhad 2009).76 PJP would later acquire 
LAKMNS’s shares, increasing its stake to 85 per cent.77 
                                               
75 LCDA had been establishing commercial joint ventures of this kind to develop both urban and rural State land 
since its establishment in 1982, long before the launch of Konsep Baru. The shareholdings in such ventures could 
vary, with LCDA holding shares in its own right and not as trustee for any landholders. 
76 LAKMNS is the charitable trust of the state mosque, formed under the Charitable Trust Ordinance (1994), and 
was chaired at the time by the Chief Minister (Rimbunan Sawit Berhad 2011). 
77 In a subsequent reorganisation, the RH Group organised all its oil palm operations into one company (Rimbunan 
Sawit Berhad (RSB), which was floated in the Bursa Malaysia in 2006. The joint-venture companies discussed 
here became subsidiaries of RSB, while retaining their existing names. 
SALCRA Raya Oil Palm Plantation 
9,271 ha NCR land (1990-1997) 
Raya Ceria Oil Palm Plantation 
First name during initial handover to 
LCDA (1997) 
PJP PELITA Biawak Estate 
3,933 ha State land (2016)  
 
Lundu Estate 
7,354 ha NCR land (2016) 
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Also, in 2002, under direction from the Ministry for Planning and Resource Management, the 
Department of Land and Surveys ceased survey works on the NCR perimeter boundary for 
Raya, leaving the boundary incomplete (SALCRA 2002).78 An RH survey company, Sri Idaria 
Sdn Bhd, on reaching the vicinity of the incompletely surveyed boundary, also had to halt the 
individual plot surveys it was conducting to determine participants’ shares for the PJP PELITA 
Lundu Plantation. Any further work on the perimeter survey and the status of the land within 
                                               
78 Land Administration Circular No. 4/2002, dated 4 September 2002. 
 
Figure 14 LCDA map of Raya Block, Lundu, identifying the subdivision of the original SALCRA 
Raya scheme: (1a) Raya NCR Oil Palm Plantation (~4,028.5 ha); (1b) approved NCR development 
(~2,889.5 ha); (1c) PELITA Cergas Sdn Bhd (~3,933 ha). Surrounding plantations also shown. 
Triangle gives approximate location of the RH Lundu Palm Oil Mill. Map adapted from PELITA 
(2005).   
1a 
1c 
1a 
1c 1c  
1b 1b 
1b 
SALCRA 
SALCRA 
SALCRA 
FELDA 
Ladang Dafa 
SEDC 
FELCRA FELDA 
Hakanda 
L.S. Suria 
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the project area was dependent on the approval of the Chief Minister, who was also the Minister 
for Planning and Resource Management (SALCRA 2002).  
At the time of the transfer of the Raya Plantation in 1997, the scheme included land from five 
participating villages, 600 households, and 778 NCR landowners (SALCRA 2002). This 
reflected a participation rate of 70 per cent by area, with individual contributions averaging 
6.63 hectares. However, in the participant spreadsheets obtained during fieldwork, the average 
contribution was only 2.49 hectares, presumably reflecting the reduced size of the NCR 
plantation.79  
Eight of the 30 participants interviewed in Selampit had land, in some cases multiple plots that 
had been classified as NCR land in the original SALCRA development but was designated as 
State land once management changed hands. Discussions about land classification were filled 
with confusion, anger, resignation, and frustration. When asked about his land status, one 
elderly respondent declared: “Yes, it’s all NCR land. All land in Selampit is NCR. But the 
company now says it’s State land. How is that possible?”80 The frustration was well summed 
up by a 40-year-old male interviewee in 2008: 
Most people are already frustrated. Because, firstly, in SALCRA’s time we were all in 
a perimeter survey of NCR land. At the time of the joint venture, half our land was 
taken out; they said it was State land. They took the Sarawak State Mosque 
[LAKMNS] as an investor. That frustrated us.81 They promised to give landowners 
official copies of the agreement to keep but, up until now, we don’t have them. We 
don’t know how many hectares, which region – they haven’t let us know. There is 
nothing. Difficult! Wait and wait 60 years, we will already be old, or dead. How are 
our children meant to know where it [their land] is? All of my land is from my 
                                               
79 It was difficult to find matching figures, and the average size of landholdings was lower in the Participant 
Landholdings spreadsheets obtained during fieldwork. The PJP PELITA Lundu participant list that covered the 
Kendaie/Selampit region included 794 participants and 688 parcels of land. The area of NCR land contributed 
ranged from 0.08 ha to 26.57 ha, with an average of 2.49 ha. However, this participant list accounted for only 
1,709 ha, not the total area of the scheme. A second Selampit list had 441 participants and 1,046 parcels, with 
contributions ranging from 0.05 ha to 49.46 ha, with an average of 3.21 ha. This participant list was titled Raya 
Oil Palm Plantation, PJP PELITA Lundu, Selampit, and accounted for a total of 3,353 ha. 
80 Ya, semua tanah NCR. Semua tanah Selampit NCR. Tapi company bilang State Land sekarang. Macam mana 
mungkin itu? Household interview with SELA 19, 76-year-old father of 13, retired (Selampit, 13 October 2008). 
81 The Bidayuh village of Selampit follows Bahai, Christian, and animistic beliefs. 
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grandmother. It was passed down to me. I will guard this land until I die, as I hold the 
rights of my children.82 
Thus, participating landholders felt they no longer had any claim to the land that had been 
passed down from their ancestors (nenek moyang), either because it had been reclassified as 
State land or had been locked away for 60 years in the joint venture. 
As revealed in Sarawak Report, the one-off premium paid by RH for the 3,914 hectares in the 
Biawak Plantation was MYR 2,914,394, or MYR 745 per hectare (Sarawak Report 2011a, 
2011b).83 This was nearly 40 per cent less than the value of MYR 1,200 per hectare placed on 
NCR land incorporated in Konsep Baru schemes (Ministry of Land Development 1997). In 
both cases, the effective cost of the land to RH was very low, perhaps a tenth of the market 
value of well-situated oil palm land (Cramb & Ferraro 2012). The Lundu (NCR land) and 
Biawak (State land) plantations were both now majority-owned subsidiaries of Rimbunan 
Sawit Berhad, RH’s umbrella company for its oil palm plantations and mills, and the two 
plantations were operated as one entity by RH in terms of management, labour allocation, and 
the day-to-day running of the plantations.84  
An important element in RH’s long-term plan for large-scale oil palm development in the Bau-
Lundu region was its investment in the RH Lundu Palm Oil Mill. The mill is located on the 
Bau/Lundu Road, about 15-20 kilometres south of Lundu town (see Figure 14), on a 250-
hectare lot held under a 60-year provisional lease that commenced on 30 January 2004 
(Rimbunan Sawit Berhad 2017). The lease entailed a premium of MYR 7,400, which is just 
MYR 29.50 per hectare (Sarawak Report 2011a). The Lundu Mill cost MYR 36 million to 
construct and was commissioned in March 2006. It has a capacity of 45 metric tonnes of fresh 
                                               
82 Kebanyakan semua sudah kecewa. Karena satu, musim SALCRA semua kami punya perimeter survey di NCR. 
Semasa joint venture, tanah kami setengah keluar, di katakan State land. Dia ambil Mesjid Negeri Sarawak. Itu 
kami kecewa. Dan dia janji dia bagi surat resmi untuk orang landowner perjanjian pegang, sampai sekarang 
tidak ada. Kita tidak tahu berapa hectare, di mana kawasan, di orang belum tunjuk. Belum ada lagi, Susah! Itu 
tunggung-tunggung 60 tahun, kita sudah yang tua, mati nanti. Macam mana kita punya anak dia tak tahu macam 
mana ini. Tanah itu semua dari saya punya nenek. Itu tanah turun sampai saya. Itu tanah saya jaga sampai mati, 
itulah saya ada hak anak-anak. Household interview with SELA 3, a 40-year-old father of two who worked as a 
RH load supervisor (Selampit, 8 October 2008). 
83 This was the standard premium for a 60-year provisional lease of State land. Sarawak Report (2011) also showed 
that a 250.8-hectare lot for RH’s Lundu Palm Oil Mill was leased for a premium of MYR 7,400, or only MYR 
29.50 per hectare. 
84 Interview with RH manager of the Lundu and Biawak plantations, 25 September 2008. 
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fruit bunches (FFB) per hour. About 40 per cent of this capacity is filled by fruit purchased 
from the RH joint-venture plantations, Lundu and Biawak (Rimbunan Sawit Berhad 2017).85  
Subsequent developments in the Raya Plantation 
The complex transactions and management arrangements made to convert the SALCRA Raya 
Oil Palm Plantation to the joint-venture Lundu and Biawak Plantations all took place with little 
knowledge or understanding on the part of the NCR landowners. While interviewees stated that 
meetings were held, they felt they had no choice as they were obliged to follow their Ketua 
Kampung, the land in any case had already been cleared, or they thought the outcome might 
be good (though the reality was now not what they had been promised).  
The Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) for the 7,354 hectares of NCR land in the Lundu 
Plantation commenced on 30 July 1998 (Silalahi 2008; Rimbunan Sawit Berhad 2009). The 
Joint Venture Company (JVC) was formed for the purpose of developing NCR land under the 
Konsep Baru approach. The JVC comprised LCDA (as both trustee for the landholders and a 
shareholder in its own right) and a RH subsidiary. Initially this was Sri Idaria (M) Sdn Bhd 
(Rimbunan Sawit Berhad 2009), the same private-sector partner that SALCRA had proposed,86 
but eventually, as noted above, in 2005 the company holding the RH stake was changed to 
Pemandangan Jauh Plantation (PJP), a subsidiary of the public company, Rimbunan Sawit 
Berhad, and the JVC became the PJP PELITA Lundu Plantation Sdn Bhd. Then Rimbunan 
Sawit Berhad acquired the 60% interest in Lundu from PJP (the estate now called PELITA 
Lundu). However, by 2016, ‘PELITA” had also been dropped from the name on the RSB 
website, and it was simply called ‘Lundu’ (Rimbunan Sawit Berhad 2016). These changes in 
the private-sector partner and plantation name were implemented without the knowledge of the 
landowners, who simply referred to the entire area by its original SALCRA name, Raya, 
regardless of whether it was in the Lundu or Biawak plantations. 
In 2008, a decade after Selampit landholders agreed to the Konsep Baru project, the participants 
had still received few of the promised benefits (see below). In that year, the Selampit Village 
Development and Security Committee (Jawatankuasa Kemajuan dan Keselamatan Kampung, 
                                               
85 In early 2017, the RH Lundu Palm Oil Mill was in the process of applying for a subdivision of the original 250-
hectare lot to sell a 67.5-hectare parcel, together with the mill and workers’ quarters, for MYR 33.7 million.  
86 Tiong Hiew-King, Executive Director of RH, was on the board of Sri Idaria (Faeh 2011, Wall Street Journal 
2016). 
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JKKK) wrote on behalf of the participating NCR landowners to the key stakeholders (LCDA, 
RH, MLD, and their local politician), stating that they no longer wanted to participate in the 
joint-venture scheme in its current form as they had not yet received any dividends. The letter 
outlined other key issues (Jinis Ak Gihep 2008, p. 4): 
(a) the private management did not follow the New Concept of Land 
Development on NCR land that was recommended by the Government;  
(b) the management in the plantation is not sincere;  
(c) the landowners have no representative on the Board of Directors; 
(d) the developer does not care about the welfare of local workers; 
(e) the estate management has personal interests and local workers are 
oppressed. 
Villagers threatened blockades and there were calls to harvest the fruit themselves.87 The unrest 
at the Lundu Plantation was not an uncommon phenomenon as the majority of Konsep Baru 
schemes were experiencing similar problems. 
Meanwhile, the joint venture on State land, initially called PELITA Cergas Sdn Bhd and 
subsequently restructured as PJP PELITA Biawak Plantation Sdn Bhd, was issued a 60-year 
provisional lease (expiring in 2062) to a total area of 3,933 hectares (Rimbunan Sawit Berhad 
2009). Up to 2017, 30 such LCDA joint ventures on State land had been formed to develop a 
gross area of 188,272 hectares, of which 115,623 hectares had been planted with oil palm (Land 
Custody and Development Authority 2017), much more than the area in Konsep Baru schemes 
on NCR land. Two-thirds of these joint ventures had land disputes over NCR land claims, 
involving blockades, fruit theft, gangster tactics allegedly used by private plantation 
companies, violent conflicts, and death.88 The Biawak joint venture has also been subject to 
NCR land claims, court cases, disputes, and blockades. Eight of the thirty people interviewed 
claimed land in the Biawak Plantation. One interviewee, a 66-year-old man, claimed 20 
hectares: “Of course, it was SALCRA before. It’s NCR land, but now they say everything is 
                                               
87 Household interview with SELA 1, 58-year-old woman, mother of four, shop-owner and pensioner: “Banyak 
keburukan (much is bad), we will blockade and take the fruit ourselves”, Selampit 7 October 2008. These 
sentiments were echoed in a village meeting later that month when the community was preparing to negotiate 
with RH. If the outcome was unsatisfactory they would begin blockades. 
88 Examples are outlined in references linked to previous Table  5 
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State. There’s no money. SALCRA is good, RH is no good. They just cheat. How can we eat?” 
89 
In 2008, PJP PELITA Biawak Plantation had a total planted area of 2,873 hectares, ranging in 
age from four to 13 years (Suden 2008). In an internal circular to shareholders of Rimbunan 
Sawit Berhad (RSB) about the proposed acquisition of the 15 percent stake held by LAKMNS, 
the following comment was made on Biawak’s improving performance: “In FY2008, Biawak’s 
turnover increased by 119.8% to RM 18.9 million as compared to RM 8.6 million in the FYE 
to 31 July 2007 due to the higher average FFB selling price and the increase in volume of FFB 
due to the increased hectarage of mature fields coupled with the improved average FFB yield” 
(Rimbunan Sawit Berhad 2011, p. 18). Yet, despite the apparent profitability of Biawak, the 
fact that the two plantations were being run as a single operation, and that the earliest phases 
of the Lundu Plantation had been planted by SALCRA in 1994, the NCR participants in the 
Lundu Plantation had not received any dividends. As outlined by the RH Lundu Area Manager: 
“Well, basically I look at it all as Rimbunan Hijau and manage it. The only thing is in charging 
the cost. That’s when we have two sections.”90 There was also the difference in shareholdings 
between the two sections, with RH holding 85 per cent of Biawak and only 60 per cent of 
Lundu. This would give an incentive to divert profits to the Biawak Plantation (or allocate costs 
to the Lundu Plantation) in order to realise more dividends for the RH Group as a whole, though 
there was no direct evidence for this. As one respondent commented: “Of course, there are 
profits in oil palm, but the methods the company uses to expand means only they get the profits, 
not the villagers.”91 
Area statements for July 2008 for the two sections showed that 3,039 hectares or 41 per cent 
of the Lundu Plantation were classified as “unsurrendered”, while 944 hectares or 24 per cent 
of the Biawak Plantation were “disputed” [(Silalahi 2008; Suden 2008) see Figure 15].  
                                               
89 Memang, dia SALCRA dulu. Dia NCR, tapi sekarang bilang semua state land. Duit tidak ada. Kalau SALCRA 
bagus, RH tidak bagus. Tipu saja. Mana bisa makan. Household interview with SELA 14, 66-year-old father of 
four and a builder. Comment made during interview about his landholdings (Selampit, 12 October 2008). 
90 Interview with the Rimbunan Hijau manager of the Lundu and Biawak Joint Ventures. He outlined that, while 
it had two sections (NCR and State land), he “looked at it all as Rimbunan Hijau and managed it accordingly.” 25 
September 2008. 
91 Memang ada untung sawit, tapi cara kompani buka hanya mereka yang untung, bukan orang kampung. 
Household interview with SELA 20: 52-year-old father of 10 and a FELDA lorry driver (Selampit, 13 October 
2008). 
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Unsurrendered areas are those which NCR landowners have not yet signed over to the joint-
venture project. In some cases, the landowners have physically prevented the land from being 
cleared through patrols and blockades. Disputed areas are those within the perimeter of a 
provisional lease which are subject to NCR claims. The holder of a provisional lease is required 
to deal with those claims, whether by excluding the area from the plantation or compensating 
the claimants in some way. Similar incidences of disputed land have been reported in LCDA 
joint ventures on NCR and State land across Sarawak. In the case of the Lundu Plantation, the 
management appears to be continually negotiating with landowners to methodically gain access 
to all of this unsurrendered land. For example, in one progress report it is noted that “Phase 2 
in Block 7: a portion of unsurrendered area of 0.7 ha surrendered by local landowner has been 
completed and planted with a total of 106 young palms” (Silalahi 2008, p. 12). In general, land 
tenure was not an issue for the RH Manager as he felt that LCDA provided a good “PR 
function” for them by handling any disputes that inevitably arose, while the company had sole 
managerial control, without interference from LCDA. 92 
 
Figure 15 Classification of land status in the two RH-LCDA Joint Ventures, July 2008 (Source: see Appendix F). 
Note: ‘Other’ includes buffer zones, unplantable land, roads and rivers. 
                                               
92 Interview with the Rimbunan Hijau manager of the Lundu and Biawak Joint Ventures, 25 September 2008. 
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The RH regional manager also emphasized the importance of overall expansion possibilities to 
increase the size of the plantation. A basic criterion for Konsep Baru projects was that the NCR 
Land Bank should have a contiguous area of at least 5,000 hectares to be an attractive 
investment for the private sector (Ministry of Land Development 1997). With over 3,000 
hectares in the Lundu Plantation unsurrendered, the effective area fell below this 5,000-hectare 
target. The planted area in the Biawak Plantation got the total up to just over 7,000 hectares 
and, as noted, RH had invested in a large palm oil mill in the region (see Figure 15 above). 
Nevertheless, RH had a “whole-of-landscape” approach to plantation development, with the 
long-term goal of accessing any land available, regardless of the land status or scheme type 
(reflecting the name of its major plantation subsidiary, Pemandangan Jauh, or “Long View”). 
This long-term expansion has been supported by powerful political allies, regardless of whether 
it conforms to official policy for land development schemes (see next section). The protest that 
such expansion of RH’s oil palm holdings in Lundu District (and elsewhere) constituted a “land 
grab” was summarily dismissed by RH’s principal patron. In 2012, during a speech in Lundu, 
the Chief Minister argued: “Why should the Government grab people’s land, when all the land 
that has yet to be granted to the people belongs to the Government?”93 
Further Expansion of the Raya Plantation: The Rental Model   
New Joint Ventures 
One of the main reasons for RH wanting to increase its plantation size on NCR land in the 
Lundu region was that its Lundu Palm Oil Mill, which had a capacity of 45 metric tonnes of 
fresh fruit bunches (FFB) per hour, was only running at 50 per cent capacity at this time 
(Rimbunan Sawit Berhad 2017). The company also hoped that new arrangements with 
landholders would serve as a model for other villages in the Bau-Lundu region that were 
identified as potentially having an additional 10,000 hectares of suitable NCR land. The 
impetus for this expansion received strong political backing in 2005 and ultimately gave rise 
to a new model for incorporation of NCR land, referred to as “New Joint Ventures” (NJV) 
(Rimbunan Hijau 2007b, 2007a).  
                                               
93 Comment made by Chief Minister Abdul Taib Mahmud at 135th anniversary celebration of Lundu District 
Office, when he said that allegations that government agencies were ‘landgrabbers’ were false (cited in Saai & 
Ruekeith 2012). In one sense he was correct in that the Land Code defines Native Customary Land as being 
untitled held by licence from the State, that is, State land subject to native customary rights. However, the High 
Court has upheld a much stronger interpretation of customary rights as a form of ownership, predating any of 
Sarawak’s land laws.  
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According to RH’s own account: “The effort to get more new areas began with Tan Sri’s [the 
Chief Minister Abdul Taib Mahmud] verbal instruction to the estate in Lundu to increase its 
Land Bank as soon as possible in order to feed the mill with sufficient FFB production to 
process.”94 However, it was not until a subsequent meeting on 3 March 2005 with the Chief 
Minister and the Minister for Land Development (James Jemut Masing), which was closely 
followed by a formal letter from the Chief Minister to the Ministry of Land Development, that 
RH seriously pursued the expansion. Seven areas were put on the table, with a total of 14,900 
hectares of NCR land. However, RH did not act fast enough and 5,600 hectares (Stunggang 
Dayak, Pasir Tengah, and Pasir Hilir) went to a rival plantation company. The remaining 9,300 
hectares would be developed in five NJV plantations, ranging in size from 800 to 3,000 hectares 
(Table 9). The holding company for all five estates was the RH subsidiary, Pertumbuhan Abadi 
Asia Sdn Bhd. 
Table 9 Five “New Joint Venture” projects with RH on NCR land in Lundu District.  
Village name Native 
company 
Date 
registered 
NJV name 
(Sdn Bhd) 
Date 
registered 
Gross area 
(ha) 
Bukit Batu, 
Kendaie 
  Mighty Roar 04-01-2005 
 
800 
Kangka, 
Sempadi 
Kunci 
Aspirasi 
21-12-2006 
 
Masian Jaya 16-07-1994 2,500 
Perian 
Perian 
Plantation 
5-6-2006 Real Time 
Yields 
27-12-2015 2,000 
Sebandi Ulu Kunci 
Integrasi 
30-1-2007 Ezy Saga 21-02-2007 1,000 
Sebandi Hilir 
Beribu 
Progress 
8-2-2007 Wealth Ezy 02-02-2007 3,000 
Total (ha)     9,300 
Source: Rimbunan Hijau (2007b). The four shaded projects were eventually managed in conjunction with the 
adjacent Raya Plantation (Lundu and Biawak). 
                                               
94 Quote from RH Executive Summary of the New Joint Venture (NJV) projects to be developed in the Lundu 
region (Rimbunan Hijau 2007, p. 3). 
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The project with the village of Kanka, Sempadi, highlights the worst aspects of land dealings 
under the Taib regime (well justifying the term “land grab”). At the behest of the Chief Minster, 
as mentioned above, RH set about developing this area. They had already begun to clear and 
plant the estate with the agreement of the Bidayuh and Malay NCR landowners, when Taib 
“gave” 1,500 hectares of the land to the company, Polar Horizons. This company was a 
subsidiary of Titanium Management, a conglomerate owned mostly by Abu Bekir Taib, the 
Chief Minister’s son. The villagers and the RH subsidiary took Polar Horizons to court, but 
Taib prevented this by “giving” the land back (Hornbill Unleashed 2011; Tawie 2011).    
The other four NJVs would eventually form one continuous plantation with the Lundu and 
Biawak Plantations (Figure 16). However, unlike Lundu and Biawak, they would be developed 
under the “New Joint Venture” (NJV) model, which deviated substantially from the approved 
model under the Konsep Baru policy. In the NJV model, each participating village formed its 
own “Native Company”, each of which then entered into a private joint-venture arrangement 
directly with RH (Rimbunan Hijau 2007b). LCDA no longer played any part in the joint 
venture company; rather, the investor’s share was 70 per cent and the Native Company’s, 30 
per cent. However, rather than being entitled to 30 per cent of declared profits as dividends, as 
in Konsep Baru, the Native Company entered into an agreement for a fixed payment of 
“dividends”, based on the age of the plantation. This was in fact indistinguishable in practice 
from a simple rental agreement with RH. 
As in Konsep Baru schemes, the land value was pegged at MYR 1,200 per hectare. Once the 
net area was ascertained, 60 per cent of this notional land value was capitalised toward the 
share of paid-up capital contributed by the Native Company to the NJV company. The 
remaining 40 per cent was held in trust by the NJV company (presumably invested in a trust 
fund on behalf of the landholders, as done by LCDA in the Konsep Baru schemes). An upfront 
annual payment was calculated based on the land area surrendered by each shareholder at a 
rate of MYR 65 per hectare while the palms were immature (Years 1 to 3) and MYR 130 per 
hectare from Years 4 and 5 (see Table 10, p. 119). The agreed preferential dividend was then 
fixed from Year 6 for the subsequent 24 years at MYR 130 per hectare. An additional MYR130 
payment was also to be paid in two annual instalments in May and December. This was most 
likely a holiday sweetener for participants, as these two additional payments coincided with 
the Dayak holiday Gawai in June, and also Christmas in December. The contracts also referred 
to a balance of MYR25 for additional shares, however it was unclear what this was from the 
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papers available (Rimbunan Hijau 2007a). The Native Company was not entitled to any other 
dividends apart from this fixed payment.  
  
Figure 16 Locations of the five New Joint Venture plantations implemented by Rimbunan Hijau 
subsidiaries. Notes: NJV plantations shown by hatching. Triangle gives location of the RH Lundu 
Palm Oil Mill. Plantation names underlined are other NCR land development schemes (SALCRA 
and FELCRA). Plantation names in italics are on State land but have had NCR land disputes 
(FELDA, Ladang Dafa). Map adapted from PELITA (2005).  
The NJV documents obtained during fieldwork in Selampit included numerous contracts and 
forms for the village representative and the Native Company Director regarding the formation 
of the Native Company and the NJV Company, all signed and dated. However, there was also 
a “Resignation as Director” letter that had been signed and fingerprinted by the Ketua Kampung 
of Selampit, who was also the Native Company Director. This letter was in English and was 
the only form that was undated. Having lived with this man’s family, I was aware that he was 
unable to speak English, let alone write it. This raises the question whether NCR participants 
SALCRA 
SALCRA 
SALCRA 
FELDA 
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in this NJV company actually knew what they had agreed to. More important, perhaps, it 
indicates that the Director’s position was in the hands of the RH company, which could then 
control any dissent from that quarter.  
      Table 10 The New Joint Venture system of payments to landholders. 
Age of palms  
(years) 
Annual payment  
(MYR per hectare) 
1-3 65 
4-5 130 
6-30 130 
Additional MYR130 to be paid in two annual instalments: May and December 
The balance of MYR 25 for additional shares 
Source: Rimbunan Hijau (2007b). 
In principle, one of the key roles of LCDA in Konsep Baru joint ventures is to act on behalf of 
the NCR landowners and ensure that their rights and interests are safeguarded (Ministry of 
Land Development 1997). However, this element has been removed from the NJV projects, 
exposing the NCR participants to greater risks in dealing directly with the private-sector 
partner. During several interviews with key informants from LCDA, both senior staff in the 
Head Office in Kuching and staff on the ground in Selampit, it became clear that none of them 
had any knowledge of the NJV projects, even though four of the projects shared a boundary 
with the LCDA joint-venture plantations and all shared the same private-sector partner.  
When one senior LCDA official was asked if the RH agreements in the NJV projects were 
legal, he replied: “Technically no. I don’t know-lah, whether they get some under the table 
approval from the timber licence company, I don’t know.”95 He further explained that it was a 
Timber Licence Area on State land, so perhaps the proponents dealt with the Forestry 
Department instead. He was thus unaware that it had been the Chief Minister and the Minister 
                                               
95 Third follow-up meeting with senior LCDA official responsible for NCR land in Konsep Baru projects 
(Kuching, 30 August 2008).  
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for Land Development who had personally brokered the agreements with RH to develop the 
areas as NCR land. When asked if this new system presented a risk for the NCR landholders 
participating, he said: “Of course, they do not have the protection of LCDA.” He added that 
“there would be no security, only bound by the agreement that they broker themselves directly 
with Rimbunan Hijau, no EIA study, no accessible documentation of progress, development 
stage, no business plans. If there’s a problem with land disputes, there would be no mediator.”  
During an interview with the RH Regional Manager about the NJV model, he said that they 
were no longer involved with LCDA (PELITA) in the new sections:  
No, the model has shifted a little bit, in the sense that they have gone from the 60-30-
10 arrangement, to more or less a rental concept. Now they’re given a figure, per 
hectare, for this age, 1-3years, 50c or something like that per palm, and 4th year 
onwards 130 ringgit per hectare. So, it is more or less a rental basis… So, Raya will 
receive dividends and Sebandi rent. 96 
Interest in the rental model from Selampit landholders 
As discussed above, the joint-venture participants in Selampit were already unhappy with the 
outcomes under Konsep Baru. They had met on 24 July 2008 to discuss what to do about the 
poor management of their NCR land and the consequent lack of promised financial benefits. 
Having become aware of the NJV rental model developed by RH with neighbouring villages, 
the Selampit landowners met again on 4 September 2008 to discuss switching to the new rental 
model. The Village Development and Security Committee (JKKK), on behalf of the NCR 
landowners participating in the joint-venture project, wrote to the Lundu District Officer to 
request a change to the rental system (Jinis Ak Gihep 2008). This letter was copied to local 
political representatives, the Ministry of Land Development, LCDA, the Executive Director of 
RH and the Senior Plantation Manager for the Lundu and Biawak Plantations, the most senior 
Bidayuh leader (temenggong), and the Dayak Bidayuh National Association (DBNA). 
The letter stated that the NCR landowners in Selampit were not satisfied with the management 
of the Lundu Plantation. As such, they were sending a request to the Government and LCDA 
                                               
96 Key informant interview with the Rimbunan Hijau manager of the LCDA joint ventures, Lundu and Biawak, 
and now also involved with the new New Joint Ventures in the Lundu region, Lundu, 25 September 2008. 
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to switch from a joint-venture company to a rental system so that all involved could benefit 
from the development. The letter made the following points (Jinis ak Gihep 2008): 
(a) the Lundu Plantation had already been operating for more than eight years but the 
landowners had not yet received the dividends that had been promised. 
(b) the managing agent [i.e., LCDA] has instead only given landowners advance dividends 
(wang pinjaman dividen) of 120 ringgit per hectare for Phases 1 and 2, while other 
participants received only 100 ringgit per hectare.97 
(c) the development of NCR land in Selampit must bring a benefit to the inhabitants of the 
village and the must be managed well and with sincerity. 
The letter reported that the NCR landowners and residents of the village were not satisfied with 
the current arrangement and had agreed to change to a rental system.  
They saw this change as necessary because the problems in the plantation would not lessen 
under the current arrangement. The letter stated that this was because: 
(a) the private management did not follow the New Concept of land development on NCR 
land that was that was recommended by the Government;  
(b) they landowners had found that the management of the plantation was not sincere; 
(c) the landowners had no representative on the Board of Directors of the joint-venture 
company; 
(d) the developer did not care about the welfare of local workers; 
(e) the plantation management had personal interests and local workers were oppressed. 
They ended the letter by stating that if the Government and LCDA did not accept the 
application, and no reasons were given, the landowners would blockade all the land that had 
already been developed (Jinis ak Gihep 2008). 
The letter from the Selampit landholders proposed a monthly rather than an annual payment, 
starting in Year 4, and at rates much higher than those offered the landholders in the five NJV 
schemes (Table 11). The counter-offer from RH was about a tenth of what Selampit was asking. 
Clearly, the higher the rental paid by the company, the lower its profits. Cramb (2013b) 
analysed a rental model, assuming payment of a fixed annual rent of MYR 1,000 per hectare 
                                               
97 Advance dividends were not strictly “dividends” in accounting terms as they were merely an advance paid from 
future dividends. NCR landowners felt that these advance dividends were not what had been promised and were 
only paid to appease them after they had threatened the company with blockades and protests.  
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from Years 1 to 25. This was just over four times the total rental of the RH offer, but less than 
half that of the Selampit proposal. He found that the landholders would be significantly worse 
off under a rental scheme than under the standard Konsep Baru joint venture (assuming both 
schemes were properly managed and achieved commercial yields).98 Hence the RH offer was 
very unfavourable and the Selampit request was not unreasonable. 
 Subsequent official recognition of the rental model 
It would be a further nine years after these initial New Joint Venture rental schemes in Lundu 
before the State Government would begin to publicly promote them as an alternative land 
development model. In 2016, the Deputy Chief Minister, Douglas Uggah Embas, who is also 
the Minister of Modernisation of Agriculture, Native Land, and Regional Development, first 
touted this “new” leasing model in his speech in the State Legislative Assembly, calling it a 
“win-win formula” for both NCR landowners and investors (Goh 2016).99 NCR landowners 
would rent their land to a private-sector investor at a fixed monthly rate for 25 to 30 years. The 
Deputy Chief Minister went on the say: “Our analysis also show that an average yearly income 
per hectare will be received by the landowners under the leasing model [of] about MYR 720 
to MYR 780” (Goh 2016), implying a rental above that offered by RH in its NJV schemes but 
a third or less of the Selampit request (Table 11). He claimed that it would provide higher 
returns for NCR landowners than the existing Konsep Baru model, though, as mentioned 
above, Cramb’s (2013) modelling does not support this claim, unless the Minister was 
acknowledging the poor performance in practice of the Konsep Baru projects. Significantly, 
Uggah commented that this rental model was not new, as “some” of the private sector had 
already been practising the method. He said: “We’ll engage the landowners and potential 
investors to fine tune the model.” The Deputy Chief Minister’s announcement indicated that 
LCDA, the supposed trustee responsible for managing NCR landowners’ interests, would be 
left out of the equation entirely.  
 
                                               
98 The study also showed that landholders and local people were better off under a managed smallholder scheme 
such as implemented by SALCRA, even assuming lower than commercial performance (Cramb 2013b). 
99 This Ministry combined the previous Ministry of Modernisation of Agriculture and the section of the Ministry 
of Land Development responsible for NCR land. 
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Table 11 Comparison of rental systems proposed by Selampit landholders and by RH.. 
Age of 
palms 
(years) 
Selampit proposal RH proposal 
Rental per 
palm per 
month 
(MYR) 
Rental per 
ha per year 
(MYR) 
Rental per 
holding per 
year (MYR) 
Rental per ha 
per year (MYR) 
Rental per holding 
per year (MYR) 
4-10 1 1,716 11,376 200 1,326 
11-15 1.5 2,574 17,064 250 1,658 
16-25 2 3,432 22,752 300 1,989 
 
Notes: Holding size taken to be the average of 6.6 ha and the planting density taken to be 143 palms per hectare 
(MEX Environmental Sdn. Bhd. 1998; SALCRA 2002; Jawatankuasa Kampung Selampit 2008). 
Outcomes of the Joint-Venture Approach in the Raya Plantation 
A succession of approaches 
There were three successive arrangements for developing NCR land in the Raya Plantation 
over a 15-year period: 
1. the managed smallholder approach of the SALCRA Raya Oil Palm Project (1993-
1997), for which there was no private-sector partner and landholders could expect to be 
issued with individual titles to their land; 
2. the joint-venture approach under the Konsep Baru policy, in the form of the PJP 
PELITA Plantation Lundu Sdn Bhd (2002-2008), with landholders having a 30 per cent 
stake and expecting to be paid dividends accordingly; 
3. the rental model or New Joint Venture approach introduced by RH, in which 
landholders would still own a 30 per cent stake in the company but in fact receive their 
“dividends” in the form of fixed annual payments per hectare, regardless of actual 
company profits, that is, a form of rental. 
This succession of arrangements was a progressively worse deal for NCR landholders, placing 
greater power and profit in the hands of the private-sector partner. At the same time, there was 
progressively less oversight and support by a government agency – from SALCRA, with its 
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active Department of Landholders’ Affairs, to LCDA, with its lack of on-ground support but a 
legal obligation to act as the landholders’ trustee, to a purely private partnership between a 
landholder company and the developer. Though the participants could be said to be 
successfully “embracing the private sector”, in fulfilment of government policy since the 
Seventh Malaysia Plan, it appeared to be at great cost and risk to the participants themselves, 
while highly beneficial to the private-sector partner. 
From the point of view of RH, the Raya Project (broadly conceived) provided the opportunity 
to increase both its access to land and its stake in the plantation companies progressively set 
up to develop the land. It has done this by utilising or developing three different types of joint 
venture:  
(a) the standard Konsep Baru joint venture over 60 years (the Lundu Plantation on NCR 
land), with RH as an investor holding a 60 per cent stake in the joint-venture company 
and controlling its operation;  
(b) a joint venture with LCDA, again over 60 years (the Biawak Plantation on what was 
deemed to be State land), with RH again holding a 60 per cent stake but paying less for 
the right to access the land (i.e., the very low premium for a provisional lease);  
(c) a joint venture on NCR land over 25 to 30 years under RH’s New Joint Venture model, 
in which RH held a 70 per cent stake and effectively rented the land from the owners 
for a very low fixed payment.  
These three types of land project were managed as a single “umbrella plantation” known as the 
Raya Project or the Raya Plantation or, simply, Raya. By 2008, the Lundu and Biawak 
Plantations encompassed a total area of 11,287 hectares (see Appendix F). The four adjacent 
plantations that were being developed under the New Joint Venture model (i.e., excluding 
Kangka, Sempadi) had a combined committed area of 6,800 hectares.100 Thus the total area of 
RH’s Raya Project was just over 18,000 hectares.  
Outcomes for the participants  
In 2008, 15 years after the Selampit community first agreed to participate in SALCRA’s Raya 
Oil Palm Project, they were now participants in the Konsep Baru joint-venture company, PJP 
                                               
100 In 2008, these plantations were in the early stages of development, with planted areas as follows: Mighty Roar 
800 hectares; Real Time Yields 2,000 hectares; Ezy Saga 1,000 hectares; and Beribu Progress 3,000 hectares. 
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PELITA Plantation Lundu Sdn Bhd, and had claims to the State land leased by PJP PELITA 
Biawak Plantation Sdn Bhd. However, the benefits of this participation, as outlined in the 
Konsep Baru Handbook (Ministry of Land Development 1997 p.24) distributed to NCR 
landowners at the time of the transition from SALCRA to LCDA, had not been realized.  
(a) Income. By 2008, when the plantation had been operating for more than eight years, the 
managing agent (LCDA) had only given landowners “advance dividends” (wang pinjaman 
dividen) of MYR 120 per hectare for Phases 1 and 2 (the original SALCRA plantings) and 
MYR 100 per hectare for other participants (Jinis ak Gihep 2008). There was also a concern 
about landholders’ investment in the state-owned investment trust, Amanah Saham Sarawak 
(ASSAR).101 Following the Konsep Baru model, 30 per cent of the up-front payment to 
landholders had been invested in ASSAR, to provide them with a regular payment separate 
from the joint-venture company’s dividends. However, a review of ASSAR by the Securities 
Commission in 2012 found that its assets had fallen to just 25 per cent of its liabilities and only 
eight of the Trust’s 90 investments did not suffer large losses (Sarawak Report 2016). By 2014, 
over 80 per cent of the money invested with ASSAR on behalf of nearly 72,000 NCR 
landowners had been lost. 
The landholders’ disappointment and frustration over the lack of income from their 
participation was clearly stated. The Selampit Area Development Chairman complained: 
“Haven’t received any benefits yet. Not the 30 per cent dividend, not any bonus from the oil 
palm. Nothing, but I’ve already been a participant for 11 years.”102 An elderly male landowner 
asserted: “In the past, they spoke of dividends, but there are none. Rimbunan Hijau lied. I 
haven’t disturbed their rights; they have taken mine.”103 A middle-aged mother of four felt that 
“RH just gives bonuses to those they like. MYR 1,000 here, MYR 500 there.”104 
                                               
101 ASSAR was established in 1993 by the Chief Minister (Abdul Taib Mahmud), who was also the Minister of 
Finance, to introduce saving practices to NCR landowners (Sarawak Report 2016).  
102 Semua benefits belum. Belum 30% dividen, belum bonus dari sawit. Semua belum, tapi sudah 11 tahun 
program. Household interview with SELA 8, 55-year-old father of three, Area Development Committee Chairman 
(Selampit, 10 October 2008). 
103 Dulu cakap dividend, tidak ada. Rimbunan Hijau tipu. Saya tidak kacau dia punya hak, dia kacau saya.  
Household interview with SELA 18, 80-year-old father of four, retired. Comment made when discussing scheme 
participation and NCR land in the Lundu joint venture (Selampit, 13 October 2008). 
104 RH kasih bonus kepada yang mereka suka saja. 1,000 ringgit sini, 500 ringgit sana. Household interview with 
SELA 1, a 58-year-old mother of four, shop-owner, and pensioner (Selampit, 7 October 2008). 
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(b) Employment. The promised employment opportunities were also minimal, with 80-90 per 
cent of the plantation’s workforce made up by migrant Indonesian labourers. The participants 
who did gain employment on the plantation were in the awkward position of simultaneously 
being employees and shareholders, without any decision-making power (Majid Cooke et al. 
2011a). This dual identity created some tension between the landholder-workers and the 
Indonesian workers. When RH’s Lundu Regional Manager was asked about this, he replied: 
“Ah yes, I would say they [tensions] are definitely there. Particularly, some may be workers, 
but they are in a unique position as they are also shareholders. So, they feel a bit special.”105 
There was an equally complex situation for local LCDA employees. They were employees of 
the managing agent and trustee when dealing with disputes in both the Lundu and Biawak joint 
ventures, but then returned home to their own villages where they were also landholders and 
participants experiencing the same issues. During field visits to the Lundu Plantation office 
with an LCDA staff member, he explained that his father was a participant in the troubled 
Kelimut Estate of the Boustead-PELITA joint venture in Kanowit.106 There the participants 
had also not received any dividends and were preparing for more blockades. Such staff had a 
unique insight into both the dilemmas of the NCR landowners and the difficulties of the 
development agency in dealing with them. In general, these staff genuinely wanted good 
outcomes for the participants but felt they had little ability to negotiate with the private-sector 
partner in either of their roles.  
(c) Infrastructure. The Konsep Baru Handbook had promised that participants’ “idled land 
will be developed into modern plantation estates with provisions of adequate infrastructure 
facilities such as roads, buildings, factories, schools, etc. [that] will increase the value of their 
land” (Ministry of Land Development 1997 p.24). However, the promises of improved 
infrastructure and facilities also remained unfulfilled. A middle-aged father of three claimed: 
“In the past, they promised to build a hall, build a road, a bridge. All they promised, they did 
not deliver.”107 
                                               
105 Key informant interview with RH manager of the Lundu and Biawak Plantations, who was also involved in 
the New Joint Ventures in the Lundu region (Lundu, 25 September, 2008). 
106 Key informant interview with LCDA official during Lundu area ground visits (Raya Oil Palm Estate, 25 
September 2008). 
107 Dulu janji buat dewan, buat jalan, jembatan. Semua dia [RH] janji tidak di tunai. Household interview SELA 
2, a 44-year-old father of three and Office Helper at the Selampit School, discussing the different promises and 
incentives RH had offered during the transition from SALCRA to LCDA (Selampit, 7 October 2008). 
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In 2008, infrastructure was still lacking in Selampit. The village was located on the west bank 
of the Kayan River, whereas the Bau-Lundu Road was on the east bank, yet there was no bridge. 
Instead, some 400 families relied on boats to ferry people back-and-forth across the river. When 
the Kayan River flooded, Selampit residents were cut off. The only alternative was a 20-
kilometre detour up to the northern Biawak Road along an unsealed plantation road frequented 
by large lorries. In 2003, the Barisan Nasional assemblyman for the Tasik Biru constituency 
(in which Selampit fell) promised MYR 500,000 for the Selampit-Bitokan Bridge Project, 
which he described as a “Christmas gift” for the 400 families in the two villages (Tawie 2011; 
Borneo Post Online 2012). This was the same bridge that had been promised during the 
transition from SALCRA to LCDA in the late 1990s. The bridge’s construction commenced 
shortly after the announcement in late 2003, which was also not long before the Malaysian 
General Elections, held on 21 March 2004. However, without any explanation from either the 
contractors or the Government, construction abruptly stopped three months later. In 2011, 
residents from Selampit and Bitokan wanted the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission to 
investigate the abandoned bridge project for possible misuse of public funds (Tawie 2011). In 
2016, it remained uncompleted. 
The village was also lacking in basic water supply. At the time of fieldwork in 2008, sections 
of the village still had no individual supply to their houses, despite earlier promises. Instead, 
people would take wheelbarrows and buckets down a large hill to a communal open-air tap to 
collect water for their households; this was still occurring in 2012 (Borneo Post Online 2012). 
Those unable to transport water had to bathe in full view of passers-by (Tawie 2011). 
(d) Land issues. The main reason NCR landowners gave for participating in the original 
SALCRA project was to receive a formal individual land title to each plot of land they owned 
(Ayob et al. 1990).108 However, the 1997 transition to Konsep Baru meant that participants 
would no longer receive land titles. Instead, they had entered into a joint-venture agreement 
that left participants feeling frustrated and powerless. Land title, in the form of a single 
                                               
108 Section 18 of the Land Code provided for NCR land to be issued with a title in perpetuity (often referred to as 
a Section 18 title), provided it was used for agricultural or customary purposes and not sold. If sold, the title 
reverted to a conventional lease, typically for 99 years. The market for such land depended on whether it fell 
within a Native Area or a Mixed Zone. 
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provisional lease to the entire plantation area, was instead issued to the joint-venture company 
for 60 years (two planting cycles).109  
Fourteen of the 30 participants interviewed thought that their land would not be returned at the 
end of the lease. Moreover, in 60 years’ time, few who had entered into the original agreement 
would still be alive to find out. This sentiment was a common theme in household interviews. 
One 41-year-old man often mentioned that the agreement was “until you were dead,” hence he 
had the worry of not knowing whether his grandchildren would be able to access the land in 
the future.110 A 41-year-old woman declared: “Sixty years, that’s what makes you sick. The old 
agreement was good, but this one is not just.”111 Another landowner and FELDA lorry driver 
expressed the villagers’ concerns well: 
Like me, I am 52 years old now. I won’t be here in 60 years. I am afraid my heir won’t 
know [about our land]. There is an agreement, but not in black and white. I think we 
are not going to get our land back. Maybe it will be sold if there are no profits, maybe 
RH will sell it to Golden Hope, Sime Darby. Because they have a 60-year agreement. 
They can do anything. They can sell, they can build a factory, they can build something 
else, whatever they want.112 
Apart from the lack of secure title to the NCR land in the Lundu Plantation, villagers also 
disputed the re-classification of the 3,933 hectares as State land that was incorporated in the 
Biawak Plantation. At the time of fieldwork, only two of the 30 participants interviewed had 
seen the official land tenure map of the Raya Plantation – the Village Head and the Chairman 
of the Selampit Area Development Committee. The map shows how the Lundu and Biawak 
Plantations fit neatly within the perimeter of the original SALCRA Raya Oil Palm Plantation, 
supporting villagers’ view that the entire area was NCR land. The surrounding plantation 
                                               
109 Under the SALCRA agreement, their land would have been caveated for 25 years to ensure the plantation 
remained intact. 
110 Household interview SELA 24, 41-year-old father of one and a RH driver (Selampit, 14 October 2008).  
111 Enam belas tahun, itu yang buat sakit. Janji dulu bagus, tapi yang ini tidak jujur. Household interview SELA 
27, 41-year-old mother of five, housewife (15 October 2008). 
112 Seperti saya, 52 tahun sekarang. Saya tidak ada dalam 60 tahun. Takut wakil tidak tahu. Dia ada agreement, 
tapi tidak ada hitam-putih. Saya pikir kita tidak akan dapat tanah itu balik. Mungkin jual kalau tidak ada untung, 
mungkin RH jual kepada Golden Hope, Sim Darby. Sebab mereka ada agreement 60 tahun. Mereka boleh buat 
apa saja. Boleh jual, boleh buat kilang, boleh buat lain, apa saja mereka mau. SELA 20: 52-year-old father of 10 
and a FELDA lorry driver. Comment made during household interview on scheme participation (Selampit, 13 
October 2008). Golden Hope was said to have 80,000 ha of oil palm directly across the Indonesian border from 
the Raya Plantation.  
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landscape further reinforces this view as there are multiple schemes for NCR land – the five 
New Joint Venture rental schemes, three SALCRA plantations, and one FELCRA plantation 
(Rimbunan Hijau 2007). The villages of Kendaie and Selampit eventually filed a case against 
LCDA and RH over this land, claiming it was their NCR land (Colchester et al. 2007, Sarawak 
Dayak Iban Association 2013). The case was still awaiting trial as of February 2013.  
As well as these global land issues, there were numerous disputes over specific plots of land. 
A key issue after RH took over managing the plantation was repeatedly using contractors to 
clear a given plot without the consent of the landowner. In 2002, a resident of Selampit lodged 
a police report against RH, claiming its contractor, Wintrip Sdn Bhd, had cleared the cremation 
ground of the Bidayuh Jagoi to plant oil palm at Rasa NCR Lot 549 (Balai Polis Lundu 2004). 
In 2006, this case was escalated to the High Court, where 97 plaintiffs from Kampung Selampit 
represented themselves against the defendant, their joint-venture trustee, LCDA (Anek Uren 
and Partners 2006). LCDA attempted to renege on its promise of compensation: 
The Plaintiffs maintain the position that the Defendant’s contractor or agents had been 
wanton in their disregard and disrespect over their land in particular over the cremation 
ground. And all their [i.e., the Defendant’s] explanations so offered were that all these, 
what the NCR Landowners were claiming as theirs, by being unmarked and untitled 
on the map, are mere State land (Anek Uren and Partners 2006, p. 2). 
The Sarawak Dayak Iban Association (SADIA) was assisting the claimants in this case. I 
visited the cremation site with residents of Selampit and SADIA’s Secretary-General, a well-
known indigenous rights activist, for a ceremony (miring) to appease the spirits.113 The blessing 
took place among the oil palms, now over two metres high, as NCR landowners tried to re-
erect carvings and old, inscribed, wooden plaques. The court case has yet to be finalized.  
In 2004, a Selampit resident’s fruit trees were cleared without his knowledge or consent by 
another RH contractor, Syarikat Malay Star Sdn Bhd (Balai Polis Lundu 2004). The destroyed 
trees included 64 illipe nut trees (engkabang, Shorea spp., the seeds of which are used to make 
edible oil), 16 jackfruit trees (cempedak, Artocarpus spp.), 5 rambutan trees (Nephelium 
lappaceum), and 13 carambola or starfruit trees (belimbing buluh, Averrhoa bilimbi). This also 
                                               
113 Miring ceremony at the Rasa Cremation Ground, attended with Nicolas Mujah from SADIA (Rasa, 20 October 
2008). SADIA alone was assisting in 200 court cases related to the violation of NCR land in Sarawak (Sarawak 
Dayak Iban Association 2013). Of these, 102 were related to oil palm development on NCR land. 
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occurred to three other participants interviewed, none of whom were compensated. One was a 
63-year-old woman, who lost engkabang, rambutan, and durian trees. She complained: “The 
Company came in, cleared everything, cut all the wood.”114 
Confronted with powerful companies and their contractors, the only recourse for landowners 
was to lodge police reports, stage protests and blockades, and file court cases, with little 
prospect of success. A sobering realisation of this came while I was helping to plant rice with 
a labour-exchange group in Selampit in one of the few small plots of available land within the 
Lundu Plantation. About 30 people had come to join the group. Breaking for lunch, the NCR 
landowner began to describe how they had to patrol the border of the plot to stop RH 
contractors from simply clearing it all in the night.115 He described how they walked back-and-
forth, holding flaming torches high, to ensure that the bulldozers would not push through. If 
clearing had been allowed to occur, it would have been impossible to trace the contractor or 
obtain compensation.  
Neighbouring villages also experienced significant encroachment on their NCR land by RH 
and other oil palm companies. In some cases, villages had several companies simultaneously 
encroaching on different parts of their village territory. The village of Kendaie, a participant in 
the original SALCRA Project with Selampit, had three private plantation companies on what 
they regarded as their NCR land. The first was the PJP PELITA Biawak Plantation, as 
discussed above. The second was Syarikat Ladang Dafa Sdn Bhd, which had been granted a 
2,676-hectare provisional lease (Lot 33, Block 11), a large part of which was claimed as NCR 
land (see Figure 16, p. 118) (Colchester et al. 2007; Pro Regenwald 2010). A court case was 
filed against Syarikat Ladang Dafa and the State Government by Baru Bian on behalf of the 
Kendaie landowners on 31 October 2003, though the land dispute went back to 1998 
(Colchester et al. 2007). Sarawak Report (2011) revealed that the 99-year lease cost the 
company just MYR 19,826, or MYR 7 per hectare, when it was issued in 1983. The land 
records refer to the area as “State Land that is possibly subject to Native Customary Rights 
claims.”116 The third company was LS Suria Plantation, which held a 696-hectare lease (over 
Lots 41, 45, and 46, Block 11, Gading Lundu Land District) to the north of the RH joint 
                                               
114 Kompani masuk, bersikan, potong semua kayu. Household interview with SELA 17, 63-year-old mother of 
six, pensioner (Selampit, 13 October 2008). 
115 SELA 2, 44-year-old father of three (Selampit, 11 October 2008). 
116 Tanah Kerajaan yang ber-kemungkinan tertakluk kpd tuntutan Hak Adat Bumiputra (Sarawak Report 2011). 
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ventures (see Figure 16, p. 118) (MEX Environmental Sdn Bhd 2007). The village 
communities affected in this case were Kendaie, Pasir Hilir, and Pasir Hulu. Their continued 
assertion of NCR land claims led to the initial investor selling the plantation to another 
company. The environmental consultant who completed the compulsory EIA for the new 
management stated:  
Despite the official status of the land area, it was nevertheless subject to NCR claims 
by residents of the nearby communities, specifically those residing at Kpg. Pasir Hilir. 
Although compensations have allegedly been paid, land related problem continue to 
surface prompting the eventual taking over of the company by the current management 
(MEX Environmental Sdn Bhd 2007, p. C1-1).  
Conclusion  
This case study has highlighted the risks for semi-subsistence, village-based smallholders 
occupying customary land of participating in large-scale joint ventures with private plantation 
companies, even where these arrangements are brokered by government agencies. Rural 
communities such as Selampit have faced immense difficulty in capitalising on the oil palm 
boom through joint-venture arrangements that are primarily devised to give companies 
profitable access to their customary land. The limited ability of NCR landholders to negotiate 
a better deal, coupled with the reality of dealing with a profit-driven private sector partner, have 
resulted in land disputes and poor financial returns in the majority of Konsep Baru joint-venture 
projects. The largely negative outcomes of participation for NCR landowners have been 
particularly severe in Selampit as they were originally in the SALCRA Raya Oil Palm 
Plantation. The year 2017 would have marked the end of the original 25-year SALCRA Raya 
Oil Palm Project agreement. Instead, the joint-venture agreement for the PJP PELITA Lundu 
Plantation will not expire until 2062, and the land excised for the PJP PELITA Biawak 
Plantation (barring a successful legal challenge) will never be returned to them, and they have 
no stake in the company. Yet Selampit landholders continue to witness the participants in 
neighbouring SALCRA plantations receiving land titles and steadily increasing dividends. 
While this is just one case study, it is symptomatic of the methods that state agencies and the 
private sector continue to use to access customary land for large-scale oil palm development. 
It should serve as a cautionary tale of the potential risks for rural landowners when dealing 
with the private sector in State-brokered arrangements. The reality for foreign migrant 
labourers working on these oil palm plantations is also challenging, as will be outlined in the 
next chapter. 
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7. THE EMPLOYMENT OF MIGRANT INDONESIAN WORKERS IN PLANTATIONS ON NATIVE CUSTOMARY LAND 
CHAPTER 7 
THE EMPLOYMENT OF INDONESIAN MIGRANT WORKERS IN PLANTATIONS ON 
 NATIVE CUSTOMARY LAND 
 “In the past the frog was under the coconut, but the problem is  
that now the frog has a phone.”117 
Introduction 
The profitability of Sarawak’s oil palm industry has come to be heavily reliant on an abundance 
of cheap and easily managed Indonesian labour. It is estimated that 80 to 90 per cent of the 
plantation workforce in Sarawak is made up of migrant Indonesian workers or TKI (Tenaga 
Kerja Indonesia, Indonesian Labour Force). As observed in Chapters 5 and 6, this also now 
applies to plantations developed on Native Customary Land, whether originally set up as 
managed smallholder schemes or established as commercial joint-venture schemes. Low 
wages, long hours, and difficult conditions in the plantation, coupled with the availability of 
better livelihood opportunities in urban centres ensures that few Sarawak residents opt to work 
in the plantation sector. Instead, the highly porous international border with Indonesia, 
combined with overpopulation and chronic poverty, ensure a steady supply of Indonesian 
workers for the Sarawak plantation industry. 
International labour migration makes up an important part of the Indonesian economy and is 
viewed by the Indonesian Government as a method to decrease domestic unemployment 
(Borneo Post 2008; Sijabat 2008). The Jakarta Post reported in 2009 that there were 4.3 million 
legal Indonesian labour migrants in 41 countries around the world (Bernama 2006; Jakarta Post 
2009). However, there were estimated to be about six million Indonesians working overseas in 
total, and that their wages supported around 30 million Indonesians back home (Jakarta Post 
2009). In 2008, nearly USD 12 billion was sent back to Indonesia in the form of remittances 
(Jakarta Post 2009). However, the Indonesian Government also recognises that the work the 
                                               
117 Comment made about Indonesian migrant workers during key informant interview with a senior official at 
FELCRA regional office in Kuching, 6 May 2008. 
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migrants undertake is highly undesirable, as highlighted by the Indonesian Manpower and 
Transmigration Minister, Erman Suparno: “They do the jobs as no locals or workers from other 
countries want to do” (Sijabat 2008). Known as “3D jobs” because they are dirty, dangerous, 
and/or demeaning, they are generally in the agriculture, construction, manufacturing, and 
domestic sectors. These sectors target unskilled and semi-skilled Indonesian labourers who are 
driven by the poverty and lack of opportunities in their home region (Firdausy 2005; 
International Organization for Migration 2010a). 
It was officially estimated in 2009 that there were 2.5 million Indonesians working in Malaysia 
(Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia 2009). Oil palm is a 
highly labour-dependent crop (especially for harvesting), and labour shortages can result in 
serious crop losses. In 2014, it was estimated that five to ten per cent of crops were lost annually 
due to labour shortages, costing Malaysia’s oil palm industry MYR 2.5 billion in foregone 
export revenue (Raghu 2014). While the Malaysian plantation sector views its reliance on 
foreign workers as a major issue, it is also well aware that Indonesian migrant labourers have 
been a “lifeline” for the industry (Khoo & Chandramohan 2002). The Indonesian Government 
also recognises that the Malaysian oil palm sector is dependent on Indonesian labour, as 
highlighted by the Indonesian Manpower and Transmigration Minister “Malaysia needs our 
workers for its oil palm plantations” (Sijabat 2008).  
Three main reasons for the high numbers of Indonesian labourers in Sarawak (and Malaysia as 
a whole) are the economic and demographic differences that exist between the two countries 
(Cramb & McCarthy 2016); the institutionalised network of recruitment agents, brokers, and 
sponsors that is in place; and Malaysia’s close proximity to Indonesia and the similarities in 
language and culture, which simplify working conditions (International Organization for 
Migration 2010b). In this chapter I look beyond the general stereotype of migrant Indonesian 
labour as a homogenous group and put a face to the Indonesian worker, exploring their diverse 
cultural backgrounds, their reasons for and methods of migration, the livelihood strategies 
involved, and the difficulties of life in the palms. The chapter is structured as follows. I first 
discuss the perceptions of Indonesian labour in Sarawak from the perspective of the 
government, the oil palm sector, and rural communities. I then provide a profile of Indonesian 
oil palm workers in a variety of plantation settings, including their motivations for migration. 
I go on to examine the processes associated with both legal and illegal migration to Sarawak. 
Finally, I consider the experiences and perceptions of Indonesian oil palm workers themselves.  
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Methods 
The data for the chapter were obtained in the course of research on the managed smallholder 
and joint-venture approaches to oil palm development on Native Customary Land. Seventeen 
oil palm plantations were visited over the course of a year from 2007-2008, with visits ranging 
from a few days to several months. These included seven managed by the Sarawak Land 
Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority (SALCRA), seven by the Federal Land 
Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority (FECLRA), and three brokered by the Land 
Custody and Development Authority (LCDA) with the private plantation company, Rimbunan 
Hijau (RH). The primary study sites were located in Bau and Lundu Districts in south-west 
Sarawak, as described in Chapter 4. A total of 25 semi-structured interviews were undertaken 
with Indonesian labourers working in these primary study sites. Interviews were conducted in 
Indonesian, generally in the workers’ barracks, though a few were undertaken opportunistically 
in the plantation or in town over a meal. Six women and 19 men were interviewed, who ranged 
in age from 21 to 41. Further interviews were also conducted with key informants, including 
the Indonesian Consul General in Sarawak; officials from the Malaysian Labour Department; 
staff of the Semuja Immigration Detention Centre; SALCRA, FELCRA, LCDA, and RH 
scheme officials; plantation managers; and local residents. In addition to interviews and 
observations, evidence was gained from government documents, research journals, and 
newspaper articles. 
Sarawakian Perceptions of Indonesian Workers 
Government perceptions 
The government rhetoric in Sarawak regarding employment in the oil palm sector has changed 
greatly over the last two decades. Initially, the introduction of plantation schemes on native 
customary rights (NCR) land was touted as a means to eradicate rural poverty by providing 
employment opportunities for the rural communities involved (SALCRA 2003, 2012). The 
schemes were viewed as a way to bring NCR landholders into the “mainstream of 
development” (Cramb 2013b). However, this line has gradually shifted to focus on the 
increasing need for Indonesian labour. In the mid-1990s, Sarawak Government development 
agencies like SALCRA reasoned that they were moving to a business model of production 
rather than one that was specifically aimed at eradicating rural poverty, hence using foreign 
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labour was appropriate.118 Initially NCR landowners would not allow Indonesian workers on 
their land, and so began the long process of persuading local communities to accept foreign 
labour. For example, foreign workers only began harvesting at the LCDA/Boustead joint-
venture in Kanowit in 2005, a decade after the plantation manager began dealing with labour 
issues.119 Before this the local Iban landowners would not allow it; they simply did not want 
foreigners working on their land. Similar stories were heard from all plantation managers 
interviewed. Instead, landowners and communities had to be persuaded over time by staff of 
the Ministry of Land Development and the local area development committees to let foreigners 
work on their land.120 
Given this widespread reluctance to accept foreign labour, until very recently, the Government 
has restricted the plantation sector to recruiting workers mainly from Indonesia.121 Indonesian 
workers were seen to be more acceptable because Indonesians and Malaysians have a closely 
similar language and social and cultural ties. Gradually, local communities have become less 
hostile to Indonesian labourers working on their NCR land within larger oil palm 
developments. However, the plantation sector has continued to lobby the Government for a 
relaxing of the Malaysian labour laws to meet the labour requirements (Borneo Post 2008; 
Sijabat 2008). This has resulted in increased calls to employ foreign labourers from countries 
such as Bangladesh (Banji 2009), no doubt because this would provide access to abundant 
cheap labour into the future. These concerns have been accentuated by the rapidly growing 
demand in Indonesia itself for domestic plantation labourers (Li 2016). 
Industry perceptions 
Labour is one of the main concerns of the oil palm industry in Sarawak. For well over a decade, 
continued access to an abundant supply of cheap labour has been considered the key limiting 
factor to the industry’s profitability and continued expansion (Khoo & Chandramohan 2002). 
While it must be remembered that this is set against the broader context of Sarawak’s economic 
transformation and urbanisation, it is still evident that the Sarawak oil palm sector prefers to 
pursue the cheaper and more abundant supply of Indonesian labourers rather than employ local 
                                               
118 Key informant interview with a senior SALCRA official, 30 November 2007. 
119 Key informant interview with the manager of the LCDA/Boustead joint-venture at Kelimut Estate, Kanowit, 
27 November 2008. 
120 Key informant interview with senior official at Ministry of Land Development, Kuching, 27 November 2007. 
121 Key informant interview with SALCRA’s labour department, 29 October 2008. 
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residents. Even in those areas where plantation schemes had been developed initially to provide 
rural communities with employment opportunities. When the matter was discussed with 
various plantation managers, it was often said that locals were lazy or found ways to avoid 
working. As stated by the manager of the SALCRA Jagoi plantation: “Villagers are good at 
disappearing.”122 The manager of the LCDA/Boustead joint-venture plantation in Kanowit 
stressed that the plantation was constrained by the local Iban not working hard enough. He 
went on to say that they had “employed two Iban [local residents] to one normal worker 
[Indonesian labourer].”123 
However, it was apparent at each site visited that local NCR landowners initially had not 
wanted Indonesian labourers working on their land, resulting in continued efforts by plantation 
management to persuade them to allow Indonesians to work there. This persuasion strategy 
was apparent at a “SALCRA Community Awareness Day” at one of their estates.124 It involved 
all the members of the local SALCRA Estate Development Committee (Jawatankuasa 
Pembangunan Ladang SALCRA, JPLS), the official communication channel between estate 
management and local landowners (see Chapter 5). This particular committee was mainly made 
up of elderly men, each of whom was each given a bright green SALCRA JPLS tee-shirt, made 
to pose for photos, and then driven out to an extremely hilly and unkempt section of the estate 
with very tall, mature oil palms. They were asked to walk around and try to cut down old fronds 
from palms that were 12 to 15 metres tall, using a long harvesting pole with a heavy cutting 
knife attached. This was understandably a very difficult task for each of the elderly men who 
tried, much to the amusement of all who watched. The SALCRA official told me: “We bring 
them here to show them how hard it will get, that we have to find another way, [and] that we 
need the foreign workers.” 
The oil palm industry in Sarawak is well aware of the importance of Indonesian labourers, and 
there is a growing concern about their dependence on them. Indonesian labour makes up 80-
90 per cent of the plantation workforce in Sarawak. The SALCRA and FELCRA plantations 
visited were probably the “best case scenarios” for Indonesian labourers in Sarawak. In those 
sites, plantation management allowed me complete freedom of access to information and 
                                               
122 Orang kampung pandai hilang. Key informant interview with SALCRA-Jagoi manager at a JPLS meeting, 16 
May 2008. 
123 Key informant interview:  the Kanowit plantation manager, 27 November 2007. 
124 SALCRA awareness day held at the SALCRA Jagoi Estate, 16 May 2008. 
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movement around the estates throughout the course of my fieldwork. Yet, even here Indonesian 
labourers had their passports removed and were strictly controlled in an attempt to stop them 
absconding and to keep local communities at ease. However, it quickly became apparent during 
interviews with plantation managers that, whereas once Indonesian labourers were extremely 
isolated, now with the aid of mobile phones, they were able to compare conditions with family 
and friends throughout Sabah, Sarawak, and Peninsular Malaysia. This sometimes enabled 
them to put pressure on estate management for higher wages and better conditions, or helped 
them avoid working on plantations that were more challenging. As expressed by a senior 
FELCRA official, “in the past the frog was under the coconut, but the problem is that now the 
frog has a phone.”125 Several FELCRA plantations visited had great difficulty in retaining 
labour due to the extremely hilly nature of the terrain. Another FELCRA official elaborated: 
“Indonesians are cluey, they ring their friends to say don’t work in hilly areas”.126 Some 
labourers instead absconded without their travel documents to find employment as illegal 
plantation workers under more favourable working conditions.  
Community perceptions 
There was a general distrust of Indonesians in Sarawak and in some cases even fear. After 
spending a number of years in Indonesia, I was quite confronted by how Indonesians were 
viewed in Sarawak. Two passing comments at the beginning of fieldwork highlighted this. The 
first was made by a prominent Iban academic, well known for advocating Dayak rights: “You 
cannot trust the Indonesians, there are a lot of Indonesians.”127 The second was heard in the 
village of Opar: “Do not go in the forest on those hills! They are full of Indonesians!)”128 It 
was common to hear such statements. In the village of Selampit, when the topic turned to 
Indonesian labour during a household interview, the respondent’s wife kept quietly repeating:  
I am afraid of Indonesians, I am afraid of Indonesians.129 
In the villages, such comments were generally made by people who had little to no contact with 
                                               
125 Key informant interview with senior official at the FELCRA head office in Kuching, 6 May 2008. 
126 Comments made during site visits to the FELCRA Padawan area estates, 29 May 2008. 
127 Comments made during visit to the Universiti Malaysia Sarawak, 22 April 2008. 
128 Jangan masuk hutan di bukit sana! Penuh dengan orang Indon! Comments made by a villager during a lunch 
while I was living in Opar, 10 May 2008. 
129 Saya takut orang Indonesia, saya takut orang Indonesia. Household interview Sela 19, Selampit, 12 October 
2008. 
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Indonesian labourers. Instead, their opinions were greatly formed by the media’s coverage of 
Indonesians in Malaysia. Whenever Indonesians were featured in the media they were 
generally associated with theft, rape, prostitution, loss of local employment opportunities, or 
illegal migrants. Articles about legal migrant workers were often sensationalised, such as one 
about legal foreign workers being certified as fit without any examination (Selvarani & 
Vijaindren 2008). The article in question stated: “This is why we have so many cases of 
infectious diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis, which have been eradicated or reduced 
decades ago.” However, Deputy Director-General of the Health Ministry, Datuk Dr Ramlee 
Rahmat, also cited in the article, shifted the focus back to illegal Indonesian migrant workers 
(Selvarani & Vijaindren 2008): “We are not as worried about the legal foreign workers in the 
country as we are the thousands of illegal workers here who may be carrying highly infectious 
diseases.”  
A Profile of Indonesian Workers in Sarawak 
Diverse characteristics of migrants 
The term Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (TKI) seems to imply that the people migrating to Sarawak 
to work in the plantation sector form a single homogenous group. This stereotype was often 
highlighted both in the media and passing conversations with Sarawakians. However, 
Indonesia is an ethnically rich and diverse nation. The Indonesian archipelago stretches over 
thousands of inhabited islands and in the 2010 Census had a population rapidly approaching 
240 million (Badan Pusat Statistik 2011 2011; World Bank 2011) coming from vastly different 
backgrounds in terms of language, culture, and religion. Even though well over half this 
population (136 million) lives on the island of Java, also home to the largest ethnic group, the 
Javanese, it is still an immensely diverse and culturally rich nation. While Indonesian is the 
country’s official language, it is estimated that around 550 different languages are spoken 
(Sneddon 2003). Despite having the world’s largest Islamic population, with over 85 per cent 
of Indonesians identifying themselves as Muslim, large numbers identify with other religions 
that are also recognised by the state (Badan Pusat Statistik 2011 2011). As such, depending on 
the origin of an Indonesian migrant labourer, their religion, culture, and first language may be 
completely different to that of other Indonesians working on an oil palm plantation in Sarawak. 
In all 17 plantations visited, the standard practice was to recruit Indonesian labourers from 
multiple distant islands, rather than from the neighbouring Indonesian provinces of East and 
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West Kalimantan. In each plantation, the Indonesian labourers came from a range of different 
islands and ethnic groups, including from Lombok, Flores, Sulawesi, Sumbawa, and Java; no 
estate employed labourers who were all of the same ethnic background. This recruitment 
strategy essentially bound the labourer to the plantation for an extended period because the 
journey home was too expensive and time-consuming. The mixing of ethnic groups also had a 
rationale according to the Indonesian Consul General in Kuching: 
Suku-suku di Indonesia punya sifat-sifat sendiri, seperti sifat masing-masing lain [the 
ethnic groups of Indonesia each have their own characteristics, like traits that are each 
different]. That’s why they also tend to mix [TKI on plantations]. Because if they are 
all from East Nusa Tenggara, or from Kupang, that would be difficult to manage 
because they tend to drink hard. If from Lombok or West Nusa Tenggara they will run 
away. If all Bugis, there will be problems with their adat-lah [customs]. And these 
problems, people die from that. So that is why they [plantation managers] tend to mix 
[workers]. So, within the companies they should have all the ethnic groups. And that 
is why they should have some Javanese, for a balancer. There are not as many, because 
Javanese work less hard.130 
The 25 Indonesian labourers interviewed in the study sites in southeast Sarawak came from six 
different islands – Java (4), Sulawesi (6), Lombok (5), Flores (6), Sumbawa (2), and Timor 
Leste (2, who still identified themselves as Indonesian). They spoke six different languages 
and were either Muslims (19) or Catholic Christians (8). They ranged in age from 21 to 41 
years. Most were in their late twenties to late thirties. Six of the 25 were women who had 
“followed their husbands”. Education levels varied from no schooling to a full Senior High 
School education. However, the majority (14) had only completed Elementary School (Sekolah 
Dasar). All the 25 had entered the country legally and were in secure positions within the 
plantation. Even from this small sample, it was clear that Tenaga Kerja Indonesia working in 
Sarawak’s oil palm plantations were culturally and ethnically diverse.  
The policy of recruiting from distant islands appeared to be effective as all 25 interviewees 
stated that they would not return home (pulang kampung) for at least the first two years of their 
contract. Furthermore, some of the longer-term Indonesian labourers interviewed had not 
                                               
130 Key informant interview: the Indonesian Consul General at his office in Kuching, 18 August 2008. 
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returned home for over six years as the time and cost involved were beyond their means. This 
was compounded by the fact that all had gone into debt to get their plantation positions, even 
before they had left Indonesia. The majority of interviewees had travelled across multiple 
islands to reach Sarawak. The two labourers from Timor-Leste had a 10-day journey to reach 
Sarawak and said that they would not be able to return home until their contracts had expired.   
The previous employment of all 25 workers was relatively low-paying compared to what they 
could earn as labourers in Sarawak plantations131. For 16 of the 25, it was the first time they 
had worked in Malaysia, whereas the other nine had previously worked in different plantations. 
Before working in Malaysia, the most common occupations were farming (11), housewife (5), 
or transport (3). Other employment included sewing, factory work, a tourist cook, and work in 
the timber industry. It also appears that, as other employment sectors such as the timber 
industry began to decline in Indonesia, working for the Malaysian oil palm industry was the 
next choice.  
Reasons for migration 
The dramatic growth of labour migration throughout the archipelago has been due to the lack 
of employment opportunities at home, limited access to land, and/or overpopulation. While 
individual reasons for choosing this livelihood strategy may vary, each is based on the hope of 
earning more money abroad. When talking with different Indonesian labourers about how 
working conditions were back in their home village, the following comment was quite 
common: “Just enough to eat from day to day” (Cari makan sehari-hari saja). In the traditional 
non-wage labour context, this saying literally means to look for enough food to eat each day, 
but now it generally implies a combination of earning enough money to buy staples and also 
utilising what you have grown yourself (e.g., rice, vegetables, fish). A more colloquial 
translation would be: “Just scraping by from day to day.” This was also highlighted by the 
response “cukup makan” (getting enough to eat) when asked about how their wages were back 
home. 
When asked about why they chose to work in a Malaysian oil palm plantation, the reasons 
given appeared to be less about a “choice” and more that the opportunity presented itself. This 
                                               
131 During interviews with Indonesian labourers they did not refer to exact earnings, instead stated that they earnt 
considerably more in Malaysia. 
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“opportunity” in most cases was a labour agent arriving regularly to their provincial centre or 
village. Even those who said they chose to follow a husband, brother, or friend also generally 
followed the same agent. The particular agent with whom they linked up appeared to be pivotal 
to how their working life overseas would actually unfold. It became clear that work in the 
Malaysian oil palm sector, as hazardous as it was, was seen as a better-paying, safer option 
than other labour options abroad. When asked, “How does work in oil palm compare to other 
jobs in Malaysia?” the general reply was “lebih senang” (easier). The only real alternatives for 
men looking for work abroad were in the logging or construction sectors, both of which 
respondents said had a higher risk of injury and a lower wage. For the male migrants, oil palm 
labour was generally viewed as less dangerous compared to the risks involved in logging. As 
a senior SALCRA official remarked about Indonesians working in the timber industry in 
Sarawak: “Mati seperti kodok [they die like frogs] and then are just bulldozed into the 
ground.”132 
The preceding comments relate primarily to why men became oil palm labourers. However, 
we must also consider why a woman would make the same choice. While no single women 
were met working in the plantations visited, it appears that an increasing number of wives are 
following their husbands to Malaysia. In some respects, it seems a harder choice for a married 
woman to leave her children behind for a prolonged period of time, especially given the 
traditional role of women in Indonesian villages. Ani was 22 when interviewed in 2008 in the 
SALCRA Jagoi plantation, and had made her own way from Lombok to join her husband who 
was already working in the plantation. She was a housewife back in her village and now worked 
collecting loose palm fruits from the fresh fruit bunches that her husband harvested. She had 
left her two young sons with her mother and often spoke of how terribly she missed them. She 
had already been in the plantation for a year and would not return home for at least another 
year. When asked how she felt about the work she replied: “It is very hot and there are lots of 
thorns, but I must follow my husband.”133  
Ani and her husband shared a barrack with Girni and her husband, who was also from Lombok. 
She was 33 at the time of being interviewed and had followed her husband to work in Malaysia, 
again leaving her two children with their grandmother. However, this was Girni’s third contract 
                                               
132 Comment made during car trip between plantations with senior SALCRA official, 12 December 2007. 
133 Itu panas sekali dan banyak duri, tetapi harus ikut suami. Interview with Ani, female Indonesian labourer 
working in the SALCRA Jagoi plantation, 16 May 2008. 
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working in a Malaysian oil palm plantation, and she chose it because it was easy work to obtain. 
When asked why she would choose to leave her children for such a long time (almost five years 
in total) she replied: “I wanted to look for more money; in the village it’s only enough to eat.”134 
The Labour Migration Process 
Role of agents  
Agents are one of the key actors in the process of Indonesian labour migration to Malaysia. 
There are numerous legal and illegal agents operating on both sides of the international border. 
Often the illegal system operates quite openly, is well organised, and is more adaptable than 
the legal one. At the time of fieldwork, there were over 400 registered labour agents in 
Indonesia and 30 in Sarawak; however, this appeared to be only a fraction of the number of 
illegal agents.135 During an interview with the Indonesian Consul General in Kuching, he asked 
me to stand and look out his office window, from where he pointed out an illegal agent’s office 
that was busily operating just across the road.136  
Each plantation worker interviewed had arrived in Sarawak through an agent. In the majority 
of cases an agent had recruited the workers in their village and had repeatedly visited to try and 
obtain more workers. These recruitment agents were both local and from other regions. In many 
cases, the interviewee already knew someone who worked in Malaysia, so they felt a little more 
secure about making the journey for the first time. However, the six respondents from Flores 
had made their own way to the small Indonesian island of Nunukan, situated near the border 
with Sabah. It was also an official immigration entry point for Sabah. They said that they waited 
at a known gathering area until an agent came and took them to various plantation companies 
in Sarawak. In most cases, interviewees were not informed where they would be going and 
only knew that it would be to work on oil palm in Malaysia. The amount paid to agents was 
not consistent and ranged from IDR 1.5 million to IDR 3 million (Table 12). Most interviewees 
had borrowed money from family, friends, neighbours, or the agent to cover these expenses, 
which was generally paid back with interest.        
                                               
134 Mau cari uang lebih, kalau di kampung cukup di makan-makan saja. Interview with female Indonesian 
labourer on her break from collecting loose fruit in a SALCRA plantation, 16 May 2008. 
135 Data obtain during a meeting with the Indonesian Consul General in Kuching, 18 September 2008. 
136 Observation was made during a meeting with the Indonesian Consul General in Kuching, 18 September 2008. 
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 Table 12 Amount paid by 20 Indonesian workers to agents to gain employment in the Malaysian oil palm sector. 
Origin Sex Recruited 
by 
Cost 
(IDR) 
Borrowed 
from? 
Amount 
borrowed 
(IDR) 
Amount 
to repay 
(IDR) 
Time to 
repay 
loan 
Sumbawa M Agent 2,500,000 Villager 2,500,000 5,000,000  
Sumbawa M Agent 2,500,000 Villager 2,500,000 5,000,000 1-3 yrs 
Timor Leste M Agent 1,500,000 Villager 1,500,000 3,000,000 6 mths 
Timor Leste M Agent 1,500,000 Villager 1,500,000 3,000,000 6 mths 
Sulawesi F Agent 3,000,000* Friend 3,000,000 4,000,000  
Sulawesi M Agent 2,500,000     
Flores M Agent 1,000,000 Neighbour 1,500,000  1 yr 
Flores M Agent 1,000,000 Older sibling 1,000,000   
Flores M Agent 1,500,000 Family 1,500,000 3,000,000  
Flores M Agent 1,500,000 None    
Flores M Agent 1,000,000 Neighbour 1,500,000   
Flores M Agent 1,000,000 Family 1,500,000   
Lombok F Broker 4,500,000*     
Lombok F Agent 1,500,000     
Sulawesi M Agent 2,300,000  2,000,000   
Sulawesi F Agent 1,650,000     
Java M Agent 3,000,000     
Java F Agent 1,500,000     
Java M Agent 3,000,000     
Java M Agent 3,000,000 Agent 2,000,000   
* Indicates amount paid to an agent for a husband and wife. 
For example, the two men from Timor Leste borrowed IDR 1.5 million to pay their agent and 
were required to pay back IDR 3 million within six months, implying an annual interest rate of 
200 per cent. Such interest rates were not uncommon; the two men recruited from Sumbawa 
borrowed IDR 2.5 million and had to pay back IDR 5 million within one to three years. They 
were in debt even before they left their village and became more indebted once they reached 
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the plantation in Sarawak, where the government levy and the plantation’s recruitment cost 
was incurred. 
Legal labour migration 
The figures for the number of legal Indonesian migrant labourers in Sarawak varied widely – 
from 112,000, according to the Immigration Department, to 169,000, according to the Labour 
Department.137 However, the same Labour Department official who gave this figure added that 
the legal figure was “just tip of the iceberg; actually, for us, there is no way to know.”138 
Considering the importance of Indonesian workers to the plantation sector, it is worrying that 
there is little consistency in figures between the relevant departments. Even the Indonesian 
Consul General in Kuching stated that there was no consistency in the figures given to his 
office by Malaysian Government departments.139  
The legal recruitment process for Indonesian foreign labourers lagged behind that of the illegal 
system, which was more flexible in adapting to the increasing demand for labourers. The legal 
system was also a far more drawn-out and costly process, as explained by a senior official from 
SALCRA’s Labour Department.140 First, the plantation company had to establish that no locals 
wanted the position. To do this, they had to advertise a walk-in interview in both English- and 
Malay-language newspapers on a Sunday. They also had to make a radio advertisement, to be 
announced three times over one day. The walk-in interviews had to be held one week after the 
advertisement at the respective divisional office. The SALCRA official also pointed out that 
no-one came to the interviews: “We have been doing this, but no locals are interested, but 
anyway that is the requirement of the law, the Labour Department. Walk-in interview, no-one 
comes, zero. Only then, because it is proven no locals are interested do we apply to the Labour 
Department for the Approval in Principle. SALCRA’s licence is only allowed to recruit 
Indonesians.”141 The Labour Department confirmed that, by law, plantation companies were 
required to advertise any available position so that a local could apply for it first.142 However, 
in reality, these advertisements appeared to be a formality; a walk-in interview within a short 
                                               
137 Figures obtained from the Immigration Department and the Labour Department in Kuching, 17 October 2008. 
138 Key informant interview with official from the Labour Department, 17 October 2008. 
139 Key informant interview with the Indonesian Consul General in Kuching, 18 September 2008. 
140 Key informant interview with SALCRA official, Labour Division, in Kota Padawan, 29 October 2008. 
141 Key informant interview with SALCRA official, Labour Division, in Kota Padawan, 29 October 2008. 
142 Key informant interview with an official from the Labour Department, 17 October 2008. 
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timeframe in a divisional centre was not feasible for most villagers, even if they wanted the 
job.  
Next, the plantation company obtained an Approval in Principle (AP) from the Labour 
Department. Only once this was obtained could they seek out a recruiting agent to get 
Indonesian labourers. The Labour Department official interviewed also stated that they did not 
know what the process was on the other side of the border in Indonesia, except that it was 
expensive. The agent then gave the plantation company a copy of the labourer’s passport so 
that the company could obtain an initial entry pass. Once obtained, the company fetched the 
labourers from the border crossing point. Next, they were given a health check to determine if 
they were fit to work; if not, they were returned to the agent. If they passed the health check, 
they were put onto an initial two-year contract, during which they were not allowed to leave 
the plantation. After that, they had the option to extend for another two years, then one further 
year, and then they had to wait for six months before applying again. 
The fees and other financial arrangements varied widely at each site visited. For SALCRA 
plantations, as of October 2008, they were as follows: (1) The agent’s recruitment fee was MYR 
1,800 per worker, but only after the worker had passed the health check. The agent would get 
70 per cent of the fee on arrival of the worker and the remaining 30 per cent after three months. 
If the labourer absconded, the full amount was recoverable from the agent. (2) Of the MYR 
1,800 paid to the agent, MYR 450 was deducted by SALCRA from the labourer’s wages as 
“administrative costs” over 22 months. (3) A Government levy of MYR 540 (other companies 
said it was MYR 650) was also deducted from the Indonesian labourer’s wages at MYR 45 per 
month. (4) A security bond of MYR 350 was also required from the worker. If any Indonesian 
labourers arrived at a SALCRA plantation looking for work without the proper documentation, 
SALCRA had to hand them over to a recruitment agent.143  
The SALCRA official interviewed also stressed that the agency could not get enough workers 
as competition for them had become intense.144 I was informed by both SALCRA and FELCRA 
officials that they had previously recruited illegal labourers, but once Government policy 
changed and fines were introduced, both agencies had stopped this practice. However, during 
the course of fieldwork, SALCRA had begun to send their “good workers” back to their home 
                                               
143 Key informant interview with SALCRA official, Labour Division, in Kota Padawan, 29 October 2008. 
144 Key informant interview with SALCRA official, Labour Division, in Kota Padawan, 29 October 2008. 
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villages to recruit more people.145 This method was likely being used because workers were 
more likely to follow a friend or relative than an unknown labour agent. Even though according 
to an official at the Sarawak Labour Department the practice was illegal.146  
However, this was not always the case in Malaysia. During colonial times it was the standard 
method of Indian rubber plantation labour recruitment in Peninsular Malaysia after 1910 (Kaur 
2013). Just like large-scale oil palm plantations, increased profitability from rubber cultivation 
required access to a “large, cheap and disciplined workforce” (Kaur 2013). Known as the 
Kangani system, Kaur (2013) describes how it also relied on trusted workers to become labour 
brokers in the Malaya frontier and poor rural areas of southern India. Furthermore, just as with 
Indonesian migrant labourers in Malaysian oil palm plantations, the personal connection and 
the large distance migrated also ensured that foreign labourers were less likely to abscond. 
In 2008, during the course of this research, the agent recruitment fees paid by SALCRA and 
FELCRA for one legal Indonesian labourer ranged from a MYR 995 to MYR 2,000. An illegal 
Indonesian labourer, such as those met on the LCDA-Rimbunan Hijau joint-venture plantation 
in Lundu, may have only cost the company MYR 200-300, which was reportedly paid to an 
agent at an unofficial border crossing (known as a “rat trail” or jalan tikus).147 When 
considering the differences in costs and time, it is obvious why some plantation companies 
chose to use illegal Indonesian labourers, who were also far more abundant than the pool of 
legally recruited Indonesian labourers. 
Illegal labour migration 
The international border between Sabah and Sarawak in Malaysian Borneo, and East and West 
Kalimantan on the Indonesian side runs through some of the island’s most remote and thickly 
forested terrain. It was first drawn up in the nineteenth century by the Dutch and the British, 
and had little relevance to the Dayaks who regularly crossed back and forth on well-worn paths 
between villages that existed long before the border was determined (Obidzinski et al. 2006). 
Stretching over 1,840 kilometres, it has few official border crossing points (Obidzinski et al. 
2006); in the case of Sarawak there were only two official border-crossing points (Figure 17). 
However, there are numerous unofficial crossing points or “rat trails” scattered right along the 
                                               
145 Key informant interview with senior SALCRA official in Kota Padawan, 30 October 2008. 
146 Key informant interview with official from the Labour Department, 17 October 2008. 
147 Information obtained from a SALCRA official, 12 August 2007. 
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border. These “rat trails” ranged from one-off routes and traditional walking trails to roads 
large enough to accommodate trucks laden with all manner of smuggled goods, like timber, 
wildlife, petrol, produce, and people. Jalan tikus have become so well used that the former 
Director of Immigration for Sarawak joked that they are “more like elephant trails!”148 This 
comment referred to the rapidly increasing numbers of illegal immigrants and smugglers over 
the years, no doubt helped by the limited border controls (Irene 2009).  
 
Figure 17  The porous border between Sarawak and Kalimantan. There are two legal border posts, Aruk-
Biawak (1) and Entikong-Tebedu (2), and many potential informal crossing points as indicated by arrows. 
Map adapted from Bissonette and Cramb (2008). 
In 2006, the Secretary-General of the Indonesian Ministry for Manpower and Transmigration, 
Harry Heriawan, stated that hundreds of thousands of Indonesians worked illegally in Malaysia 
(Bernama 2006). He estimated that 1.2 million of the 1.7 million Indonesians in Malaysia were 
                                               
148 Lebih seperti jalan gajah! Comment made during an informal dinner with Datu Robert Lian, who had recently 
retired as Director of Immigration, Sarawak, Kuching, 24 April 2008. 
The porous border 
1 
SARAWA
2 
 
2
148 
 
there illegally. There appeared to be no set path for legal or illegal Indonesian migrant 
labourers; they could switch back and forth between the legal and illegal systems (Figure 18).  
 
Figure 18 Legal and illegal labour circuits between Indonesia and Sarawak (jalan tikus = illegal border-crossing; 
lari = to abscond). 
For example, some Indonesian labourers may have followed a legal recruiting agent all the way 
from their home village to the plantation in Sarawak. Others may have arrived at the Malaysian 
border and crossed illegally, but nevertheless obtain employment in a plantation that secures 
their permits. Yet others may have been bounced back and forth across the border in a circuit 
of illegal entry, detention, deportation, illegal entry, and so on. The risk of detention for 
Indonesian labourers travelling without the proper documentation was high, as both police and 
local volunteer groups known as RELA (Volunteers of the Malaysian People, Ikatan Relawan 
Rakyat Malaysia) were keenly on patrol. RELA (comprised local citizens who received MYR 
8 per hour to look for “illegals”.149 While RELA had supposedly been disbanded, it was 
rumoured during the course of fieldwork that former RELA members were being paid a bonus 
for each illegal labourer they brought in. During a visit to the Serian Detention Centre (Depot 
                                               
149 Key informant interview: official from the Labour Department, 17 October 2008. 
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Pendatang Tanpa Izin Semuja), in response to a question about whether the number of 
Indonesian illegal migrants caught was increasing, the guard replied: “Sometimes it’s like a 
flood.”150 When further asked how they coped with such a sudden intake of illegal Indonesian 
workers, he replied: “Cepat proses!” (Process them quickly!). 
All applications for foreign workers in Sarawak had to be processed by the Malaysian 
Immigration Department, which had the motto “friendly, trustworthy, and firm service with a 
smile” (Department of Immigration Malaysia 2008). Yet this is hardly the greeting for illegal 
migrant labourers if detained. Under Section 6(1)(c) of the Immigration Act 1959/63 and the 
Passport Act 1966, the punishment for entry and stay in Malaysia without a valid pass or permit 
is: “Fine not exceeding MYR 10,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or 
both, and liable to whipping of not more than six strokes” (Department of Immigration 
Malaysia 2008). While this punishment was generally reserved for repeat offenders, the initial 
process in Sarawak was as follows: (1) On first arrest, after a period of detention they were 
transported to the Indonesian-Malaysian border post at Entikong-Tebedu, where they were 
deported to Indonesia. (2) If arrested again within six months, the penalty was six months’ 
detention and one stroke of the cane. (3) If arrested again within nine months, the penalty was 
six months’ detention and three strokes of the cane. (4) If arrested again within one year, the 
penalty was one year’s detention and six strokes of the cane. 
Indonesian labourers who had been deported had few choices, especially if they were already 
in debt to the agent who initially brought them to Malaysia. One option was to return to their 
home village in Indonesia. However, because Malaysian plantation companies favoured 
recruiting Indonesians from remote provinces, such as from the islands of Nusa Tenggara 
Timor, they would have difficulty returning home due to the large cost involved. The 
alternative option, which an officer of the Serian Detention Centre told me was the most 
commonly chosen, was to cross back over the porous border illegally via jalan tikus.151 If 
detained again, the penalties escalated, as noted above. Hence headlines like: “Man gets four 
months’ jail, whipping for illegal entry” are common (Borneo Post Online 2010). The accused 
in this case was a 23-year-old plantation worker from South Sulawesi who was arrested during 
a police road block at 10.40 pm when he failed to produce a valid travel document. He was 
                                               
150 “Kadang-kadang macam banjir”. Comments made by a guard during a visit to Serian Detention Centre, 21 
October 2008. 
151 Comments made during a visit to Serian Detention Centre, 21 October 2008. 
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whipped three times, and imprisoned for four months (Borneo Post Online 2010). 
However, the illegal labour system is often easier to navigate than the legal one. It also has the 
added incentive for plantation companies that they do not have the high upfront costs of 
recruiting legal Indonesian labourers – and they can pay them even lower wages. Attempts to 
police illegal Indonesian labour recruitment in oil palm plantations is difficult, and in many 
cases infeasible. Some plantations visited, like the LCDA/Rimbunan Hijau joint-venture 
project at Lundu, were seen to employ both legal and illegal workers, with different payment 
systems in place for each. In border plantations like those in Lundu, some Indonesian workers 
simply came across the border each day to work, and if police arrived they just ran back across 
the border.152 However, this was also a risky strategy for the labourers, because if they were 
caught they would end up in detention, and repeat offenders often received canings, as 
discussed above. Pye et al. (2012) argue that this dual (legal/illegal) labour system is actually 
embedded in the politics of the oil palm complex because it provides plantation companies 
with “flexibility” in their hiring and firing of workers. However, “flexibility for the estate 
managers translates to insecurity for the workers” (Pye et al. 2012 : 333). The dual system also 
persists because in some respects it meets the needs of migrant workers who are willing to take 
the risks, providing more employment opportunities than would otherwise be the case and 
enabling them to slip between the two systems to their advantage (see Figure 18, p. 148). 
Life in the Palms 
Working conditions and rights 
Indonesian workers on Sarawak’s oil palm plantations existed in a harsh environment and were 
strictly controlled. Despite being a vital part of the Malaysian plantation sector, their rights 
were severely limited. Fear of arrest, long hours, a hazardous working environment, poor living 
conditions, passport removal, isolation, and travel restrictions were just some of the issues 
faced. However, there was almost no protection and little recourse for Indonesian labourers in 
Sarawak if they were mistreated or had disputes with their employers. In Peninsular Malaysia, 
there was the National Union of Plantation Workers, composed mainly of Indian members 
(Narayanasamy. A 1998). Formed in 1954, its main aim was to improve the conditions of 
plantation labourers. However, no such union existed to ensure that Indonesian labourers 
                                               
152 Comment made by SALCRA employee during a plantation visit in Bau, 11 December 2007. 
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received fair treatment on plantations. Instead, all aspects of an Indonesian workers’ life in 
Malaysia appeared to be dependent on their employer. Furthermore, any disciplinary action 
was also at the employer’s discretion. As stated by the former Chief Minister, Abdul Taib 
Mahmud, at a Sarawak Business Summit, “If these migrant workers are not behaving well or 
productive enough, it’s up to the employers to deport them” (Borneo Post Online 2008). What 
awaits them on the other side of the border is of little concern to the Malaysian authorities. The 
only initiative for Indonesian labourers seen throughout the course of fieldwork was a 
“helpline” set up by the Indonesian Consulate in Kuching (Figure 19). However, it had received 
little publicity, and the Consul General even asked if I would distribute some of the small 
stickers to workers in the plantations I visited. In Indonesian, the stickers simply stated 
“Complaints: The Consul General of the Republic of Indonesia”, with a phone/SMS number 
and the Consulate address.153  
 
Figure 19 Hotline sticker for Indonesian migrants in Sarawak (actual size). 
The working conditions observed in the SALCRA and FELCRA plantations visited were quite 
similar. It was standard practice on all plantations that passports and work permits were held 
by plantation management. When I asked the workers why management kept their passports, a 
common response was: “I don’t know, maybe they are afraid we will run away” (Saya tidak 
tahu, mungkin takut kita lari”). The main difference between these sites was the terrain; the 
steeper the terrain, the harder it was for an oil palm estate to retain labourers. On FELCRA’s 
Gayu plantation I was informed that there were only two Indonesian workers left out of 27. 
The rest had absconded due to the very steep terrain, which made working conditions extremely 
difficult and, in some areas, hard to even stand up.154 The management had to resort to asking 
the local villagers for help in harvesting while waiting on another 15 Indonesian labourers to 
arrive. On the LCDA/Rimbunan Hijau joint-venture plantation in Lundu, the working 
                                               
153 The hotline sticker was given to me during a meeting with the Indonesian Consul General, Kuching, 18 
September 2008. 
154 Information obtained from FELCRA official during a site visit to the Gayu estate, 29 May 2008. 
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arrangements were more varied. This was primarily because they also employed illegal 
Indonesian labourers.  During field research, 83 of the illegal Indonesian labourers were 
arrested in a single police raid and jailed in Kuching.155 It was said that, generally, when the 
police came, the illegal labourers would just run back across the border or hide in the palms, 
but it appears that the illegal workers were not so lucky on this occasion.  
Wages were paid once a month on each of the plantations, the rate varying according to the 
phase of the plantation (hence the size of the palms) the labourers worked in. Each labourer 
was required to give their thumbprint in order to get their wages. At the SALCRA Jagoi 
plantation, these “pay days” had a festive atmosphere, with numerous small vans waiting 
outside selling bread, colourful cakes, soft drinks, vegetables, fish, and clothes. The local shop-
owners were also waiting to collect payments for the debts the labourers had accrued over the 
previous month. All Indonesian labourers interviewed had varying levels of debt. Some had so 
much debt that they were no longer able to send remittances home, which was the main reason 
given for choosing work on an oil palm plantation in the first place. At the LCDA/Rimbunan 
Hijau joint-venture plantation, “pay day” was quite different. There was a clear division 
between the legal and illegal labourers. Illegal labourers did not get paid at the main office like 
the legal Indonesian labourers; instead, they were “paid amongst the palms” by their field 
supervisors.156 It was also the only day in the month when legal workers were given written 
permits to go to the largest nearby town – Bau. On spending the day with a group of Indonesian 
labourers heading to town, I became aware of the importance they placed on mobile phones 
and finding ways to supplement their income. In town, the main aim of many of the labourers 
was to buy phone cards. One brother and sister from the LCDA/Rimbunan Hijau plantation 
bought MYR 1,470 worth of phone cards at MYR 10 each; they would then sell them in the 
estate for MYR 12 to supplement their wages. On the SALCRA plantations, Indonesian 
labourers were allowed to go to town twice a month.  
Living conditions 
There were no official standards for the living conditions of Indonesian labourers in Malaysia; 
the standard of accommodation was dependent on each individual company.157 Housing on the 
                                               
155 Information obtained during an interview with LCDA/Rimbunan Hijau joint-venture plantation employee who 
lived in the village of Sebandi, 11 August 2008. 
156 Information obtained from a plantation field supervisor during a trip around the plantation, 10 October 2008. 
157 Key informant interview with a senior official, Ministry of Land Development, Kuching, 27 November 2007. 
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plantations was in barracks. These ranged from simple wooden structures on the 
LCDA/Rimbunan Hijau plantation to sturdy brick constructions on some of the SALCRA 
plantations. Accommodation blocks were allocated according to the place of origin of the 
workers; one plantation had a Sumbawa barrack, a Lombok barrack, a Sulawesi barrack, and 
so on. Each barrack only had people from the same island in residence, in some cases from the 
same village. The primary reason given for this was the differences in language and religion 
between workers from different islands.  
In one of the SALCRA plantations, food was purchased either during trips to town or by phone 
from shops in the local village that delivered produce to the barracks. The LCDA/Rimbunan 
Hijau plantation had a canteen for workers to purchase supplies, but the prices were much 
higher than in town. During my time at this plantation, there were protests over water shortages 
in the barracks. However, such protests were swiftly dispersed, sometimes with the aid of 
hardwood batons used on those unwilling to disperse. In all plantations visited, male Indonesian 
labourers hunted for game; in a number of cases this included protected species such as the 
pangolin. Other animals hunted included bats, fish, snakes, squirrels, frogs, macaques, and 
numerous bird species. As one Indonesian labourer put it, “we use the protected species posters 
as a menu and catch whatever we can.”158 Both women and men gathered vegetables or fished 
in the stream running through the plantation, raising a question about prolonged exposure to 
pesticides and herbicides.  
There were children living on the LCDA/Rimbunan Hijau joint-venture plantation and they 
were seen to be helping their parents in the plantation during the day. One seven-year-old boy 
I spoke to had lived there for three years and had never attended school. His mother was very 
proud that he was “clever at phoning people in the village” (pandai main HP dengan orang 
kampung). While state-run plantation development schemes in Sarawak, such as SALCRA, did 
not allow children to live on the plantations and ensured that women returned to Indonesia if 
they became pregnant, private plantation companies such as Rimbunan Hijau were not under 
the same scrutiny. The Government did recognise that there were children on plantations and 
that there was a serious lack of facilities for them. Under the Ninth Malaysian Plan, the Sarawak 
Labour Department allocated funding to develop childcare centres for plantations to cater for 
                                               
158 Comment made during interview with Indonesian labourers, 12 October 2008. 
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children aged four and below (Ringgit 2007). However, these were targeting the children of 
local workers, whereas the vast majority of labourers were Indonesian.  
Health and safety 
Harvesting fruit bunches from mature oil palms was both labour-intensive and dangerous. Add 
to that working in areas with steep and hilly terrain, and the possibility of injury greatly 
increased. Medical help was often far from the plantations and, in any case, illegal workers 
would not generally risk being caught in order to seek medical help. As stressed by a 38-year-
old male Indonesian labourer from Sumbawa: “If you are sick and don’t have a pass, you don’t 
go to the clinic.”159 I visited the regional hospital closest to two of the case-study sites and 
obtained access to the emergency registrations book (Table 13). A total of 87 Indonesians were 
admitted to the emergency ward over a 10-month period in 2008. In almost all cases they had 
come from an oil palm plantation. Of the 59 males, 23 had laceration wounds. Harvesters were 
required to cut fruit bunches that could weigh over 50 kilograms from palms that could be up 
to 20 metres tall. These bunches were cut down with a large, sharp sickle attached to a long 
wooden pole. There was a high risk of injury when working with these sickles or machetes. 
The hospital records showed that the laceration wounds were to the “knee, left leg, left arm, 
right toe, forehead, ear, ankle, leg, finger, rib, tendon, head, thigh, and groin.” Acute abdominal 
colic, malaria, soft tissue injuries, backaches, fever, and throat infections were just a few of the 
other ailments to male Indonesian labourers. Female Indonesian labourers appeared to have a 
different set of ailments, possibly due to the different work they did in the plantations. In some 
cases, it was found that these jobs included spraying herbicides like Paraquat, which is banned 
in 32 countries because of its toxicity to humans (Felton-Taylor 2012). Some ailments may 
have been a sign of exposure to such agrochemicals – throat infection, allergic reaction, asthma, 
and skin rash (Table 13). These emergency ward records provided a stark insight into the 
difficulty and risks involved in working on oil palm plantations.  
 
 
                                               
159 Kalau sakit tidak ada pas, tidak pergi ke klinik. Comment made during interview with Indonesian labourers, 
12 October 2008. 
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Table 13 List of ailments suffered by Indonesian emergency ward patients admitted to Lundu Hospital from 
January to October, 2008 (n= 87). 
Complaint (male) No. of 
patients 
Complaint (female) No. of 
patients 
Laceration wound 23 [Illegible] 9 
Acute abdominal colic 5 Throat infection 4 
Foreign body 4 Allergic reaction 2 
Malaria 4 Hypertension 2 
Acute gastroenteritis 2 Malaria 2 
Fever 2 Tonsillitis 2 
Soft tissue injury 2 Acute gastroenteritis 1 
Appendicitis 1 Asthma 1 
Backache 1 Backache 1 
Conjunctivitis 1 Broken limb 1 
Crash injury 1 Fever 1 
Ear pain 1 Generalised body weakness 1 
Eye injury 1 Hyperpyrexia 1 
Headache 1 Laceration wound 1 
Muscle pain 1 Miscarriage 1 
Neonatal jaundice 1 Phenomena 1 
Throat infection 1 Pneumothorax 1 
Urinary tract infection 1 Skin rash 1 
  Snake bite 1 
Total 53 Total 34 
Source: Lundu Hospital Emergency Ward admission records for January-October, 2008. 
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Conclusion 
In most debates about the expansion of oil palm in Sarawak, much of the attention has been 
focused on the land rights and livelihoods of rural Sarawakians. The economic importance of 
the Indonesian labour force is acknowledged, but the characteristics, motivations, and 
circumstances of Indonesian workers in Sarawak are rarely considered. Rather, they are treated 
as a homogeneous mass and are strictly controlled and isolated in oil palm plantations where 
they typically suffer from low wages, long hours, and difficult conditions. Indonesian workers 
are viewed with distrust by Sarawakians and there is little regard for their safety or welfare. 
Legal migrants are generally recruited from the distant islands of the Indonesian archipelago, 
their passports removed, and their movements highly restricted. Conditions for illegal workers 
can vary, from daily movement back-and-forth across the border to extremely harsh conditions 
in the plantations, with the ever-present risk of severe punishment if apprehended.  
The process of recruiting and delivering migrant workers to Sarawak is well established and 
hinges on the role of Indonesian agents. Driven by the often-chronic poverty in their home 
villages, these migrants travel long distances and incur significant debts, effectively locking 
them into long-term employment on plantations. The boundary between legal and illegal 
migrants is blurred and dynamic.  Some workers who arrive legally abscond to plantations with 
better working conditions, in turn also becoming illegal labourers, while others who arrive 
without proper documentation are illegally processed by plantation agencies keen to acquire 
their services and shift into the status of a legal labourer “through the back door”. The porous 
nature of the international border between Sarawak and Kalimantan also complicates the 
process, with some illegal labourers moving regularly back and forth across the border to avoid 
arrest. Nevertheless, illegal workers are highly vulnerable to arrest, severe punishment, and 
deportation. 
The living and working conditions of Indonesian labourers on Malaysian oil palm plantations 
leaves much to be desired. While some agencies are striving to improve conditions, others show 
little regard for migrant workers. As the labour market in the Sarawak oil palm sector tightens, 
the bargaining ability of Indonesian workers may improve. However, the Sarawak 
Government’s decision to look further afield to recruit impoverished workers from other 
countries like Bangladesh suggests that reducing costs to the plantation companies is the main 
motivation, not improving the welfare of international migrant workers. 
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8. DIVERGENT TRAJECTORIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NCR LAND 
CHAPTER 8 
DIVERGENT TRAJECTORIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NCR LAND 
“NCR issues have been very juicy issues.”160 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I compare and contrast the managed-smallholder and joint-venture case studies 
in the context of the pressure to develop Native Customary Rights land in Sarawak.  Actor- and 
location-specific outcomes will be considered to better determine how scheme participation 
varies. The trends in employment in both the managed-smallholder and joint-venture modes 
will also be compared. This section will further consider how Government initiatives appear to 
be geared towards enabling the plantation sector continued access to NCR land and cheaper, 
foreign labourers.  
The Pressure for Development of NCR Land 
The Sarawak Government has set an ambitious target of two million hectares of oil palm 
plantations by 2020 – 16 per cent of the total land area of the state. With limited remaining 
State Land available, achieving this goal will require the rapid conversion of large tracts of 
Native Customary Land (or NCR land). Approximately 500,000 hectares have been identified 
by the Government for conversion – a third of the estimated 1.5 million hectares of NCR land 
in Sarawak. The Government has long promoted the large-scale development of NCR land into 
oil palm plantations as the prime method to improve rural livelihoods.  
However, it is increasingly being found that such kinds of development do not always lead to 
improved livelihoods. Tania Li has shown for Indonesia how individualised land rights, the 
inability of landowners to secure enough income from alternative employment, and the lack of 
access to new land means that participants may end up worse off after joining large-scale 
development schemes (Li 2014). The likelihood of landholders being made worse off is greater 
if the development scheme is primarily established as a means of “delivering land to the estate 
                                               
160 Deputy Chief Minister, and Minister of Modernisation of Agriculture, Native Land and Regional Development, 
Douglas Uggah Embas, when referring to the latest round of NCR land issues to hit the press, this time in relation 
to the status of communal land reserves known as pemakai menoa and pulau galau (Boon 2017). 
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sector” (Cramb 2016 p.197) rather than for the benefit of landowners. As land resources 
become scarcer due to large-scale agricultural expansion, this scenario will become more 
common for rural communities in the region. As Li (2014, p.3) argues, 
For billions of rural people, the promise that modernisation would provide a 
pathway from country to city, and from farm to factory, has proven a mirage. 
Lacking an exit path, they stay where they are, but all too often the old set of 
relations that enabled them to live and work in the countryside has disappeared, 
and the new ones – increasingly capitalist in form – do not provide a viable 
livelihood. 
The key issues addressed in this study have revolved around the plantation sector’s drive for 
access to land and labour and the processes by which customary landholders and migrant 
workers have been caught up in this imperative. The profitability and continued growth of this 
boom crop are heavily reliant on continued access to these two resources (Khoo & 
Chandramohan 2002). However, as both land and labour resources have declined, the private 
sector in Sarawak has mobilised its political patrons to push for ever-greater access to NCR 
land on favourable terms, and for a steady supply of low-wage, readily disciplined foreign 
labourers. The research has shown that this push has not necessarily been in to the benefit of 
NCR landowners and foreign labourers. Yet the feeling expressed by many interviewees, that 
they had no choice but to follow the village (ikut kampung), raises questions as to whether the 
NCR participants had a genuine choice or were merely responding to the development agency’s 
forceful push into their customary lands on behalf of the plantation sector. 
Managed-Smallholder versus Joint-Venture Modes 
Nevertheless, the research has also shown that the approach of the two state agencies that have 
the power to implement large-scale oil palm development on NCR land – SALCRA and LCDA 
– has differed in significant ways. The main purpose of the study was to compare and contrast 
how landholder participation in these two modes of oil palm development has been experienced 
and whether the outcomes matched the landowners’ expectations in each case. When 
considering these two institutional arrangements, the initial attractions as perceived by the 
participants interviewed fell into two main categories: land and employment. Each agency 
promoted itself as a catalyst for rural development – a means to convert “underutilised” land 
into a productive asset providing a long-term income stream through regular dividends at the 
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same time as offering increased employment opportunities (Ministry of Land Development 
1997; SALCRA 2003). SALCRA also offered the key incentive of land tenure security by 
promising individual land titles, whereas participation in the New Concept of land development 
through LCDA did not. While the nature of the SALCRA institutional arrangement meant that 
Opar participants were assured of eventually receiving individual land titles, NCR landowners 
in Selampit participating in the LCDA-brokered joint venture with Rimbunan Hijau (RH) had 
grave concerns about their land tenure security, heightened by the loss of some of their NCR 
land to RH’s separate Biawak Estate.  
Over the 40 years since SALCRA’s establishment and the 20 years since LCDA’s joint-venture 
projects were first launched, similar areas of NCR land have been developed through these 
agencies – 51,000 hectares by SALCRA and 79,000 hectares under the auspices of LCDA by 
2016. However, this represents a mere 9 per cent of the total planted area of 1.5 million hectares 
(Ching 2015; Department of Statistics Malaysia 2016; SALCRA 2017). The combined area of 
130,000 hectares was substantially less than 190,000 hectares planted by independent 
smallholders, who make up the fastest-growing sector. The low rate of growth of SALCRA’s 
planted area has not been due to lack of demand from landholders but largely due to political 
restrictions on its expansion (arguably to leave the field open to LCDA). In contrast, the slow 
growth of the LCDA schemes has been primarily due to the difficulty of getting a sufficient 
number of NCR landowners in a given area to agree to participate in a single large-scale 
scheme, mainly out of a fear of losing their land to the project and increasingly due to concerns 
about receiving the promised dividends as scheme after scheme has run into financial problems. 
Thus, the two approaches have been appraised quite differently, not just by the case-study 
participants but also by landholders throughout Sarawak, with the joint-venture approach being 
viewed as especially problematic. 
Joint ventures between the private sector and rural landowners are not new. In Indonesia, the 
Government has also actively promoted such partnerships for the last two decades through 
contracts with groups of smallholders (Gatto et al. 2017). However, these contracts were often 
found to be unequal, with the benefits tipped in favour of the private companies rather than the 
customary landowners they were supposed to help (McCarthy et al. 2012; Gatto et al. 2017).  
This study has also highlighted the risks for semi-subsistence, village-based smallholders 
occupying customary land of participating in large-scale joint ventures with the private sector. 
It has shown the difficulty for rural communities to capitalise on the oil palm boom to improve 
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their livelihoods in a joint-venture arrangement that was devised to exclude them from most of 
the benefits. The limited ability of NCR participants to negotiate a better deal, coupled with 
the reality of dealing with a profit-driven private-sector partner, has resulted in disputes 
occurring across the majority of LCDA joint-venture projects. As stated by an official in the 
Bau District Office: “Due to the villagers’ ignorance and little education they don’t understand 
what they sign or agree to. For them 1,000 ringgit is a lot of money. I work for the government, 
but I still say what is good and what is bad.”161 
The largely negative outcomes of participation in joint-venture schemes have been particularly 
hard to bear in Selampit as they were originally participants in the SALCRA Raya Oil Palm 
Plantation. By 2017 they would have reached the end of the original 25-year agreement with 
SALCRA and would have received income and land titles. Instead, their joint-venture 
agreement with LCDA will not expire until 2062. Selampit landholders will continue to witness 
participants in neighbouring SALCRA plantations receiving land titles and steadily growing 
dividends, while they have no expectation of titles and have not received any dividends. 
Nevertheless, the Sarawak Government continues to give private companies ever-greater 
access to NCR land in Sarawak through evolving joint-venture models, in a rather ad hoc 
approach to large-scale development. As discussed in Chapter 6, under direction by the former 
Chief Minister, Taib Mahmud, RH developed a new “joint-venture” model on 9,300 hectares 
of NCR land that excluded LCDA altogether and effectively paid the landowners a fixed low 
rental rather than dividends (Rimbunan Hijau 2007b). By 2016, government leaders were 
calling such leasing schemes a “win-win formula”, while promising to “engage the landowners 
and potential investors to fine-tune the model” (Goh 2016). This seemingly haphazard and even 
less transparent approach to developing new institutional arrangements for the large-scale 
development of NCR land only further increases the risk for NCR participants.  
These continually evolving “new concepts” of land development for NCR land create an even 
more difficult terrain for NCR landowners to navigate. If they are unlucky, and their NCR land 
is gazetted to be included in an unsuccessful model, they will be stuck with long-lasting 
consequences. The use of such methods is driven by the Government’s ambitious development 
targets, coupled with an increasing shortage of land for oil palm plantations. The result is that 
                                               
161 Key informant interview with Bau District official, Bau, 21 May 2008.   
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the private sector has become the driving force for large-scale NCR land development at the 
expense of the NCR participants. It appears that the Government will use any institutional 
arrangement necessary to facilitate the private sector’s push to access new areas for oil palm. 
At the same time, there are increasing calls for Bidayuh land to be titled so that communities 
can develop it themselves. A senior Bidayuh leader and Minister for Solidarity, Youth and 
Sports, Manyin Jawong, recently spoke about the increased value of titled land for the 128 
documented Bidayuh villages in south-western Sarawak (Pilo 2017):  
We are in the vicinity of Kuching City and Serian, Bau, Lundu, and Padawan. 
If we are given our land title, we can develop our lands on commercial basis to 
become the food basket not only for the Bidayuh but for the whole state. 
Such statements are an indication that Taib-era policies to control access to NCR land are not 
uncontested and may eventually be changed to the benefit NCR landowners.  
Actor- and Location-Specific Outcomes 
The study also showed that the experience of participating in large-scale oil palm development 
can vary greatly depending not only on the scheme-type but also on the characteristics of the 
actors involved and the particular context in which the development occurs. On paper, the 
institutional arrangements are straightforward and clear-cut. Both SALCRA and LCDA portray 
an image of combating rural poverty through the on-going successful expansion of NCR 
projects in the State. In the media, the apparent success is often portrayed by senior politicians 
handing over giant mock-cheques at dividends ceremonies. However, on the ground the picture 
becomes far less black-and-white and increasingly complex and murky. This is a key finding 
from the research.  
The SALCRA project studied in Opar, while slow to develop, has since been shown to deliver 
on most initial expectations regarding granting land title and disbursing dividends (Chapter 5). 
However, the LCDA project in Selampit was fraught with conflict, land loss, illegal land 
clearing, destruction of burial grounds, blockades, police reports, and court cases (Chapter 6). 
The key expectations of participants in both Opar and Selampit were linked to land security, 
dividends, and increased employment. As noted above, while both development agencies 
promised similar outcomes from participation in terms of dividends and employment within 
the plantation, only SALCRA offered access to secure land title in return for contributing NCR 
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land to the project. This is the point where the participation experience of each village diverged 
greatly.  
Within Opar, however, there was still a wide range of outcomes. Some well-connected 
participants had access to good employment opportunities and dividends and received their 
land titles, while at the other extreme there was those who had received no financial returns, 
no land titles, and few realistic employment opportunities, even after a decade or more of 
participation. This left SALCRA management engaged in a difficult balancing act of 
maintaining a profitable oil palm plantation while trying to appease a sub-set of unhappy 
participants. Their approach was to continue promising large dividends but excluding poor-
performing participants from the incentives and opportunities that had been promised. In 2008, 
15 years after the project was established, only six of the 30 SALCRA participants interviewed 
had received land titles, while 19 had started to receive dividend payments. 
In addition to the obvious concern with delayed issuing of land titles (ultimately the 
responsibility of the Department of Land and Survey), there was also a strong feeling among 
Opar participants that they had been let down by SALCRA and that the agency was not 
delivering on what it had originally promised. Many participants felt that they had had their 
choice removed and had limited ability to negotiate a better deal. Nevertheless, most in the 
community felt somewhat removed from the operations of the Bratak Estate. They were 
increasingly oriented to Bau, Kuching, and even Peninsular Malaysia where household 
members pursued non-farm employment, or to the small lots that had not been contributed to 
the scheme, and so where less troubled by lack of employment in the plantation. In reality, the 
Bratak Estate had turned their NCR land into an asset that generated an additional source of 
cash income to supplement their diversified livelihood portfolios.  
However, the experience of participants in the Selampit case study was more uniformly 
negative. As detailed in Chapter 6, the NCR landowners in Selampit had originally agreed to 
participate in the SALCRA Raya Oil Palm Project. However, the management of the project 
was transferred to LCDA under questionable (certainly opaque) circumstances. The reason for 
the change was not entirely understood by participants and meant that they were no longer part 
of the SALCRA model of development which would have eventually granted them land title 
and, most likely, substantial dividends. Instead, the Selampit landowners were incorporated in 
a large-scale joint venture with LCDA and the private-sector partner RH. As part of this 
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transition, the landowners found that nearly 4,000 hectares of land previously included in the 
original SALCRA Project had been re-gazetted as State Land and was allocated for a second 
joint venture between LCDA, RH, and the Sarawak State Mosque (LAKMNS).  No further 
claim to this land on the part of Selampit residents was entertained. Moreover, the remaining 
two thirds of the land was managed by RH as part of its larger complex with little or no input 
from the landowners or their trustee, LCDA, and with no financial return in the form of 
dividends. The imposition of the joint-venture agreement had left the landowners with little or 
no ability to negotiate a better deal, other than through gradually increasing levels of protest – 
written requests, police reports, blockades, and for the land re-gazetted as State Land, court 
cases. LCDA, the trustee, did little to advocate for the landholders’ rights.  
The power and influence of RH and its pursuit of larger commercial goals has to be taken into 
account as an important element in this story. As documented in Chapter 6, the close political 
and commercial ties between the then Chief Minister, now Governor, Abdul Taib Mahmud, 
and the founder and CEO of RH, Tiong Hiew King, emboldened the company in its oil palm 
expansion plans. Indeed, RH is now a global player in oil palm development, notorious for its 
use of political connections to gain access to agricultural and forest land in various countries. 
Thus, in 2005, the Chief Minister encouraged RH to expand further in Lundu District, in 
response to which it negotiated five so-called “New Joint Venture” projects, four with villages 
just to the north of Selampit. These new projects completely by-passed LCDA and the New 
Concept guidelines, and gave even worse terms to the participating landholders than received 
by Selampit landholders. What was originally planned and promoted as a single 9,000-hectare 
SALCRA project that would confirm and formalise landholders’ title to their NCR land, had 
been reduced to a 5,000-hectare joint venture that was rolled into an 18,000-hectare plantation 
managed as a single commercial entity by RH and its subsidiaries, with no direct input from 
landholders and little effective control or influence by the landholders’ trustee.  
Trends in Employment on the Plantations  
With regard to the employment aspect of the two NCR land development models, both 
SALCRA and LCDA promised employment for members of participating households as a 
major benefit, and this was often stressed in the political campaign to develop NCR land. Yet 
at the time of the research 80 to 90 per cent of the plantation labour was provided by Indonesian 
migrant workers. Interviewees from each village stated that in the plantation development 
phase there was more employment for villagers, but by the late-1990s both agencies were 
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increasingly turning to migrant labour for the majority of plantation tasks, especially for 
harvesting. 
Six of the 30 interviewees in Opar had jobs in the SALCRA Bratak Estate. However, it was 
generally stated that the wages from working in the plantation were not enough to live on (tidak 
cukup makan) and that plantation work was just for the old and uneducated. In the Bau-Lundu 
SALCRA estates as a whole, 33 per cent of participants had total earnings that were below the 
poverty line of MYR 720 in 2008 (Sarawak Development Institute 2009). In Selampit, 19 of 
the 30 households interviewed had family members who worked in an oil palm plantation 
(including eight people who worked at the FELDA plantation on the eastern side of the Kayan 
River). The 19 worked six to seven days a week and earned MYR 300-2,000 a month. Thirteen 
of the 19 earned below the poverty line. Yet, in general, participating landholders, especially 
in Opar, are happy to leave the plantation work to others, knowing that they will receive 
dividends and can deploy their household labour in less demanding and more remunerative 
activities. 
It is clear that the profitability of Sarawak’s oil palm industry, including the plantations on 
NCR land, is heavily reliant on an abundance of cheap and easily managed Indonesian labour. 
However, Indonesian migrant labourers are viewed with distrust and there is little regard for 
their safety or welfare. To ease local concerns and maintain “discipline”, Indonesian labourers 
have few rights and are strictly controlled. As outlined in Chapter 7, they suffer low wages, 
long hours, and difficult conditions. Legal migrants are generally recruited from the distant 
islands of the Indonesian archipelago, passports removed, and movement highly restricted. 
Conditions for illegal workers can vary, from daily movement back-and-forth across the border 
to extremely harsh conditions and the risk of severe punishments. There has been little attempt 
to improve their rights or conditions.  
In 2014, over 500,000 international migrant labourers, mainly young, unskilled, Indonesian 
males, made up the majority of the commercial plantation labour force in Malaysia (Murphy 
2014). However, there has been a persistent shortage of plantation workers in recent years. In 
mid- 2015, it was reported that there was a shortfall of over 59,326 workers in the plantation 
sector in Sarawak, resulting in MYR 2.8 billion in lost revenue (Wong 2016a). The lost revenue 
was due to an estimated 15 per cent of yield reduction due to unharvested fruit rotting on the 
palms (Murphy 2014). The Chief Executive Officer of the Sarawak Oil Palm Plantation 
Owners Association, Sylvester Fong Tshu Kwong, stated that in mid-2016 the Sarawak oil 
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palm industry had only 101,110 of the 160,426 field workers required (Wong 2016a). He 
estimated that to reach Sarawak’s target of two million hectares by 2020, that total would rise 
to 255,143 field workers (Wong 2016a). There are three main reasons for the labour shortfall: 
government policy restricting the number of migrant labourers; increased demand for labourers 
in the Indonesian plantation sector; and migrant labourers being restricted to a five-year visa, 
resulting in a lack of more experienced plantation workers (Murphy 2014). Indonesian 
labourers have also been described as undermining the Malaysian plantation sector by using 
Malaysia as a training ground before returning to work in the Indonesian plantation sector 
(Heng 2016; Wong 2016a). 
The high land development targets for oil palm coupled with these acute labour shortages have 
led the Sarawak Government to look further afield than Indonesia. The former Minister for 
Land Development, James Masing, urged in 2016 that locals be given priority to work in 
Sarawak’s plantations (Heng 2016). However, he went on to state that locals demanded higher 
wages and did not want a 3D job (dirty, difficult, and dangerous) (International Organization 
for Migration 2010; Heng 2016). Instead, the Minister raised an old call for recruiting 
plantation labour from further afield (Heng 2016):  
If we still cannot get locals to work in the plantations, we will then have to look 
into recruiting foreign workers. We are looking into sourcing workers from 
Myanmar, Nepal, Cambodia and Vietnam. Bangladeshis are not suitable to 
work in the plantations, but they are good in the manufacturing sector. 
Calls for increased wages and educational and medical benefits for labourers to encourage both 
local and Indonesians into the industry have been largely dismissed by the private sector, even 
though the Malaysian Palm Oil Board estimated that the plantations are highly profitable 
(Murphy 2014). The Minister’s proposal to source workers from poorer countries appears 
geared towards enabling the private plantation sector to access a new source of abundant, cheap 
labourers rather than focusing on improving wages and conditions. For the foreign labourers 
recruited from further afield there would be higher risk and greater isolation due to the lack of 
any shared culture or language with the surrounding rural communities. Given the limited 
support available for Indonesian labourers, as documented in Chapter 7, workers from further 
abroad would be in an even more precarious situation. 
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Conclusion 
The divergent trajectories of large-scale oil palm development on Native Customary Rights 
land in Sarawak have resulted in mixed outcomes for scheme participants. While these 
outcomes are by no means black and white, they have fallen short of participant expectations. 
The case studies on the managed-smallholder and joint-venture modes have highlighted the 
potential risks of participation, and the limited power participants have to address issues if they 
arise. Furthermore, the continued pressure to develop NCR land has resulted in a push by both 
the plantation sector and the government to pursue new migrant worker streams, an outcome 
that would only serve to place plantation labourers in an increasingly risky life in the palms.  
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9. CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
The oil palm boom in the Asia-Pacific region has raised fundamental questions about how 
semi-subsistence, village-based smallholders occupying customary land can capitalise on the 
boom to improve their livelihoods. This issue is central to debates about rural development in 
the Malaysian state of Sarawak, where the rate of oil palm expansion has been unprecedented 
and large areas with potential for oil palm development are owned or claimed under customary 
tenure or Native Customary Rights (NCR). These debates also reflect a larger and long-
standing argument in development studies over the relative merits of state-led rural 
development (the dominant mode from the 1960s to the 1980s) and private-sector-led rural 
development (the favoured mode in the era of market liberalism since the 1980s). 
The aim of this research was to investigate the processes and livelihood impacts of participation 
in large-scale oil palm development on Native Customary Land in Sarawak. The specific 
objectives were: 
1. Analyse the processes involved in the two main institutional arrangements for large-
scale oil palm development on NCR land – the managed smallholder approach of the 
Sarawak Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority (SALCRA) and the joint-
venture approach of the Land Custody and Development Authority (LCDA). 
2. Assess how participation in these two types of scheme has been experienced by NCR 
landowners and the degree to which the outcomes matched their initial expectations. 
3. Investigate the motivations and experience of Indonesian migrant workers in large-
scale oil palm developments on NCR land.  
The livelihoods framework was used to structure the research to maintain the focus on the 
perspectives and experience of local-level actors, both landholders and plantation workers. The 
livelihoods approach helped to highlight the processes and outcomes of participation, the 
responses of the various actors involved, and how their livelihoods were ultimately affected. 
Within this framework, a case-study approach was chosen, allowing in-depth analysis of how 
scheme participation by landowners and workers was experienced in particular contexts. The 
scale of analysis was a particular oil palm scheme or project. The Bau-Lundu region in south-
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western Sarawak was chosen for the study because there is on-going oil palm expansion with 
examples of all the modes of oil palm development on NCR land, including the two major 
modes considered in the study. As well, the region abutted the Indonesian border, allowing 
various formal and informal migration by Indonesian workers seeking employment on the oil 
palm plantations.  
The two villages selected as case studies were Kampung Opar in SALCRA’s Bratak Oil Palm 
Scheme and Kampung Selampit in the LCDA-brokered PJP-Pelita Lundu Plantation, operated 
by the powerful plantation giant, Rimbunan Hijau (RH), as part of its larger Raya complex. 
Both villages belonged to the Bidayuh ethnic group. Multiple methods were used to develop 
an understanding of these two cases and a cross-case comparison was conducted to deepen 
understanding of the processes and impacts of participation, helping to meet the first two 
research objectives. Indonesian plantation workers were also interviewed in each of the case-
study sites and elsewhere in fulfilment of the third objective. 
There were various limitations to the research. The first was that only two case studies were 
undertaken. Ideally, multiple scheme villages in different contexts (e.g., location, scheme type, 
land-use history) would be studied, as well as villages with independent and assisted 
smallholders. Within each case study, it would have been useful to look more closely at the 
employment of each household member. It was noted during fieldwork that some participants 
had a second house located on the outskirts of the capital, Kuching, which was used as an 
extension of the village-based household. Movement between these residences and forms of 
employment would have affected attitudes to and participation in the oil palm schemes. 
A second limitation was not knowing from the outset that RH had begun to develop its “New 
Joint Venture” rental model in villages neighbouring Selampit. Without explicitly including 
these villages in the study, it was hard to obtain detailed information; some of the key findings 
were based on passing comments made in Selampit. It would also have been helpful to 
investigate how a household deals with having land in multiple types of large-scale 
development, as well as in smallholdings, and to get their assessment of the advantages and 
disadvantages of each mode.  
A third limitation was the limited time spent with Indonesian labourers. The RH plantation was 
located near the Indonesian border. It would have been very useful to study how people used 
the plantation to cross the border and how frequent those crossings were. A further study could 
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involve visiting the home villages of a number of Indonesian workers to assess the impacts of 
labour migration on the other side of the border. Some Indonesian interviewees commented 
that most of the men had left their home village. An increasing number of wives were following 
their husbands to Malaysia, leaving their children with their grandparents or siblings. A study 
of the social and economic impacts on the home village would be very important as this 
phenomenon is likely to increase.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, the research has been able to analyse the processes involved 
in the two main institutional arrangements for large-scale oil palm development on NCR land 
– the managed smallholder approach of the Sarawak Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation 
Authority (SALCRA) and the joint-venture approach of the Land Custody and Development 
Authority (LCDA). Overall, it was found that the institutional processes of SALCRA’s 
managed smallholder scheme had a greater transparency than those of LCDA’s joint-venture 
scheme, which were primarily in the hands of the private-sector partner, Rimbunan Hijau. 
There was a detrimental imbalance of power in favour of the private sector in the large-scale 
joint-venture, one that has left NCR participants with little recourse if the private-sector partner 
failed to uphold its side of the agreement. Furthermore, while the institutional processes in each 
case appeared straightforward, the reality on the ground was far more nuanced and complex, 
with divergent outcomes within and between schemes dependent on actor- and location-
specific characteristics and circumstances.  
Despite the prominence given to these large-scale approaches, they have contributed relatively 
little to the total area of oil palm in Sarawak. By 2016, 40 years after it was established, 
SALCRA had developed 51,000 hectares or just over three per cent of the total planted area, 
while the LCDA-brokered schemes, which were launched 20 years ago, accounted for just over 
five per cent. Independent smallholders accounted for more than these two categories 
combined. Moreover, in terms of how participation was experienced by the NCR landowners 
involved, the research found that the outcomes of participation rarely matched initial 
expectations of the participants in either of the case studies. Instead, participation resulted in a 
limited ability for the majority of NCR landholders to capitalise on the oil palm boom.  
In the case of SALCRA, there was a broad range of outcomes: from some better-situated 
participants accessing employment opportunities, receiving substantial dividends, and 
obtaining formal land titles, to others who had not yet received any financial returns, were still 
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waiting on land titles, and were offered few attractive employment opportunities, even after a 
decade of participation. However, the key benefit of participation in a SALCRA scheme was 
still assured – the eventual receipt of a formal NCR land title in perpetuity.  
In contrast, the outcomes of participation in the LCDA joint-venture scheme implemented by 
Rimbunan Hijau were largely negative. NCR landowners felt deceived, resulting in conflicts, 
blockades, and court cases. The close relationship between senior political figures and the 
private sector partner, Rimbunan Hijau, were especially detrimental to NCR participants in 
Selampit and neighbouring communities. As well as receiving almost no benefits from the joint 
venture, Selampit residents lost rights to nearly 4,000 hectares of land they had previously been 
led to believe was their NCR land. Other communities were locked into poorly scrutinised 
rental agreements of which the supposed trustee, LCDA, was not even aware. The power of 
Rimbunan Hijau was such that various devices were used to acquire and pool the land of several 
communities as cheaply as possible into a large, centrally-controlled commercial plantation, 
managed to maximise the investor’s assets and profits. These findings highlight the significant 
risks for NCR landowners in dealing with the private sector, even when a government agency 
is supposedly taking the role of trustee.   
The research also investigated the motivations and experience of Indonesian migrant workers 
in large-scale oil palm developments on NCR land in Sarawak. They were found to suffer low 
wages, long hours, and difficult conditions. Legal migrants were preferentially recruited from 
the distant islands of the Indonesian archipelago, passports removed, and movement highly 
restricted. Conditions for illegal workers varied, from daily movement back and forth across 
the international border, to extremely harsh conditions in plantation barracks with the risk of 
severe punishment. In the case of the SALCRA scheme, government regulations for foreign 
labourers were followed. However, in the Rimbunan Hijau plantation there was a wide range 
of both legal and illegal agreements. This finding again highlights the differential risk for 
participants, in this case migrant labourers, between public- and private-sector schemes.  
The unprecedented rate of oil palm expansion in Sarawak, coupled with ambitious land 
development targets and the tenuous nature of customary land rights, are placing increasing 
pressure on NCR landowners to participate in large-scale oil palm projects. Add to this the 
“back-room” agreements between key political figures and their private-sector allies in 
Sarawak’s entrenched system of patron-client politics, and NCR landowners are exposed to an 
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even greater risk of exposure to unequal land agreements. In addition, given the increasingly 
remote location of these oil palm plantations and the rise of private-sector control, there are 
also increased risks for the foreign migrant labourers who live within these estates. While this 
research examined just one small corner of south-west Sarawak, it revealed processes that are 
occurring throughout Sarawak. Moreover, multinational conglomerates like Rimbunan Hijau 
are pushing these same methods to develop vast tracts of customary land in tropical countries 
around the world which often have even less capacity to resist. It is thus essential to continually 
monitor and evaluate how customary land is being developed and how migrant labourers are 
being employed, both in Malaysia and globally, if large-scale agricultural projects are indeed 
to be a catalyst of rural development and a genuine way to improve rural livelihoods. 
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Appendix A Interview 1: Community Leader  
Time of interview: 
Start:  
Finish: 
Nama:      
Age:  
Group: 
Longhouse/ Village Name: 
a. Village/ longhouse information 
1. How long have you been in this position? 
2. How many households/ people are in your village?  
b. Oil Palm 
1. How and when did you find out about the scheme/ decide to plant oil palm? 
2. Did the community all agree with the development? 
3. What was the village like before the oil palm plantations?  
4. How have things changed in your village since oil palm development?  
5. Do you have regular contact with the scheme?  
To household interview 
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Appendix B Interview 2: Household  
Date:   
Village: Interview #: 
Interview start:   
Finish: 
Participants’ details  
Name:  
Age: 
Cultural group:  
Birth village: 
Present village: 
Household Head:  
Religion:  
Marital Y / N - spouse’s group/village:  
Household members 
How many people live in this house?  
How many children do you have? (List after household if living elsewhere) 
________________________________________________________________ 
First Name M/F Position Age Education Employment Location Freq. return 
  Head      
        
        
        
 
c. Household land 
How much land does this household own? (acres/ha)  
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How is this land being used? 
Land use acre/ha Comments 
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
How much land is with SALCRA/ LCDA/ FELCRA? (acres/ha) 
Was your land surveyed?  
Do you have a map of your land?  
Do you still know where your land is/ visit it?  
What year/phase was it planted? 
What was this land being used for before it was planted with oil palm?  
How did you learn about SALCRA/ FELCRA/ LCDA/ KBT?  
Why did you join SALCRA/ FELCRA/ LCDA/ KBT?  
How long will your land be with SALCRA/ FELCRA/ LCDA?  
Will you receive a land title?  
If no, why not?  
Have you received dividends Y / N  
What year did they start?   
How much did you receive last payment? 
How much did you receive last year? 
If no, why not?  
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Additional comments: Do any of your family work for SACLRA/ LCDA/ FELCRA now 
Have any of your family ever worked for SACLRA/ LCDA/ FELCRA?  
Have you received all the benefits that SALCRA/ LCDA/FELCRA promised?  
What has SALCRA/ FELCRA / LCDA done for this village?  
How do you feel about the Indonesian workers?  
In what ways has life in this village changed since the oil palm plantation?  
Do people still follow the old beliefs (i.e. osok sumuk babai)?  
 How has the environment changed since SALCRA/ LCDA/ FELCRA came?  
 Is there anything good or bad about SALCRA/ LCDA/ FELCRA?  
Household income 
What jobs are important for your household? 
Source of income Y/N What now  
1,2,3 
before  
1,2,3 
Comments 
 
Padi       
Pepper      
Rubber      
Rattan      
Fruit trees      
Vegetables      
Livestock       
Forest products      
Oil palm wages       
Dividends oil palm      
Work on other farms      
Kerja Kontrak      
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Non-farm wages      
        
Business       
      
Pension      
Transport      
Remittances      
Other      
 
For those who work in the oil palm plantation, what type of work do they do and how much do 
they earn?  
 
Name M/F Age Work Days / 
week 
Rate of pay 
(daily, 
contract etc 
Income/ month 
 
       
       
       
       
       
 
i. Who do they work with in the plantation?  ii. Do they work on their own land? 
- Family - Same village  - Different village - Indonesians - Other  
Do they work on their own crops after they finish in plantation each day?  
Farming 
Does this household still do farming activities? Y/ N  
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What farming activities did this household undertake in the past year? 
Activity Y/N Amount/ 
day 
Amount/ 
year 
Price Income/ own 
use 
Comments 
Padi       
Rubber       
Pepper       
Vegetables       
Fruit trees:       
-       
-       
Oil palm       
 
 Who works on your crops: Yourself   Family     Neighbours    Indonesians    Other  
How often do they work?  
How much do you pay them?  
Do you use fertiliser, herbicide or pesticides? 
Baja/ Racun For what? Brand Cost Where 
buy 
Freq. app 
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Do you have any animals that you keep or sell? Y / N 
 
 
Animal Animals No. sold in 
past year 
Total income/ 
own use 
Comments/details 
Mature Imm. 
Pigs      
Chickens      
Cattle      
Ducks      
      
Fishpond Area:    
 
Forest and fishing activities 
1. Did members of this household undertake any forest activities in the past year?  Y / N 
Activity 
 
Times / 
month 
Amount / 
month 
Sell/ own use Income / 
month 
Comments 
      
      
2. Do you use local medicinal plants from the forest?  
3. What changes have occurred in the availability of forest produce since the oil palm 
plantation? Why? 
 
 
4. Did members of this household engage in fishing in the past year? Y / N 
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Type of fishing Times/ month Amount/ 
month 
Sold/ own use Income / month 
     
     
     
     
 
5. What changes have occurred in the availability of fish in the rivers since the oil palm 
plantation? Why? 
6. Do you collect/ buy food from the plantation?  
7. What type of animals are in the plantation?  
8. Do you hunt in the plantation (what, how)?   
Non-farm activities 
What type of non-farm jobs or businesses do people in this house do?  
Name Work Days / 
week 
Months 
/ year 
Rate of pay 
 
Income / 
month 
Location 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
Do you/ they employ other people in your business?  
Additional comments:  
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e. Labour migration 
Have you ever lived away from the village (why, when, where)  
Are any members of this household living/ working outside of the village?  Y / N 
Who M/F Age Reason for absence 
(work, marriage, study) 
Where How 
long 
Freq. 
return 
       
       
       
       
Do any member of your family live outside the village?  
Do any of the people that work have young children? Y / N If so, who looks after them? 
Who Age child Minder Length time Paid? 
     
     
     
     
Do you think your children/ grandchildren will continue to live in the village when they are 
older?  
Is life in the village hard or easy?  
How does life in the city compare to life in the village, is one harder or easier?   
Why do people leave the village?  
 
Additional comments: 
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Appendix C Interview 3: Plantation Manager  
Date:   
 Start:  
Finish:  
Scheme       
Plantation  
Name  
Group 
Length of time employed:  
Previous position: 
a. Plantation details: 
1. What is the total land size?  
2. What is the present planted area?  
3. How many plots/ phases are there?  
4. What is the average yield?  
5. Do you plan to still expand the plantation?  
b. Land details: 
1. What is the area of State land?  
2. What is the area of NCR land?  
3. How many landholders are participating?  
4. How many have received land title?  
5. How many have received dividends?  
6. Do participants keep land titles or do you store them here? 
7. Can a participant receive dividends before they receive land title?  
8. If with scheme, do participants get a copy or see their land titles?  
9. What infrastructure/ support have you given to participating villages? 
c. Workers details: 
1. How many workers are on this plantation?  
2. How many workers are: 
a. Local:    M   F 
b. Non-local:   M   F 
3. Do locals like to work on their own land?  
4. Do they work with family, neighbours, Indonesians?  
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5. What types of positions are there on the plantation? 
Position Workers Origin Wage Position entails 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
6. Where do the non-local workers come from? Why?  
7. How do you recruit them?  
8. What does the scheme pay, and what do the TKI pay themselves?  
9. Do they get passports?  
10. Where are they stored  
11. Where is their housing?  
12. How long are contracts?  
13. Do they ever leave the plantation before their contract ends?  
14. How do you encourage them to stay?  
15. How do the locals get along with the Indonesia workers?  
16. How are the local workers?  
d. Crop protection: 
1. Do you have any problems with theft on the plantation 
2. Do you have any problems with fruit transportation?  
3. Do you have problems with pests in the plantation?  
4. How do you control them?  
Baja/ Racun For what? Brand Frequency 
applied 
Quantity 
applied 
Problem 
with theft 
      
      
 
Additional comments 
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Appendix D Interview 4: Indonesian Plantation Labourer  
Date:  Interview #:  
Time of interview:     
Start:  
Finish:   
a. Personal details 
1.   Name:  
2.   Gender:  
3.   Age:  
4.   Cultural group:  
5.   Religion:  
6.   Home village:  
7.   Education: 
8.   Marital status:  
9. Spouse’s location:  
10. Do you have children? Y  N. If so, where are they?  
a. Household Information 
1. Can you tell me about the other members of your household? 
First 
Name 
M/F Relationship Age Education Employment Live 
outside 
village 
Y/N 
Work 
outside 
village 
Y/N 
Location 
 
  Head       
         
         
         
         
         
         
b. Employment information: 
1. How long have you been working here?  
2. Is this your first job in Malaysia?  
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3. Why did you decide to come to Sarawak?  
4. Why did you start plantation work?  
5. Method of arrival in plantation (how, broker, transport, costs):  
6. Did you have to borrow money to come? (who, amount, interest)  
7. Do you have a passport? If so where is it?  
8. Did you know where you were coming to before you arrived in Sarawak?  
9. Position:  
10. Wage:  
11. Hours worked:  
12. Origin co-workers (Indonesian, same village?):  
13. Do you know Indonesians on other estates or have family in Sarawak?  
14. Plantation support:  
15. Do you have time off? Y / N. If so, what do you do?  
16.  Do you work for local farmers or businesses as well? Who? When? Wages?  
17. Have you worked on other plantations in Malaysia? How do conditions here compare to 
other plantations?  
18. How do conditions in oil palm compare to other jobs?  
19. Previous employment:  
Job Location Position Length of time Wage 
     
     
     
     
 
1. What are 3 things that are good about working in the plantations? 
2. What are 3 things difficult about working in the plantation? 
c. Living arrangements 
1. How much is your accommodation?   
2. How many people stay in it?  
3. Where do you buy your food from?  
4. Do you have a ‘tab’ with that shop? How much is it now?  
5. Do you collect any food from the plantation/ forest?  
6. Do you have contact with the people in the village?  
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7. Have you travelled around Sarawak, e.g. to Kuching?  
8. Can you get a ‘surat jalan’ to go to town?  
9. How often do you return home?  
10. How often do you contact home?  
11. Do you send money/goods home?  
Additional comments 
 
 
212 
 
Appendix E Sources for Table 6 
Table 14 List of data sources for information supplied in Table 6, p.95, for the private sector partners involved in NCR joint venture projects in 2007. 
Region JVC plantation company name, 2007 
(Sdn. Bhd.) 
Source 
Southern 
1 PJP PELITA Lundu  Personal communication, Selampit 2008 
2-3 KTS PELITA Simunjan  
- http://www.theborneopost.com/2014/07/12/villagers-reap-reward-of-joint-venture-project-with-kts-PELITA/   
- http://thebrokenshield.blogspot.com.au/2009/12/ncr-land-owners-biggest-dilemma.html 
4-6 Tetangga Akrab PELITA Pantu  
- Cramb, R. A. (2013). A Malaysian Land Grab? The Political Economy of Large-scale Oil Palm Development 
in Sarawak. LDPI Working Paper 50, The Land Deal Politics Initiative: 45.   
- https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/89041  
- http://thebrokenshield.blogspot.com.au/2009/12/ncr-land-owners-biggest-dilemma.html 
7-9 Harn Len PELITA Bengunan  
- http://www.harnlen.com.my/profile.html 
- http://www.thestar.com.my/news/community/2014/03/05/harn-len-PELITA-bengunan-raises-production-of-
ffbs/ 
- http://m.thestar.com.my/story.aspx?hl=Two+natives+lose+NCR+land+case+against+plantation+firm&sec=me
tro&id=%7BAF56EED5-3B3F-41C7-B4D8-D111EDF621EC%7D 
10 FC PELITA Undop  No information found 
11 TH PELITA Beladin  
- http://www.pro-regenwald.de/docs/sarawakncrlanddisputecases.pdf 
- http://www.thestar.com.my/news/community/2013/08/24/high-court-strikes-out-writ-of-summons-against-
plantation-firms-over-ncr-land-disputes/ 
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- http://www.thestar.com.my/news/community/2013/08/24/high-court-strikes-out-writ-of-summons-against-
plantation-firms-over-ncr-land-disputes/#rFrxzVUOCjg1tPb5.99” 
12 A & M PELITA Bebak  No information found 
13 Kabo Awek Betong No information found 
Central 
14 SPB Wak Pakan Plantation             - http://spb.listedcompany.com/misc/ar2009.pdf 
15 Block A PELITA Kanowit No information found 
16-17 Boustead PELITA Kanowit 
- http://www.theborneopost.com/2012/07/21/ncr-land-owners-of-joint-venture-get-land-back/ 
- http://www.theborneopost.com/2014/08/07/appeal-court-affirms-legality-of-ncr-land-devt-scheme/  
- http://www.taann.com.my/wp-content/themes/starkers-master/images/Outline_%20Of_History_Ta_Ann.pdf 
18 
Palmraya PELITA Spapa Oya (Spapa Oya 
– Dalat) 
- http://soppoa.org.my/membership/our-members 
- http://ibgv.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2015-Mafrica-Jobenar-Raya-Estate.pdf 
- http://www.jayatiasa.net/usr/pagesub.aspx?pgid=45   
19 Palmraya PELITA Sikat Plantation 
- Cramb, R. A. (2013). A Malaysian Land Grab? The Political Economy of Large-scale Oil Palm Development 
in Sarawak. LDPI Working Paper 50, The Land Deal Politics Initiative: 45.   
- http://spb.listedcompany.com/misc/ar2009.pdf 
20 PJP PELITA Selangau Plantation  No information found 
21 Palmraya PELITA Meruan 
- http://soppoa.org.my/membership/our-members 
- Cramb, R. A. (2013). A Malaysian Land Grab? The Political Economy of Large-scale Oil Palm Development 
in Sarawak. LDPI Working Paper 50, The Land Deal Politics Initiative: 45.   
22 SPB PELITA Mukah 
- http://www.spbgroup.com.my/jva.htm 
- http://spb.listedcompany.com/misc/ar2009.pdf 
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23 
Kwantas PELITA Plantation (Balingian) 
Ulu Balingian (Block A& B 20,613) 
- http://www.kwantas.com.my/p_oil.aspx 
No information found 
Northern 
24-25 Ta Ann PELITA Silas  
- http://www.taann.com.my/wp-content/themes/starkersmaster/images/Outline_%20Of_History_Ta_Ann.pdf 
- (Colchester, Pang et al. 2007) 
26 DD PELITA Sebungan  
- Cramb, R. A. (2013). A Malaysian Land Grab? The Political Economy of Large-scale Oil Palm Development 
in Sarawak. LDPI Working Paper 50, The Land Deal Politics Initiative: 45.   
27 SPB PELITA Suai (Formerly known as 
Titian Tepat Sdn. Bhd.). 
- https://hornbillunleashed.wordpress.com/2013/09/20/50330/ 
28 SOP PELITA Bekenu & Niah 
- http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2015/03/25/longhouse-dwellers-in-land-dispute-being-
harassed/ 
- http://disclosure.bursamalaysia.com/FileAccess/apbursaweb/download/?name=EA_FR_Attachments&id=125
573 
29 SOP PELITA Kedayan-Kelulit  
- http://disclosure.bursamalaysia.com/FileAccess/apbursaweb/download/?name=EA_FR_Attachments&id=125
573 
30 PJP PELITA Ulu Teru 
- Rimbunan Sawit Berhad (2011). Circular to shareholders Sibu, Rimbunan Sawit Berhad: 132. 
- (Songan and Sindang 2000) 
31 PJP PELITA Long Ekang-Banyok  
- Rimbunan Sawit Berhad (2016). "Our Business: Plantation." Retrieved 24 July 2016, from 
http://www.rsb.com.my/plantation.html. 
 
 
Appendix F Area statements (ha) for PJP PELITA Lundu and PJP PELITA Biawak 
Table 15 Area statements (ha) for the LCDA-Rimbunan Hijau Joint Ventures in Lundu, July 2008. PJP PELITA 
Lundu has a total of 7354 ha, and PJP PELITA Biawak has a total of 3933 ha. Note the size of “unsurrendered 
land” in the Lundu Plantation (3039.1 ha), and the “Disputed Area” in the Biawak Plantation (944.15 ha). Data 
adapted from (Silalahi 2008, Suden 2008) 
PJP PELITA Lundu- NCR land 
Matured area Phase Year planted Area (ha) 
 
Phase 1 1995 267.56 
 
Phase 2 1995/1996 554.84 
 
Phase 3 2000/2001 1554.51 
 
Phase 4 2002/2003 866.84 
 
Phase 5 2000/2001 391.3 
 
Phase 7 2003/2004 540.7 
Total mature planted area 
  
4175.75 
Immature area Phase 4A 2005 56.53 
Total planted area 
  
4232.28 
Land under preparation 
  
0 
Total planted area 
  
4232.28 
Unsurrendered land 
  
3039.1 
Building site 
  
30 
Nursery site 
  
33.62 
Road & Reserves 
  
19 
Lundu Grand Total 
  
7354 
PJP PELITA Biawak- State land 
Matured area Phase Year planted Area (ha) 
 
Phase 1KA 2000 452.7 
 
Phase 1KB 2001 273.4 
 
Phase 2K 2000/2001 652.05 
 
Phase 3KA 2001 618.2 
 
Phase 3KB 2002/2003 200.7 
 
Phase 4K 2002 604.5 
 
Phase 5K 2004 71.15 
Total mature planted area 
  
2872.7 
Immature area 
  
0 
Land under preparation 
  
29.64 
Road & Rivers 
  
13.11 
 216 
Buffer zone 
  
9.4 
Unplantable 
  
64 
Disputed area 
  
944.15 
Biawak Grand Total 
  
3933 
Combined total planted area  7104.98 
Combined total area  11,287 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
